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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the cognitive processes of social learning 
from the bottom up. In the field of comparative psychology, an overemphasis 
on understanding complex cognitive processes in nonhuman animals (e.g. 
empathy, imitation), may be detrimental to the study of simpler mechanisms. 
In this thesis, I report five studies of simple cognitive processes related to social 
learning. A series of experiments with human children and capuchin monkeys 
(Sapajus sp.), examined action imitation and identified a possible role for 
associative learning in the development of this ability. An analysis of 
observational data from captive capuchins explored a number of lesser-studied 
social learning phenomena, including behavioural synchrony, the neighbour 
effect, and group-size effects. The results of this study emphasise the 
importance of exploring behaviour at a number of levels to appreciate the 
dynamic nature of social influence. Two final experiments examined social 
contagion in capuchin monkeys, and highlight the importance of describing the 
relationship between behaviour and emotion to properly understand more 
complex social cognition. Together, these studies demonstrate how 
approaching human and nonhuman behaviour from the bottom up, as well as 
from the top down, can contribute to a better comparative science of social 
learning. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
Social learning occurs when the behaviour of an animal is influenced by the 
behaviour, the results of behaviour, or the presence of another animal (adapted 
from Heyes, 1994). Evidence of social learning has been reported in a panoply 
of taxa. Wild populations of chimpanzees display socially learned behavioural 
traditions (Whiten et al., 1999), while sticklebacks learn about foraging locations 
from conspecifics (van Bergen, Coolen, & Laland, 2004). Female fruit flies use 
social cues to decide on the best substrate for egg-laying (Sarin & Dukas, 2009), 
and humans are so reliant on learning from other humans that some believe our 
superior social learning skills could be a key factor in the evolution of our large 
brains (Whiten & van Schaik, 2007).  
 
While it is unsurprising that social animals use social information in adaptive 
ways, the diversity of social learning throughout the animal kingdom leaves us 
questioning whether all social learning is equal. Common-sense (as well as 
empirical studies) tells us that human cognition is vastly different from that of a 
fly, encouraging us to categorise a spectrum of processes that range from 
cognitively simple to complex. Social learning in invertebrates will be of a 
simple kind, reliant on processes of associative learning known to be 
taxonomically widespread in both vertebrates (Macphail, 1982) and 
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invertebrates (McConnell, 1966), while primate social learning will often 
require more complex cognitive processes (Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & 
Marshall-Pescini, 2004). In the field of comparative psychology, the human 
mind is often considered a yardstick against which to compare the minds of our 
closest evolutionary relatives, particularly other primates (for a discussion see 
Barrett, Henzi, & Rendall, 2007; Heyes, 2012a). This a priori assumption 
regarding the complexity of processes that determine human behaviour ignores 
the many cognitive parallels humans and other animals share. Simple processes 
are likely to regulate many socially influenced behaviours in humans and in 
other primates, but often this line of research is ignored. In the course of this 
thesis I will consider the importance of so-called “simple” mechanisms of social 
learning and examine their role in primate behaviour. By highlighting the 
importance of these simple mechanisms and the role of associative processes in 
social learning, we can enrich our understanding of how animals, both human 
and nonhuman, learn from each other. 
 
Differentiating the mechanisms of social learning 
The definition of social learning provided in the opening line is not 
controversial, appearing often in texts covering the topic (e.g. Hoppitt & 
Laland, 2013; van de Waal, Claidière, & Whiten, 2013). However, when it comes 
to specific mechanisms of social learning, historically there has been little 
3 
 
consensus over the meaning of exact terms. For example, Byrne and Russon 
(1998) describe a hierarchical approach to imitation. Under their paradigm 
imitation occurs at the level of unique actions but also at the level of action-
sequences. Alternatively, Voelkl and Huber (2000) describe “true imitation” 
occuring when an animal is biased toward the use of a particular action (i.e. the 
use of a particular bodypart to perform an action) after observing the same 
action performed by a demonstrator. In the following section I will define many 
of the commonly studied mechanisms of social learning, but this list will not be 
exhaustive (for a summary of the history of social learning mechanisms see 
Hoppitt & Laland, 2013). Instead, this introduction to the terminology of social 
learning research will act as a basis on which to highlight some important 
limitations of a comparative psychology of social learning.  
 
The scope of social learning research is vast. A wide range of social learning 
mechanisms have been described over the last few decades (Galef, 1988; Heyes, 
1994; Hoppitt & Laland, 2008a; Whiten & Ham, 1992), and researchers are 
beginning to understand the complexity inherent in teasing these mechanisms 
apart, both theoretically and operationally. In previous literature, a distinction 
has sometimes been made between mechanisms of social learning and social 
influence (Whiten & Ham, 1992; Whiten, 2000). Social learning is thought to 
take place when an observer learns something new about their environment 
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through the observation of a conspecific (Whiten, 2000). For example, while 
standing in my living room I might learn that it is cold outside by observing 
people through my window wearing winter coats. Examples of social influence 
on the other hand occur when an animal’s behaviour is altered by observing 
another individual, but nothing new about the environment is learned (Whiten, 
2000); e.g. observing a friend pass by my window might influence me to leave 
my house to talk to them, but I may not learn anything new about my 
environment by doing so. Importantly, although nothing is learned directly 
through mechanisms of social influence, indirect learning can take place 
(Heyes, 1994; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013). For example, after leaving my house to 
talk to a friend (social influence) I may learn that it is cold outside. Examples of 
social learning and social influence are often examined together as “social 
leaning mechanisms” (Heyes, 1994; Hoppitt & Laland, 2008a, 2013) and will be 
treated as such here. However, three further distinctions are made.  Social 
learning can take place when an individual is influenced by:  
 
a) The behaviour of another,  
b) The results or products of another’s behaviour, and 
c) The presence of another individual or group of individuals. 
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In other reviews similar distinctions have been made between learning from a 
behaviour itself and the products of behaviour (Call & Carpenter, 2002; Heyes, 
1993). Here, a further distinction is made for the effect of presence.  
 
Learning from behaviour 
When learning from behaviour, the motor action of an individual influences the 
performance of the same motor action from an observer. A monkey might learn 
how to use her hand to pry off the lid of a canister (Voelkl & Huber, 2000), or a 
pigeon might learn to step on a treadle for a food reward rather than pecking 
(Zentall, Sutton, & Sherburne, 1996). An animal might be prompted to perform 
a yawn or a scratch, solely by observing another exhibit the same motor action 
(Feneran et al., 2013; Paukner & Anderson, 2006). In these cases, an animal 
changes its behaviour because of the action it observes, not because of the effect 
that action had on some element of the environment. In the following brief 
summary of how animals learn from behaviour, two mechanisms will be 
covered: Imitation and contagion.  
 
Imitation 
While imitation is the most studied mechanism of social learning, its definition 
is not universally agreed (for example Galef, 2013; Zentall, 2012). At its most 
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complex, imitation is defined as the ability of an animal to learn how to 
perform an action previously not present in its behavioural repertoire after 
seeing the action being performed by another individual (Byrne, 2002b). The 
intrinsic difficulty in determining whether any observed behaviour is truly 
novel has been widely discussed (Caldwell & Whiten, 2002; Zentall, 2012), and 
some have argued that a novel sequence of actions may better describe 
imitative learning (Byrne & Russon, 1998;  Whiten, 1998). In contrast, others 
have suggested that action matching without understanding the intentions or 
goals of the individual being imitated is not “true imitation” (Tomasello & Call, 
1997; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). For others, matching the 
topographical features of an action is sufficient (Heyes, 1994; van de Waal & 
Whiten, 2012; Voelkl & Huber, 2000). While it could be argued that the study of 
imitation has been muddied by such conceptual discrepancies, vigorous debate 
over the classification of imitation has encouraged researchers to seriously 
consider the cognitive mechanisms that may underlie the copying of an action. 
Due to the difficulties in evaluating the novelty of an action or identifying 
whether an imitator understands the intentions of the individual being 
imitated, the use of imitation here refers to the matching of topographical 
features of an action  (e.g. van de Waal & Whiten, 2012; Voelkl & Huber, 2007).  
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Action imitation is thought to be particularly demanding in cognitive terms due 
to the “correspondence problem”. The correspondence problem was described 
by Nehaniv and Dautenhahn (2002) as the difficulty faced by an observer in 
recreating an action that perceptually, cognitively, or motivationally 
corresponds to the actions of the model. If a dog is to imitate a human for 
example, how can she recreate an action performed by a human’s hand when 
her own hand (or paw) is nether functionally or perceptually similar? This 
correspondence problem is also present when imitation occurs within a species. 
When a human observes the actions of another, the perceptual input gleaned 
from this observation rarely maps directly to the perceptual experience of the 
action performed by the self. For example, when learning a musical instrument 
the learner often sits facing the teacher, both holding an instrument. If the 
teacher asked the student to make a chord-shape solely by observing the 
teacher’s actions it would be impossible to transpose the shape purely through 
the matching of visual input. Both visual representations are presented in 
Figure 1.1 from the perspective of the student (A – looking at a teacher’s hand, 
B – looking at one’s own hand). Considering the gestalt it is clear that the visual 
representations are different, but it is useful to draw attention to specific 
features. When observing the finger positions of the teacher (Figure 1.1-A) the 
entire chord-shape is situated at the bottom of the visual field with respect to 
the guitar neck; open strings on the guitar neck are nearer the top of the visual 
field. When observing one’s own performance of the same shape (Figure 1.1-B) 
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the fingers are closer to the top of the visual field with open strings at the 
bottom. When considering individual finger placement, the teacher’s ring-
finger is positioned closest to the left-most edge of the visual field (see Figure 
1.1.A-I), but the student’s ring-finger is observed closer to the right-side of the 
visual field (see Figure 1.1.B–II). This example is extreme, but this 
correspondence problem is common when the topographical features of an 
action are to be matched. While it is unclear how this correspondence effect is 
overcome, some have suggested that the mirror neuron system, first identified 
in macaques in the 90s (see Chapter 2; di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & 
Rizzolatti, 1992; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996) might solve this 
problem and help bridge the correspondence gap. However, the cognitive 
processes required to convert an observed action into a corresponding motor 
response continue to puzzle psychologists.  
 
Imitation has been studied in a number of species with varying results. One 
method of identifying imitation is through a two-action task. These studies 
incorporate an apparatus that can be operated in two different ways (e.g. a door 
that can be opened by pushing or pulling). One method is demonstrated to an 
observer by a model (e.g. the door is pushed open), and if observers tend to 
perform the same actions that they saw demonstrated, imitation is said to have 
occurred.  
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Figure 1.1. A representation of the visual perception of the motor action 
necessary to create the D-major chord on a guitar from the perspective of a 
student observing A) a teacher facing the student, and B) the student’s own 
fingers on the neck of a guitar.  
 
While the two-action method has been hugely successful in identifying 
evidence of social learning in animals (Dawson & Foss, 1965; Dindo, Whiten, & 
de Waal, 2009; Heyes & Dawson, 1990; Price & Caldwell, 2007; van de Waal et 
A) 
B) 
I 
Il 
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al., 2013), it has been argued that many of these tasks do not sufficiently 
demonstrate action imitation as other social learning processes may account for 
the copying of actions (Heyes & Ray, 2000). For example, in some cases social 
learning may occur through object-movement re-enactment or emulation 
learning, both of which will be discussed later in greater detail. 
 
More recently, researchers have adapted the two-action paradigm to account 
for this criticism. Instead of presenting subjects with an apparatus that can be 
operated in two different ways, researchers train model animals to interact with 
an apparatus using two different body parts (van de Waal & Whiten, 2012; 
Voelkl & Huber, 2000, 2007). If an apparatus can be opened using either hand 
actions or mouth action, then an individual who copies the action observed can 
be said to have imitated. Studies using this method have identified action 
imitation in Apes, New World, and Old World monkeys (Buttelmann, 
Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; van de Waal & Whiten, 2012; Voelkl & 
Huber, 2000, 2007), as well as some species of birds (Akins & Zentall, 1996; 
Zentall et al., 1996).  
  
Another method of identifying imitation of actions is through the Do-As-I-Do 
paradigm. This procedure requires an experimenter to first train an animal to 
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perform a number of actions on command. Subsequently, the trainer performs 
one of the trained actions, says “do this”, and rewards an animal only if it 
performs the same action. This training procedure of action shaping and 
positively reinforced copying is repeated for a number of actions, and finally 
some novel untrained actions are introduced. An experimenter performs an 
untrained action and says “do this”. The question is whether animals have 
learned to use this rule as a cue to imitate. If the animal copies a novel action, 
evidence of imitation has been found. This method has successfully identified 
imitative capacity in enculturated chimpanzees, orangutans, and dogs (Call, 
2001; Custance, Whiten, & Bard, 1995; Topál, Byrne, Miklósi, & Csányi, 2006), 
but not capuchin monkeys (Fragaszy, Deputte, Cooper, Colbert-White, & 
Hémery, 2011). The incorporation of controlled and standardised procedures in 
the “Do-as-I-do” paradigm and two-action method have added empirical 
validity to less controlled examples of imitative behaviour in apes (Hayes & 
Hayes, 1952; Russon & Galdikas, 1993), and form the best available evidence of 
imitation in nonhuman animals.    
 
Due to the correspondence problem, imitation is considered more cognitively 
demanding than other social learning mechanisms (Whiten, 2000), and 
conclusive identification of imitative learning in an experimental paradigm 
must rule out the possibilities of other simpler mechanisms giving rise to the 
12 
 
observed effect (Zentall, 2012). For example, after observing a conspecific 
cracking nuts with a nearby rock, a capuchin monkey might approach the 
conspecific and shortly afterwards, begin cracking nuts. A human observer 
recording this event might conclude that a monkey learned to imitate nut 
cracking behaviour. However, it could also be argued that the mechanism 
leading to the performance of the behaviour was local enhancement; the 
monkey was merely attracted to the site through the presence of the individual 
at the location, and the nut cracking behaviour was acquired through 
individual, trial-and-error learning (Heyes, Ray, Mitchell, & Nokes, 2000). 
Other mechanisms that could confound the study of imitative ability include 
stimulus enhancement (i.e. the animal is attracted to a specific object or 
stimulus type), affordance learning (i.e. the animal learns about the physical 
properties of an object), goal emulation (i.e. learning through observation of 
possible goals that can be achieved), and response facilitation (i.e. a behaviour 
already in an individual’s repertoire is primed by observing the same 
behaviour being performed). In the past, the primary goal of social learning 
research was to isolate cases of imitation by using certain apparatus that 
prevents other non-imitative interpretations (e.g. the two-action method, see 
Dawson & Foss, 1965; or the ghost-apparatus, see Hopper, 2010), however, 
more recently there is a trend to examine other social learning mechanisms for 
their own sake. 
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It is encouraging that over the last decade promising steps have been made to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of social learning in nonhuman 
animals, examining numerous mechanisms (Amici, Aureli, & Call, 2013; 
Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Hoppitt, Blackburn, & Laland, 2007; Matthews, 
Paukner, & Suomi, 2010; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009), throughout a range of 
taxa (e.g. Bombus terrestris, Dawson, Avarguès-Weber, Chittka, & Leadbeater, 
2013; Drosophila melanogaster, Sarin & Dukas, 2009; Toxotes jaculatrix, Schuster, 
Wöhl, Griebsch, & Klostermeier, 2006; Homo sapien and Pan troglodytes, Whiten, 
McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). A thorough examination of 
simple mechanisms is crucial to the development of a comprehensive science of 
social learning in animals, and while it is recognised that a broad range of 
mechanisms play a role in social leaning (Caldwell & Whiten, 2002; Hoppitt & 
Laland, 2008a; Zentall, 2006), differentiating between mechanisms is different 
from understanding them (Galef, 2013). While convincing demonstrations of 
true imitation in nonhumans are rare, extensive evidence of other ways through 
which animals are influenced by the actions of conspecifics has been identified 
in a range of species. 
 
Social contagion 
Social contagion is defined as the “spread of affect, attitude, or behaviour from 
individual A (the initiator) to individual B (the recipient), where the recipient 
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does not perceive an intentional influence attempt on the part of the initiator’’ 
(p 266, Levy & Nail, 1993). Social contagion is an umbrella term for a number of 
different mechanisms, covering the transfer of emotional or motivational state 
(e.g. fear, hunger), specific behaviours (e.g. yawning, scratching), or 
behavioural states (e.g. play, locomotion). A number of specific terms have 
been used to describe the social transmission of these various states, namely, 
response facilitation, behavioural contagion, and emotional contagion (Hoppitt 
& Laland, 2008). Response facilitation has been defined as the instances where 
“the presence of a demonstrator performing an act (often resulting in reward) 
increases the probability of an animal which sees it doing the same” (p. 237, 
Byrne, 1994). Behavioural contagion has been described as a subset of response 
facilitation where a class of behaviours are transmitted rather than one specific 
behaviour, and the socially induced behavioural response is instinctual, 
released without prior conditioned learning (Hoppitt & Laland, 2008; 2013). 
While this distinction clearly outlines specific cases under which certain 
terminology should be used, the study of socially transmitted behaviours of 
this kind rarely differentiates between learned or innate response facilitation, 
and in any case, this distinction is largely trivial. In most cases the prior 
experience of an animal is unknown and it is impossible to identify whether the 
socially transmitted behaviour is due to a learned or innate process. Therefore, 
it has been argued that without detailed knowledge of an animal’s 
development, observations of behavioural transfer should be classified as 
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response facilitation rather than behavioural contagion (Amici et al., 2013; 
Hoppitt & Laland, 2008). However, this semantic distinction is rarely 
recognised. For example, it is well documented that the presence of another 
individual yawning increases the probability that an observer will yawn 
within-species (Anderson, 2010; Norscia & Palagi, 2011; Palagi, Leone, Mancini, 
& Ferrari, 2009; Platek, Critton, Myers, & Gallup, 2003), and between species 
(Harr, Gilbert, & Phillips, 2009; O’Hara & Reeve, 2011; Silva, Bessa, & de Sousa, 
2012), and while this effect is almost ubiquitously referred to as behavioural 
contagion (e.g. Anderson, 2010; Platek et al., 2003), there is evidence that yawn 
contagion is not present from birth (Millen & Anderson, 2011), suggesting this 
phenomenon might more prudently be described using the more inclusive term 
of response facilitation. 
 
Evidence of response facilitation is common in the comparative literature. 
Feeding and drinking behaviour is more likely to occur when others are 
feeding (Galef, 1993; Galloway, Addessi, Fragaszy, & Visalberghi, 2005; Hoppitt 
& Laland, 2008b; Visalberghi & Addessi, 2001). Yawning has received 
increasing interest, with evidence of within-species social facilitation in a 
number of primate species (Palagi et al., 2009; Paukner & Anderson, 2006; 
Provine, 1992), and dogs have also been found to yawn after seeing or hearing 
humans yawn (Joly-Mascheroni, Senju, & Shepherd, 2008; Silva et al., 2012). 
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Yawning is sometimes considered a form of displacement behaviour, and such 
displacement behaviours have also been the subject of much interest due to 
their contagious nature. Displacement behaviours are automatic behaviours, 
often self-directed and related to body-care or grooming (Troisi, 2002). Specific 
examples of these behaviours include scratching, or self-grooming in mammals 
(Cohen & Price, 1979; Maestripieri, Shino, Aureli, & Troisi, 1992), and preening 
in birds (Palestis & Burger, 1998). Similarly to yawning, preening and 
scratching behaviours are prompted by observing a conspecific perform the 
same behaviour (Feneran et al., 2013; Holle, Warne, Seth, Critchley, & Ward, 
2012; Hoppitt et al., 2007; Palestis & Burger, 1998). The function of such socially 
facilitated behaviours is unknown, although in the case of scratching and 
grooming it could be related to awareness of parasite removal (see Chapter Six 
for further discussion on this topic). A separate line of research has identified a 
link between displacement behaviours and emotional arousal (Schino, Perretta, 
Taglioni, & Troisi, 1996; Troisi & Schino, 1987), which raises the question of 
whether emotional state may be contagiously transferred also, facilitating not 
only behavioural synchrony in a group but emotional synchrony. 
 
If we observe socially facilitated behaviour we assume that some cognitive or 
emotional process, or a combination of the two, has instigated this behavioural 
change. It is sometimes useful to draw a distinction between these two 
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processes. While there will be some overlap between cognitive and affective 
mechanisms, the transfer of emotion is likely to incorporate the activation of 
unique neural and hormonal systems specific to emotion (Ledoux, 2000) that 
are known to have important short-term and long-term effects on behaviour 
(Katz, Roth, & Carroll, 1981) and physiology (Joëls et al. 2004). However, as it is 
difficult to assess the transfer of an emotional state between animals, emotional 
contagion, or emotional state-matching (de Waal, 2008) has been studied to a 
greater degree in humans. Behaviourally, observations of rapid mimicry of 
facial gestures has been proposed as evidence of emotional contagion in 
humans (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Hess & Blairy, 2001), and orangutans (Davila-
Ross, Menzler, & Zimmermann, 2008). However, studies examining 
physiological measures provide clearer evidence of automatic emotional 
transfer. In humans, it has been found that observing someone experience 
anxiety or disgust elicits similar physiological responses in an observer 
(Buchanan, Bagley, Stansfield, & Preston, 2012; Waters, West, & Mendes, 2014; 
Wicker et al., 2003). These emotionally contagious responses are in some cases 
elicited in subtle ways. A participant watching the face of a second participant 
who is watching video clips showing actors displaying joy and fear reacts with 
corresponding facial expressions and exhibit increased skin conductance 
response (Dezecache et al., 2013). As behaviour is our primary window through 
which we can interpret an animal’s emotions (Maestripieri et al., 1992), it is 
difficult to distinguish emotional contagion from behavioural contagion. 
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Displacement behaviours have been suggested as reliable indicators of 
emotional state (Maestripieri et al., 1992; Polizzi di Sorrentino, Schino, Tiddi, & 
Aureli, 2012), so when we see contagious displacement activity it is difficult to 
distinguish between a behavioural effect or an emotional phenomenon. This 
question has yet to be examined, and will be explored further in later chapters. 
Some have suggested that evidence of behavioural state matching, rather than 
the matching of specific behaviours per se qualifies as evidence of emotional 
contagion (Osvath & Sima, 2014). For example, upon seeing a conspecific 
playing, observer ravens will begin playing, however, the specific behaviours 
can be different (Osvath & Sima, 2014). Similarly, researchers examining 
contagion between different groups of captive primates have found that 
aggressive vocalisations from one primate group tend to increase aggressive 
behaviours in neighbouring groups (Grand & Leighty, 2013; Videan, Fritz, 
Schwandt, & Howell, 2005; Watson & Caldwell, 2010). Affiliative emotional 
contagion seems to take place when more affiliative vocalisations are heard 
(Videan et al., 2005; Watson, Buchanan-Smith, & Caldwell, 2014; Watson & 
Caldwell, 2010). These neighbour effects are some of the best evidence we have 
of emotional contagion in nonhuman animals as the vocalisations that elicit 
behavioural responses match the actions they produce in terms of emotional 
content, but not with regard to the specific behavioural responses. However, 
further experimental work is necessary to gain a complete understanding of the 
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interaction between behavioural and emotional contagion (as outlined in 
Chapter 4).  
 
Learning from products  
Having examined how a conspecific’s actions can influence the behaviour of an 
observer, the influence of the products of those actions will now be explored. 
When learning from the products of behaviour an observer does not learn from 
or about a motor action. Instead, by observing a conspecific’s behaviour, 
individuals might learn something about the environment. An animal might 
learn how something in the environment works (i.e. affordance learning), or 
that a certain goal is possible (i.e. goal emulation), or more attention might be 
paid to a specific location or stimulus (enhancement effects). During social 
learning of this type the motor action of the observed individual has no direct 
effect on the motor action of the observer (as is the case during behavioural 
contagion or imitation), however, a shared goal, or shared attention, can have 
the result of producing matched behaviour. Some of the mechanisms described 
in this section are considered simple in terms of the cognitive processing 
required, especially when compared to some forms of imitative learning (i.e. 
compare the associative account of enhancement effects, Leadbeater, 2015, with 
the hierarchical model of imitation, Byrne & Russon, 1998). However, these 
learning effects have been observed in a diverse range of species and likely play 
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a significant role in the lives of many species.  
 
Enhancement effects: The stimulus and the location 
If observing an animal interact with a stimulus increases the likelihood of 
observers interacting with that same stimulus at a later time, stimulus 
enhancement is thought to have occurred (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013). If 
observing an individual in a certain location increases the likelihood that an 
observer will spend time in that location, local enhancement is argued to have 
taken place (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013). Some have considered local enhancement 
to be a special case of stimulus enhancement where the location acts as the 
stimulus (Galef, 1988; Heyes, 1994). However, Hoppitt and Laland (2013) prefer 
to differentiate between the two mechanisms and propose that different 
cognitive processes will produce distinct behaviour in each instance. For 
example, stimulus enhancement is said to operate as a social case of single-
stimulus learning (Heyes, 1994; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013). Single-stimulus 
learning is a basic principal of learning theory where the presence of a stimulus 
acts to make an animal more or less responsive to that stimulus at a future time; 
these effects are known as sensitisation and habituation respectively (Heyes, 
1994). During stimulus enhancement, an individual is thought to become 
sensitised to a stimulus after observing a conspecific interact with it, 
subsequently increasing the rate of interaction with that stimulus. However, 
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during stimulus enhancement, learning is not limited to a single stimulus, but 
this increased sensitivity becomes generalised to other stimuli that share some 
sensory feature (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013); this is not thought to occur with local 
enhancement. Local enhancement does not act to sensitise an observer to a 
given location, but instead draws an individual to that location for other 
reasons that may not necessarily persist at a future time (i.e. an individual 
might be attracted to a location for social bonding, or to group with others for 
warmth; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013). The difference between these enhancement 
effects is the type of learning that takes place. During stimulus enhancement 
something is learned about a stimulus that changes behaviour at a future time, 
but during local enhancement an animal is drawn towards a location because of 
a conspecific’s presence; learning may take place at that location but the act of 
local enhancement is not itself an instance of learning about a location. Local 
enhancement by this definition serves to describe a different phenomenon to 
stimulus enhancement.  
 
Occasionally, evidence of enhancements effects is discovered while studying 
imitation or general social learning ability in animals (Caldwell & Whiten, 2004; 
van de Waal & Bshary, 2011; Wilkinson, Kuenstner, Mueller, & Huber, 2010). 
For example, common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus; Caldwell & Whiten, 2004) 
and keas (Nestor notabilis; Huber, Rechberger, & Taborsky, 2001) who had 
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observed conspecifics interacting with an apparatus did not imitate the specific 
behaviour of the models, but did interact more often with the elements of the 
apparatus that models touched. Studies specifically aimed at examining 
stimulus and local enhancement have found examples in a range of species. 
Ninespined stickleback (Pungitius pungitius) are more likely to feed in a location 
where a conspecific was observed feeding, but do not generalise this learning to 
other stimulus types (e.g. colour; Webster & Laland, 2012). A later study by the 
same authors (2013) found that male guppies (Poecilia reticulata) were attracted 
to the location where other males were performing mating displays, but only 
when those models were present at the location. If the demonstrating male was 
removed before the observers were allowed to make their decision, no local 
enhancement effect was found (Webster & Laland, 2013).  
 
Some believe that associative learning processes may determine local 
enhancement (Leadbeater, 2015), and given that both single-stimulus learning 
and associative learning are evolutionarily ancient it is not surprising that 
evidence of enhancement effects have been reported in invertebrates, 
amphibians, and reptiles. Gregarious locusts (Schistocerca gregaria) prefer to lay 
eggs and feed near conspecifics (Lancet & Dukas, 2012). After observing 
conspecifics in a specific part of a water tank, wood-frog tadpoles (Lithobates 
sylvaticus) will move to that location even after the conspecifics are no longer at 
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that location  (Chapman, Holcomb, Spivey, Sehr, & Gall, 2015). Moreover, even 
non-social animals, like insular lizards (Podarcis lilfordi), prefer to feed near 
conspecifics (Pérez-Cembranos & Pérez-Mellado, 2014). Even when learning 
does not occur during local enhancement, being near a conspecific may 
influence behaviour in other ways. Hoppit and Laland (2013) suggest that 
animals that congregate may tend to be coordinated in their feeding and 
foraging behaviours, especially under patchy feeding conditions. This may 
explain evidence of behavioural synchrony in baboon troops that travel 
together through varying environments (King & Cowlishaw, 2009), and may 
drive shared decision making when travelling through an environment 
(Strandburg-Peshkin, Farine, Couzin, & Crofoot, 2015). 
 
Some recent studies have attempted to differentiate between types of 
enhancement. While differentiation is sometimes based upon whether the cue 
that facilitated learning was spatial or not (Guillette & Healy, 2014; Mersmann, 
Tomasello, Call, Kaminski, & Taborsky, 2011), some studies do attempt to tease 
apart whether learning has generalised to other stimuli, indicative of stimulus 
enhancement rather than local enhancement. One study found that bees 
(Bombus terrestris) that had associated live conspecifics with rewarding flowers 
would subsequently use fake social cues (i.e. model bees placed on flowers of a 
certain colour) to determine the colour of flower on which to forage (e.g. 
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stimulus enhancement; Avarguès-Weber & Chittka, 2014). However, bees that 
in an initial stage had learned to associate model bees, rather than live 
conspecifics, with rewarding flowers were found at the second stage of testing 
to only favour foraging on flowers where model bees were present without 
showing a preference for a colour of flower. While this study demonstrates that 
previous experience contributes to social learning processes, the authors 
conclude that the difference observed between social and non-social conditions 
also suggests that some evolved capacity may explain differences between 
individual and social learning.  
     
In recent years there has been an important drive to understand more about the 
mechanisms that facilitate social learning in animals, and importantly, evidence 
of simpler enhancement effects are now being investigated in earnest to learn 
about what conditions are necessary for learning to occur (e.g. Webster & 
Laland, 2013) and what types of previous experience may be necessary to 
facilitate these effects in the first place (Avarguès-Weber & Chittka, 2014; 
Dawson et al., 2013). Evidence that enhancement effects are widespread 
throughout a range of animal taxa may lead to the conclusion that complex 
patterns of behaviour only observed in some species (e.g. social traditions) 
cannot be a result of these mechanisms. However, recent evidence suggests 
otherwise. Stone handling behaviours thought to be an example of a cultural 
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tradition in Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata; Huffman, 1996) have recently 
been found to be facilitated by “simple” enhancement effects (Leca, Gunst, & 
Huffman, 2010). Beyond enhancement effects there are other ways in which the 
products or results of behaviour may influence others, and these will be 
explored next.  
 
Emulation  
The term emulation has a number of meanings in the comparative and 
developmental literature. Hopper (2010) distinguishes between three forms of 
emulation: Goal emulation, affordance learning, and object movement re-
enactment. Goal emulation takes place when after observing another individual 
complete an action that produces some measurable result (e.g. a food reward), 
the observer is motivated to achieve the same goal, but may do so by different 
means (Call & Carpenter, 2002; Hopper, 2010; Whiten & Ham, 1992). An 
example of this type of goal emulation was observed by Tomasello and 
colleagues (1987) who found that after observing a conspecific use a tool to 
obtain a food reward, chimpanzees were more likely to use the same tool to 
gain the reward, even though the observers used different actions. The authors 
believe that chimpanzees were motivated to use the tool to achieve the same 
goal (i.e. achieve a food reward) but the specific method to achieve this reward 
was acquired through individual learning. Stimulus enhancement was ruled 
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out in this instance as chimpanzees that had not seen a demonstrator were just 
as likely to interact with the tool but they did not use it to get a food reward.  
 
Affordance learning is influenced by the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson 
who defined affordances as what an environment or object offers an animal 
(1977). For example, a horizontal, flat, rigid, and extended surface affords 
support; a surface with these properties and located at knee height affords sitting 
(Gibson, 1977). Any object in an environment could afford any number of 
manipulations or actions, however, some affordances are not readily available 
through simple observation. For example, a nut with a shell may afford cracking 
but this information is not available purely by observing the nut. An individual 
might learn that certain nuts afford cracking through trial and error learning, 
but this may also be learned by observing another individual crack a nut. 
Finally, through object movement re-enactment (OMR), an individual might 
learn about the way in which an object might move (Hopper, 2010). In many 
cases “ghost procedures” have been employed to distinguish imitation from 
OMR. Studies that use ghost procedures compare individuals who have 
observed a demonstrator successfully manipulate an apparatus to gain a 
reward, with individuals who have seen the apparatus being manipulated by 
hidden pulleys or strings, without a demonstrator present (i.e. the ghost 
demonstration). If observers learn to operate the apparatus after observing the 
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ghost demonstration then OMR is said to have occurred rather than imitation 
(Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 2008; Hopper, 2010). These three types 
of emulation learning are in many cases difficult to differentiate, as the 
behaviour observed after all three cases of learning will often be the same 
(Hopper, 2010). Evidence of emulative learning is less common than 
enhancement effects. A number of studies report evidence of learning from 
emulation in children (Hopper et al., 2008; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009; Tennie, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2006), however, opinions differ regarding its relative 
significance to social learning in apes (Hopper et al., 2008; Tennie et al., 2006; 
for a review see Byrne, 2002a). 
  
While it is interesting to differentiate between imitative learning and emulation 
learning, it is also important to recognise that emulative learning may be as 
important as imitation in driving complex behaviour in humans. For example, 
Caldwell and Millen (2009) examined social learning in humans by 
manipulating the amount of information a learner received. The task’s goal was 
to create a paper aeroplane that could fly as far as possible. In one condition 
participants could observe others make their paper aeroplane (i.e. learning 
from actions) while in another condition participants could only see the 
finished paper aeroplane with information on how far it flew (e.g. learning 
from an end-state and goal). In both cases, social learning occurred, 
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demonstrating evidence of both emulative and imitative learning. Furthermore, 
this study incorporated a transmission-chain method which simulated human 
cultural practices, allowing the transfer of previously learned skills to a new 
“generation” of participants (whether through actions or products). It was 
found that performance improved over generations (i.e. aeroplanes flew 
further) providing evidence of cumulative culture (the capacity for learning to 
improve cumulatively over generations). Interestingly, cumulative learning 
occurred in both imitative and emulative conditions suggesting that end-state 
matching and goal emulation can under some circumstances help drive a 
phenomenon thought to be a cornerstone of human cognition.  
 
Learning from presence 
In some cases, it is not the behaviour of a conspecific, nor the results of 
behaviour that influence an observer. Sometimes, an animal’s presence is 
enough to affect behavioural or motivational change in another. Nothing is 
learned during presence effects, but they are an important category of 
mechanism to understand, especially in the context of how they interact with 
other social learning mechanisms. The main mechanism to be considered here 
is social facilitation, but the effect of group size on behaviour will also be 
examined. 
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Social facilitation 
Zajonc (1965) differentiated between two types of social facilitation: Audience 
effects and co-action effects. Audience effects are limited to events where the 
mere presence of another individual (or individuals) has the effect of changing 
behaviour. This definition is in line with contemporary usage of social 
facilitation (e.g. Hoppitt & Laland, 2013). Co-action effects, on the other hand, 
occur when individuals in groups are simultaneously engaged in the same 
behaviour (Zajonc, 1965). Social facilitation as co-action will not be discussed 
here as it does not contribute further insight to the study of social learning 
mechanisms once contagion effects or two-way audience effects are considered. 
Audience effects have been studied in experimental conditions where it has 
been discovered that behaviour is significantly altered by the presence of 
another individual (for reviews see Aiello & Douthitt, 2001; Zajonc, 1965). 
Generally, it is found that well-established behaviours that are easy to execute 
are performed more often as a result of audience effects while newly learned 
behaviours or behaviours that require greater cognitive effort are inhibited 
(Zajonc, 1965). For example, on simple tasks that test a participant’s attention, 
eye-hand co-ordination, or reaction time, humans perform better when 
someone else is nearby (Bergum & Lehr, 1963; Travis, 1925). However, less 
automatic responses are often inhibited by an audience.  Zajonc and Sales 
(1966) employed a clever method to examine audience effects on easy and 
difficult tasks. Initially, American participants were trained to pronounce 
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different Turkish words, but the training was unequal and participants 
received a lot of training for some words and very little for others. In a testing 
phase, the trained words were flashed upon a screen for a very short period of 
time (1/100th second) and participants were asked to pronounce the words they 
observed. Overall, rapid stimulus presentation led to poorer recall for words 
that had received little training, and greater recall for words that had received 
considerably more training. However, comparing audience effects for over-
trained words and under-trained words, researchers found that when it came 
to over-trained words performance was better with an audience present, while 
the opposite effect was found for under-trained words. Evidence of social 
facilitation is not limited to humans, with the presence of a conspecific 
increasing the rate of bar pressing in rats and macaques (Levine & Zentall, 1974; 
Reynaud, Guedj, Hadj-Bouziane, Meunier, & Monfardini, 2015). Social 
facilitation effects have also been observed in feeding contexts where the 
presence of others influences food intake. Humans eat more and have longer 
meals when eating with others (Decastro, 1994), and chicks raised in pairs eat 
more than those raised in isolation (Tolman, 1964).  
 
Zajonc (1965) explains social facilitation as increasing the “drive” (i.e. 
psychological and physiological arousal) of an individual leading to improved 
performance on simple tasks. However, a recent study identified greater 
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activity in brain regions related to attention in monkeys during tasks conducted 
in the presence of a conspecific, but no increase in brain regions related to 
motivation and no change in stress hormone levels (Monfardini et al., 2015). 
This study provides some insight into the physiological basis of social 
facilitation, but no support for Zajonc’s theory of increased “drive”.  
 
Group-size effects 
This final mechanism is not regularly included in the taxonomy of social 
learning processes, possibly because it could be considered a special case of 
social facilitation (e.g. Meunier, Petit, & Deneubourg, 2007). Nonetheless, 
research has demonstrated that the number of conspecifics present at a given 
time influences behaviour, so it is important to consider group size when 
discussing presence effects. Also, the number of conspecifics present at an area 
can lead to behavioural change unrelated to audience effects; for example, a 
larger group may facilitate increased foraging rates due to shared vigilance to 
predators. In fact, the effect of group size has mostly been studied in the context 
of vigilance in birds, primates, and other mammals (Beauchamp, 2012; Lazarus, 
1978; Pays et al., 2009; Robinette & Ha, 2001; Treves, 1999). It is believed that 
one of the benefits of group living is that increased total vigilance in groups 
helps avoid predation (Lazarus, 1978). Indeed, in many studies of group-living 
animals we find that as group size at a given time increases, the proportion of 
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individuals scanning their surroundings is reduced (Ebensperger, Hurtado, & 
Ramos‐Jiliberto, 2006; Lazarus, 1978). Measures of collective vigilance have 
been found to increase as group-size increases while individual vigilance 
decreases (Ebensperger et al., 2006) and may facilitate more varied foraging 
strategies (Beauchamp, 2013). Interestingly, when this effect has been studied in 
primates the opposite relationship has been observed. As group-size increases 
in primates the number of individuals showing vigilant behaviour also 
increases (Hirsch, 2002; Kutsukake, 2007; Robinette & Ha, 2001; Treves, 1998). It 
is thought that this may be caused by a need to detect threats of aggression or 
scrounging from conspecifics rather than vigilance for predators (Hirsch, 2002) 
and has been observed in at least one other large brained non-primate species 
(Corvus caurinus, Robinette & Ha, 2001). Group-size effects may also indirectly 
contribute to a variety of other social learning mechanisms, as greater numbers 
of individuals increase the possibility of any social learning, whether via 
response facilitation, imitation, emulation, or audience effects.  
 
Social learning from the bottom up 
It is useful to delineate the contexts under which social learning takes place. 
However, the naming of mechanisms and distinguishing between specific 
mechanisms is only the beginning of understanding the science of social 
learning. Over a decade ago, Byrne (2002b) highlighted that while it is certainly 
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beneficial to describe the various social learning mechanisms (e.g. Hoppitt & 
Laland, 2008; Whiten & Ham, 1992; Zentall, 2006), this approach tends to focus 
on the form of the behavioural phenomena observed and not on how the 
mechanism might operate or how it may develop. It seems that little progress 
has been made in this regard, as more recently Galef (2013) has similarly 
endorsed the idea that while definitional consensus is useful, it may 
inadvertently restrict the scope of social learning research. Galef argues that the 
methods used to identify social learning (notably the two-action method, i.e. 
Dawson & Foss, 1965) have not contributed to understanding the cognitive 
processes underlying social learning but instead merely differentiate between 
imitative learning and other “simpler” flavours of social learning. As the field 
of social learning research has progressed over the last two decades a general 
consensus has emerged concerning the description of the behavioural 
phenomena covered by scientists of social learning, and these include the 
definitions detailed above. The greatest debate concerning ways of 
discriminating between mechanisms have been retained for those processes 
considered the most complex, namely imitation and emulation (see Caldwell & 
Whiten, 2002). Often, simple processes are explored as mere alternative 
explanations once imitative learning is ruled out, but Galef argues that the 
consensus concerning these definitions have been mistaken for understanding 
these simpler mechanisms. We may agree that stimulus enhancement, for 
example, takes place when a conspecific’s interaction with a certain stimulus 
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influences an observer to pay closer attention to, or interact with that stimulus. 
However, we know little about the cognitive mechanisms that underlie this 
phenomenon, how this cognitive ability develops in an individual, how it is 
phylogenetically distributed, or what internal states and external stimuli 
facilitate or disrupt the process. According to Galef, a lifetime of work awaits 
those interested in answering these questions on the simpler processes that are 
likely to influence behaviour in a wide range of species. In this thesis I aim to in 
some way address this need by focusing on these simpler processes, examining 
how they may function and develop in primates. 
 
Having identified a problem, it is necessary to consider an approach that might 
afford a better understanding of the cognitive processes involved in social 
learning. In recent years, some comparative psychologists have expressed an 
interest in tackling animal cognition from the bottom up. de Waal & Ferrari 
(2010) highlight the trend in animal cognition research, especially in the field of 
primatology, to focus on cognitive processes we might think are uniquely 
human, like mental time-travel (Vale, Flynn, & Kendal, 2012), empathy (Preston 
& de Waal, 2002), and imitation (Whiten & Ham, 1992), in an effort to discover 
evolutionary homologues in our primate relatives. An approach to animal 
cognition concerned with exploring complex cognition from a top-down 
perspective asks: “can this species perform this complex cognitive task?”, with 
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a null result forcing us to instead consider simpler mechanisms as alternative 
explanations for the observed behaviour. This approach has been criticised for 
taking an anthropomorphic stance to animal cognition (Barrett, Henzi, & 
Rendall, 2007; Shettleworth, 2010), and instead it has been argued that a greater 
understanding of the simpler processes that underlie or scaffold more complex 
cognition will deliver a more thorough comparative approach to cognition (de 
Waal & Ferrari, 2010). For example, before empathy is questioned, the 
mechanisms that facilitate empathy should be explored (e.g. emotional 
contagion, Preston & de Waal, 2002). To understand imitation we must 
understand the role of mirror neurons in action matching (de Waal & Ferrari, 
2010). Other researchers are similarly motivated to dissect the cognitive 
capacities of animals from the ground-up. Shettleworth (2010) has argued that 
the focus on identifying cognitive mechanisms in other animals that resemble 
human processes misses opportunities to explore the more simple or automatic 
processes that will underlie both human and animal behaviour. Shettleworth 
specifically references evidence of a preference for immediate pay-off over 
more long-term rewards that is common in both humans and many other 
species (Anderson, Kuroshima, & Fujita, 2010; Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’ 
Donoghue, 2002; Vick, Bovet, & Anderson, 2010). The idea that a quick, 
automatic, domain-general, and evolutionarily ancient cognitive and emotional 
system underlies much of human behaviour has gained considerable interest in 
other fields (Damasio, 1996; Kahneman, 2011). This reinterpretation of the goal 
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of comparative psychology drives the research program outlined in this thesis. 
Complex cognitive abilities may exist in both humans and nonhuman animals 
but a complete picture of these processes will not be gained by approaching 
these abilities from the top. In the field of comparative social learning the top 
has traditionally meant imitation, but some recent empirical and theoretical 
work suggests that starting at the bottom may be a more fruitful enterprise.  
 
An associative account of social learning  
The study of social learning mechanisms has greatly benefited from a largely 
consensual view of the mechanisms of social learning, however, there is still 
much to learn about the basic processes involved for each mechanism 
described. Under the cognitive paradigm behaviourist principles have fallen 
out of fashion, labelled as “killjoy” explanations (Dennett, 1983) that 
incorporate “awkward terminology” (Tomasello, 1998), but the tenets of 
associative learning are largely misunderstood (Barrett, 2011b; Rescorla, 1988), 
and can contribute greatly to an understanding of social learning. Some steps 
have already been taken to examine the role of associative processes in social 
learning.  
 
A comparative science of social learning suffers from a habit of setting out to 
identify some variety of social learning in an animal, without asking questions 
37 
 
about how specific types of social learning may have developed and how they 
may work. In the field of primate research the ontogeny of a social learning 
mechanism is difficult to assess as most long-lived primates lead rich social 
lives before ever interacting with a two-action apparatus. It is not surprising 
then that much of the research concerned with the development of social 
learning mechanisms comes from organisms whose life-history is easier to 
control. Some studies with invertebrates have highlighted the importance of 
previous experience to exploit social information adaptively (Avarguès-Weber 
& Chittka, 2014; Dawson et al., 2013).  
 
Where bumblebees (Bombus terrestris) have learnt to associate conspecifics with 
rewarding flowers, they will subsequently be attracted to flowers where they 
observe conspecifics. Conversely, where bees have learned to associate 
conspecifics with unrewarding flowers, they will use a conspecifics presence to 
avoid that flower (Dawson et al., 2013). This demonstrates that simple 
associative processes are responsible for at least some social learning processes. 
More recently, it was found that after learning to associate live conspecifics 
with rewarding flowers, subsequent observations of model bees on flowers of a 
certain colour led the bees to forage on all flowers of that colour (evidence of 
stimulus enhancement- see above; Avarguès-Weber & Chittka, 2014). However, 
learning to associate model bees and rewarding flowers facilitated subsequent 
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foraging only at sites where models bees were located; in other words learning 
was not generalised to other flowers of the same colour (evidence of local 
enhancement; Avarguès-Weber & Chittka, 2014). The authors conclude that 
while some forms of social learning are facilitated by simple associative 
processes (e.g. local enhancement), some innate mechanism may be required to 
bring about stimulus-enhancement effects. This may be the case, but the 
authors do not address olfactory cues available to bees during social training 
that may facilitate associative learning even when visual cues are absent. 
Nevertheless, the fine-grained teasing apart of differences between social and 
non-social associations, as well as the insight gained from examining the role of 
previous experience, demonstrates how little is known of how simple 
mechanisms operate. Associative processes have been used to explain 
enhancement effects (Leadbeater, 2015), but recent research has also examined 
the role of associative processes when learning from actions.  
 
An associative account of action imitation has been proposed (Heyes & Ray, 
2000). From this perspective, a motor representation of an action (e.g. a hand 
opening) becomes associated with a sensory representation of that action (e.g. 
observing a hand opening) through any contiguous and contingent sensory-
motor experience. Once an association has developed, the sensory experience of 
an action may activate the motor representation of that action and lead to a 
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matching action response. While this type of sensorimotor experience can occur 
through self-observation, it also takes place when animals are performing the 
same behaviour in synchrony. For example, a group of chickens foraging 
together may begin pecking when a food source becomes available. During this 
feeding event an individual may develop an association between the action of 
pecking and the sensory experience of seeing conspecifics peck. In this 
example, the sensory-motor association will also become associated with the 
presence of food, which may act to strengthen this association. After this 
sensorimotor experience, future observations of pecking may cause an observer 
to peck. In fact, previous studies have found that pigeons will imitate both 
pecking and stepping actions (Zentall et al., 1996), potentially facilitated by past 
sensorimotor experience. This associative model was proposed to explain how 
animals may solve the correspondence problem (Heyes & Ray, 2000), but 
similar Hebbian models at the neurological level have been proposed to explain 
action imitation and action understanding (Del Giudice, Manera, & Keysers, 
2009; Keysers & Perrett, 2004; although see Catmur, 2011, for important 
differences). This associative approach to imitation has also been extended to 
account for the development of mirror neurons (Cook, 2012; Heyes, 2010), and 
importantly, is supported by studies that have tested the predictions of this 
model in the context of action imitation (Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, Brass, & 
Heyes, 2008; Press, Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2007) and mirror neuron function 
(Catmur, Mars, Rushworth, & Heyes, 2011; Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007). 
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While associative accounts of behaviour may not be in vogue in the current 
cognitive climate, it is important to test their validity. The potential of these 
associative models lies in their ability to predict behaviour in humans and other 
animals, and while some have criticised the generalisability of associative 
models to more complex forms of social learning (Gallese, Gernsbacher, Heyes, 
Hickok, & Iacoboni, 2011; Rawlins et al., 2005), it is important to consider how 
these models might explain aspects of social learning processes before turning 
to explanations that require top-down processing or richer representational 
accounts.  
 
A better understanding of social learning processes can be gained from a study 
of associative accounts of social learning, and so-called “simple” mechanisms of 
social learning are worthy of consideration in their own right. The answers 
gained from taking this bottom up approach will contribute to a deeper 
understanding of social learning in human and nonhuman animals.  
 
Thesis goals 
Having summarised the state of social learning research in the field of 
comparative psychology and highlighted the broader theoretical and empirical 
problems in this area, I will now outline how the studies forming the backbone 
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of this thesis address these issues. Four of the five data-chapters to follow 
examine the cognition, behaviour, and physiology of capuchin monkeys 
(Sapajus sp.). Capuchin monkeys are a New World species that interest 
researchers of social learning because of their high brain to body-mass ratio 
(Macphail, 1996), socially tolerant nature (Fragaszy, Feuerstein, & Mitra, 1997), 
tool use capacities (Visalberghi, 1993), and evidence of socially learned 
traditions in wild populations (Perry, 2011). Capuchins have been studied 
extensively to examine their social learning abilities (Dindo, Thierry, & Whiten, 
2008; Dindo, Whiten, & de Waal, 2009a; Fragaszy et al., 2011; Visalberghi & 
Addessi, 2001) yet no evidence of action imitation has been identified in this 
species (Fragaszy & Visalberghi, 1989; Fragaszy et al., 2011). Here, a bottom-up 
approach to social learning will examine the prevalence of other, simpler social 
learning mechanisms in capuchins and their role in capuchin behaviour.  
 
In Chapter Two, action imitation will be examined in the context of a stimulus-
response experimental paradigm. While previous studies have failed to identify 
action imitation in capuchins, this study examines any bias towards imitating 
actions using a novel method for the first time with non-human primates. 
Using a stimulus-response method allows the testing of predictions made by an 
associative account of action imitation and facilitates testing of the role of 
sensorimotor experience in action imitation. Chapter Three further develops the 
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study of an associative account of action imitation but with human children. 
The study reported in Chapter Three complements the study of action imitation 
in capuchins by examining the same associative principals introduced in 
Chapter Two. Chapter Four returns to capuchin monkeys to examine a range of 
social mechanisms that have been underexplored in the primate literature. 
Using observational methods, capuchin behaviour is studied at the group level 
allowing a thorough examination of the factors that might influence group 
behaviour in capuchins. The focus of this chapter is to address phenomena that 
are under-explored in the primate literature, namely, group-size effects, 
behavioural synchrony, and inter-group social contagion. Chapter Five 
examines emotional contagion. While thought to be the foundation of empathy, 
this topic is difficult to study in primates as behavioural measures of emotion 
are difficult to validate. Here, an experimental paradigm allows the 
measurement of both behaviour and stress hormone levels to examine the 
impact of emotionally valenced stimuli on the emotional response of capuchins. 
The physiological measurement of stress also allows the validation of 
behavioural measures of emotional states in capuchin monkeys. The 
phenomenon of behavioural contagion is examined further in Chapter Six. This 
chapter specifically addresses a behaviour that is contagious in primates but is 
also linked to emotion in primates: Scratching. Together these studies shed light 
on some of the lesser studied mechanisms of social learning, and provide a 
better understanding of the factors that contribute to social learning. 
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Chapter 2: Automatic imitation in capuchin monkeys 
 
During social interactions we unconsciously adopt each other’s behavioural 
tics, imitate actions, and synchronise our postures. We prefer individuals that 
imitate us (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), and act more prosocially following these 
interactions (Stel, Van Baaren, & Vonk, 2008). This phenomenon, dubbed the 
chameleon effect, has understandably garnered much interest from social 
psychologists since its discovery over a decade ago (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
Stel et al., 2008; van Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009). 
Meanwhile, a similarly unconscious and automatic effect has been identified in 
controlled cognitive studies. Seeing an action (e.g. opening a hand) primes the 
performance of that action but interferes with the execution of an incompatible 
action (e.g. making a fist). Automatic imitation is a reliable behavioural effect, 
specifically related to motor imitation, and distinct from other stimulus-
response compatibility effects (Boyer, Longo, & Bertenthal, 2012; Catmur & 
Heyes, 2011). Examining automatic imitation, cognitive neuroscientists have 
been asking what this phenomenon might reveal about imitative learning in 
humans (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Capa, Marshall, Shipley, Salesse, & 
Bouquet, 2011; Cook, Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2010; Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & 
Haggard, 2005).  
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We can imitate by recreating, through action, the perceived visual qualities of 
the act we see performed by another. However, the visual information obtained 
from perceiving someone perform an action often does not correspond to the 
sensory experience of observing your own actions (for a more detailed 
discussion on this problem see Chapter One). This is especially problematic 
when the nature of the action renders it opaque to the actor (e.g. in the case of 
facial gestures). Mirror neurons, first discovered in the F5 region of a pigtailed 
macaque’s parietal lobe by researchers in Parma (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, 
Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996), may 
offer an explanation for the ability to solve this “correspondence problem” 
(Nehaniv & Dautenhahn, 2002). Neurons sampled in this premotor area fired 
when the macaque performed an action (i.e. grasping a peanut), and also when 
the monkey observed the researcher perform the same action. These initial 
studies described neurons with both visual and motor properties, single cells 
that could represent information about another’s actions in egocentric terms. A 
thorough exploration of this neural subset was published in 1996, outlining 
multiple properties of these cells, referred to for the first time as “mirror 
neurons” (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996). For example, these 
neurons fired when monkeys observed an experimenter acting upon an object 
but did not fire when the object or the action were presented in isolation. While 
most neurons were active for specific motor actions (i.e. a power grip or 
precision grip), some neurons were sensitive to the goal of the action, firing 
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irrespective of effector (i.e. three sampled neurons fired when the experimenter 
picked up an item using either the hand or mouth). Subsequent studies of 
single neurons have explored interesting properties of these macaque mirror 
neurons (see Caggiano, Fogassi, Rizzolatti, & Thier, 2009; Keysers et al., 2003; 
Umiltà et al., 2001), and studies suggest a comparable system exists in humans 
(Hari et al., 1998; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & 
Fried, 2010).  
 
The function of these neurons has been disputed (see Gallese, Gernsbacher, 
Heyes, Hickok, & Iacoboni, 2011, for a forum discussion), but a parsimonious 
interpretation suggests mirror neurons play a role in recognising the actions of 
others (Bonini & Ferrari, 2011; Gallese et al., 2011). Importantly, while the 
primary function of mirror neurons may not be related to imitation, through 
action recognition, these neurons could still solve the correspondence problem 
by recruiting additional brain regions. Function aside, the origin of mirror 
neurons, the question of whether these neurons are innate or formed through 
experience, deserves consideration. 
 
Mirror neurons have understandably received a great deal of attention and two 
explanations for how these neurons came to exist in primate brains have been 
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proposed. One account suggests mirror neurons have evolved for the specific 
purpose of solving the corresponding problem, and exist from birth as an 
adaptation. Heyes (2010) points out that this approach is implicit in many 
discussions of mirror neurons and imitative learning (e.g. Meltzoff & Moore, 
1997; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). A competing view proposes mirror neurons 
develop through experience, and are not present at birth (Heyes, 2010). Both 
models were originally proposed to explain imitation but have subsequently 
been refined and adapted to account for mirror neuron function (Catmur, 
Walsh, & Heyes, 2009; Heyes, 2010; Meltzoff, 2005).   For example, the active 
intermodal mapping account (AIM) describes an innate process that matches 
the representation of observed motor actions with proprioceptive feedback 
from the performance of the same action (Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; 1983). 
Support for the AIM account is provided by reports of imitation in infants too 
young to have learned to imitate from experience of social interaction (Meltzoff 
& Moore, 1977, 1983). An alternative theory, first outlined by Heyes and Ray in 
2000, favours an associative, developmental approach to imitation (for a more 
detailed recent account see Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014). The 
associative sequence learning (ASL) approach posits imitative ability (and a 
mirror neuron system) is formed through compatible sensorimotor experience, 
the contingent experience of performing and observing the same action (Heyes, 
2010; Ray & Heyes, 2000). This sensorimotor experience could occur when an 
infant observes their hands, (Del Giudice et al., 2009), or by being imitated by 
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caregivers. It has been shown that during interactions between mothers and 
young infants (17-33 weeks of age), 16% of the time was taken up with the 
mother imitating the child (Pawlby, 1977). Heyes and her colleagues suggest 
this type of interaction is essential for learning an association between the 
sensory and motor properties of an action, creating sensorimotor, neural 
connections through Hebbian processes (Cook et al., 2014; Heyes, 2010; Ray & 
Heyes, 2011b). Importantly, we can test predictions made by these approaches 
to better judge their validity. 
 
While a number of studies have reported evidence of neonatal imitation 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1997, 1983; Meltzoff, 1988), the generalisability of this effect 
has been questioned (Anisfeld, 1996; Hayes & Watson, 1981; Lodder et al., 2014; 
Ray & Heyes, 2011b). It has been reliably discovered that infants imitate tongue 
protrusion actions (e.g. Meltzoff & Moore, 1983; Soussignan et al., 2010; for 
reviews see Anisfeld, 1996; Ray & Heyes, 2011), however, this behaviour is also 
elicited by flashing lights and music (Jones, 1996; Jones, 2006). These 
supplementary findings lend support to the idea that tongue protrusion is an 
innate exploratory behaviour elicited by multiple arousing stimuli, ungoverned 
by innate intermodal processes (Anisfeld, 1996). For example, upon finding that 
a variety of non-social stimuli elicited tongue protrusion in neonates, Jacobson 
(1979) proposed that these observations make sense when stimuli could be 
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interpreted in the context of a feeding event (e.g. resembling a nipple). 
However, criticisms of neonatal imitative effects have been countered by recent 
suggestions that null results may be due to type II errors (Simpson, Murray, 
Paukner, & Ferrari, 2014). Simpson and colleagues (2014) extracted relevant 
data concerning effects sizes and samples sizes from studies that have found an 
effect of neonatal imitation, concluding that a sample size of 26 individuals is 
necessary to identify neonatal imitation (when power = .80, α = .05, f = 0.4). The 
authors demonstrate that studies that met this sample-size criterion were more 
likely to discover neonatal imitation effects while studies that report null effects 
were more likely to have lower sample sizes. Nonetheless, as recent research 
suggests early experience is important for the development of imitative ability 
(de Klerk, Johnson, Heyes, & Southgate, 2014; Vanderwert et al., 2015) it is far 
from certain that precocious imitative ability is necessarily indicative of 
innateness.  
 
While the best evidence supporting an innate action matching mechanism is 
debatable, increasing support for the ASL view has been provided by 
examining the manipulation of automatic imitation in stimulus-response 
compatibility (SRC) tasks. In an SRC task participants are asked to perform two 
different actions (e.g. hand opening/closing) in response to releasing stimuli 
(words, colours, etc.). A task irrelevant image that is either action compatible or 
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action incompatible accompanies the stimulus. Reaction times are consistently 
quicker when the image presented corresponds with the action to be 
performed, while incompatible images invoke slower responses (Brass et al., 
2001; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Heyes et al., 2005; Stürmer, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). If imitation is dependent on sensorimotor 
experience, automatic imitation effects could be easily eliminated through 
incompatible sensorimotor training (where images of incompatible actions are 
repeatedly paired with releasing stimuli). Indeed, an incompatible training 
session delivered 24 hours before a test of automatic imitation significantly 
reduced the effect (Heyes et al., 2005). Catmur et al. (2008) using a similar 
method examined activity in brain areas associated with mirror neuron activity 
in humans. After incompatible training (performing hand actions when 
presented with an image of a foot and vice versa), brain areas previously 
related with hand actions were active when viewing images of a foot. 
 
It is worth noting that while I have focussed on the ASL approach here, another 
domain-general account of imitation has also been proposed. Prinz (1997; 2005) 
has described how psychological research throughout the 20th century focused 
on a sensory-motor paradigm, considering action as the result of stimuli. An 
ideomotor approach presents action as the result of intention, a potentially 
fruitful alternative to the dominant paradigm, and a useful theoretical tool for 
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the study of imitation (Prinz, 2005). The ideomotor approach suggests that 
sensory and motor representations are not only encoded separately but are also 
cognitively linked (i.e. this is known as dual coding; Prinz, 1997). When an 
action is performed (e.g. opening of the hand), the motor representation of this 
action becomes linked to the cognitive representation of any perceptual features 
this action produces (e.g. seeing an open hand). It follows that the observation 
of an event that is similar to any perceptual element of a previously encoded 
sensory-motor association may trigger performance of that action (Brass & 
Heyes, 2005; Paulus, 2014). Under this model, perception and action are 
intrinsically linked and the performance of any action (whether in the context 
of imitation or not) will be guided by the perceptual consequences of that 
action (Prinz, 1997). This approach predicts that the similarities between 
previously learned sensory-motor associations will influence the ease of 
imitation and this has been supported by cognitive studies using stimulus-
response compatibility procedures in adults (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; 
Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000) and children (Bekkering & Wohlschlager, 
2000).  
 
The ideomotor approach largely complements the ASL perspective (Brass & 
Heyes, 2005; Cook et al., 2014), and Heyes (2013) describes the vertical 
associations of the ASL approach (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.1) as analogues of the 
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“dual coding” described by the ideomotor approach. It may be true that the 
ideomotor approach stresses the role of top-down modulating factors in 
guiding the links between perception and action (Bekkering & Wohlschlager, 
2000; Liepelt, Cramon, & Brass, 2008), however, this has not been considered 
problematic to the ASL approach (see Heyes, 2013; Cook, Dickinson, & Heyes, 
2012; Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Heyes, 2010; Longo, Kosobud, & Bertenthal, 
2008). One discrepancy between these models was highlighted by Brass and 
Muhle-Karbe (2013) in a recent commentary on the ASL approach, where they 
state that the association learned in an ideomotor approach is the link between 
an action and its effect on the environment, while the ASL approach is 
concerned with links between stimuli and action responses. In their response, 
Cook et al. (2013), clarify that the ASL model is compatible with this ideomotor 
perspective and that a focus on links between stimuli and responses is largely 
due to methodological considerations. The ASL approach predicts that the 
same links would be developed in the context of actions and their effects. 
Overall, these two domain-general accounts predict that the correspondence 
problem can be solved through sensorimotor experience, and predictions of the 
ASL model explored throughout this thesis will be applicable to an ideomotor 
approach.  
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As previously mentioned, automatic imitation has been studied in detail in the 
context of human cognition yet little work has examined the comparative 
domain. A comparative perspective is crucial, as the ASL approach predicts 
that contingent sensorimotor experience, mediated by evolutionarily ancient 
learning processes, will produce automatic imitation (Heyes, 2005). As 
predicted by this theory, evidence of automatic imitation has been found in two 
evolutionary diverse species. Budgerigars (Melopsittacus undulates) rewarded 
for imitating a conspecific perform a foot or beak action learned the associative 
rule quicker than subjects rewarded for performing an opposite action (Mui, 
Haselgrove, Pearce, & Heyes, 2008). Similarly, domestic dogs (Canis lupus 
familiaris) rewarded for opening a door with the same body part as their owner 
(hand/paw or mouth), learned quicker than individuals rewarded for using the 
opposite body part (Range, Huber, & Heyes, 2011). While these initial results 
are promising, further study is necessary to examine the full effects of 
automatic imitation. To date, no study has examined this paradigm in 
nonhuman primates. Given that evidence of mirror neuron activity at the level 
of the single-cell is almost exclusively found in studies of monkeys (for a 
review see Kilner & Lemon, 2013) it is crucial to examine automatic imitation in 
monkeys to test the assumption that mirror neurons might facilitate imitative 
behaviour. Automatic imitation is defined within the context of the SRC 
paradigm, but other behaviours studied by comparative and behavioural 
scientists are likely governed by the same underlying cognitive processes. 
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The study of imitation in nonhuman animals has been complicated by 
conceptual discontinuities and despite efforts to consolidate approaches the 
field still suffers from a lack of cohesion (Caldwell & Whiten, 2002; Galef, 2013). 
However, we are interested in motor imitation at the action level, more 
specifically defined as “the cognitive operations needed to transform visual 
information into matching motor acts” (p 14; Custance, Whiten, & Fredman, 
1999). For example, while rarely considered “true imitation”, behaviours 
previously considered under the heading response facilitation, mimicry, or 
contagion (see Zentall, 2006) could also be considered “automatic” imitation, 
potentially mediated by a mirror neuron system. Indeed, according to the ASL 
approach it should not be surprising to find automatic imitative behaviours 
throughout the animal kingdom (Heyes, 2011).  
 
Initial attempts to examine imitation in monkeys delivered null results 
(Mitchell & Anderson, 1993). A classic study of social learning in capuchin 
monkeys concluded a distinct lack of imitative ability (Visalberghi, 1993). Six 
capuchins were presented with a transparent, hollow cylinder that containing a 
food reward. The three monkeys that had not learned to obtain the reward 
through individual learning were permitted to observe a skilled capuchin 
manipulate a tool to retrieve the reward. After more than 50 observations each, 
the unsuccessful capuchins did not learn the task. However, observers 
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subsequently interacted significantly more often with the apparatus, suggesting 
exploratory behaviour was socially facilitated, but not socially learned (i.e. 
possibly stimulus enhancement; see Chapter One for definition). More recent 
studies of enculturated capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) suggest similar 
results with little evidence of motor imitation observed (Fragaszy et al., 2011). 
However, it could be argued that what is examined in these studies does not 
specifically tap into the motor imitation that would be facilitated through an 
ASL approach, instead examining a broader range of social learning 
mechanisms including affordance learning and goal emulation. Voelkl and 
Huber (2000, 2007) published two accounts of motor imitation in common 
marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). In an initial study, marmosets were more likely 
to use the same body part as an observed conspecific (either hand or mouth) to 
open a box containing a food reward (2000). Additional support was supplied 
by a subsequent study that analysed details of the marmoset actions. The 
precise movements of the monkey corresponded with the demonstrator’s action 
only if the individual had previously observed the demonstrator. More 
recently, using a protocol based on Voelkl and Huber’s experiment in 2000, van 
de Waal and Whiten (2012) discovered that vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus 
aethiops) who observed a conspecific opening a reward-baited canister with 
their hands were more likely to do the same, whereas those that did not see this 
behaviour were more likely to use their mouths to open the container. In this 
present study we hope to examine imitation at this action level in capuchin 
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monkeys, by looking specifically at automatic imitation. Also, this study will 
examine predictions based on an ASL approach for the first time with a 
nonhuman primate species. 
 
Our aims are two-fold. Firstly, using an adapted SRC paradigm, automatic 
imitation in capuchin monkeys will be examined. Previous studies suggest 
capuchin monkeys learn primarily from non-imitative forms of social learning 
but the methodology employed here will permit investigation of more subtle 
imitative effects in capuchin monkeys. If capuchin monkeys find it easier to 
learn an imitative rule than a counter imitative rule it would suggest some 
ability for automatic imitation. Secondly, we hope to examine the 
generalisability of the ASL approach to a nonhuman primate species. If an ASL 
approach is accurate, we would predict that any automatic imitative effect will 
be eliminated, or reduced, through incompatible sensorimotor experience. In a 
first experiment we address both of these aims. Capuchin monkeys were 
trained to perform an action upon observing an experimenter perform an 
action. Half of the monkeys were rewarded for performing the same action, 
while the other monkeys were rewarded for performing the alternative action. 
We predicted that if capuchin monkeys automatically imitate motor actions the 
monkeys that learn the imitative rule should perform better (hypothesis 1). 
Following this first set of training, the associative rules were reversed; i.e. 
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monkeys that were initially rewarded for imitating were rewarded for 
performing opposite actions, and vice versa. If capuchin monkeys possess a 
predisposition to imitate, it might be expected that during this reversal-learning 
stage those learners that are switching from an incompatible associative rule to 
a compatible rule should perform better than individuals that experience the 
alternate reversal. However, if the ASL approach is correct, the experience of 
learning an incompatible rule should interfere with the prior learning 
responsible for any initial automatic imitation effect and performance during 
this reversal-learning stage should be comparable between groups (hypothesis 
2). A second experiment further examined the possibility of a predisposition for 
imitative ability. Two monkeys from experiment 1 were retested on a series of 
reversal learning sets. Using the same SRC procedure, each monkey learned a 
compatible and incompatible rule at least twice. If an innate predisposition to 
imitate exists we predicted that performance on the compatible associative rule 
will be consistently better than on the incompatible rule (hypothesis 3).  
 
Experiment 1: Methods 
Animals and research site 
Subjects were eight capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) from the Living Links to 
Human Evolution research site at Edinburgh Zoo, housed in mixed species 
groups with common squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus). Capuchins participate 
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in research sessions voluntarily for additional food rewards (for a 
comprehensive description of the facility see MacDonald & Whiten, 2011). The 
monkeys are fed a varying diet of fruit, vegetables, and monkey chow daily. All 
rewards offered in the course of research sessions were supplementary to their 
diet. Raisins, sunflower seeds, pineapple juice, and peanuts were used in this 
study as rewards and to encourage participation. Research was reviewed by 
zoo keepers at the Living Links research site and ethical approval was granted 
by the University of Stirling Psychology Ethics committee. All research took 
place between February 2011 and June 2012. 
 
Materials 
Study sessions were conducted in a purpose-built research area that connects 
capuchin indoor and outdoor enclosures. Capuchins can be temporarily 
isolated from their group mates in a series of research cubicles consisting of 
eight cubic compartments (.5m³; see Figure 2.1, a). Capuchins are shut within 
these cubicles by opaque or transparent slides and each monkey has been 
trained through positive reinforcement training to feel comfortable during 
sessions. Capuchins have also been trained to place their hand on the slide door 
if they want to leave. If monkeys display signs of anxiety or intent to leave the 
experimenter allows the monkey to exit. Two targets were used in this study. 
To shape two disparate actions a modified table tennis paddle was used (head 
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size approx. 15cm diameter with a 10X3cm handle, see Figure 2.2). Alternate 
sides were coloured black and white to facilitate colour discrimination training. 
A second target was used in the SRC condition that differed in shape and 
colour (12x13cm rectangular head with a 10X2 cm handle, see Figure 2.2). 
Figure. 2.1: a) Experimental cubicles; b) Presenting target and colour stimulus 
to capuchin monkey. 
 
The cubicle window (i.e. the Perspex screen orientated toward the 
experimenter) included a small opening in its centre. This opening allowed 
juice to be delivered to the capuchin through a mouthpiece connected to a 
rubber-tube and syringe.  
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Figure 2.2: Targets used for training and testing in SRC trials.  
 
On the bottom left side of the cubicle window was a hole (3.5cm diameter) 
through which food rewards were offered. Sessions were recorded on a Sony 
Mini DV Digital Video Camera. 
 
Procedure 
Shaping behaviours and discrimination learning 
The methods employed to shape behaviours was developed during my MSc 
studies (O’ Sullivan, 2011). For monkeys to complete SRC trials, two actions 
employing disparate body parts were trained: touching the cubicle window 
with a) their hand and b) their mouth. The training of both actions took place 
concurrently through positive reinforcement of successive approximations of 
each action. While the same target was used to cue both actions, a different 
coloured side was used in each case (i.e. the black side was always presented 
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when training hand actions and the white side was always presented during 
the training of mouth actions). To train each individual to touch the cubicle 
window with their mouth, diluted fruit juice (one part juice to two parts water) 
was delivered from a syringe to the mouthpiece on the inside of the cubicle. 
Capuchins learned to bring their mouths to the screen to receive the juice 
reward. Next, the experimenter presented the training target approx. 5cm in 
front of the window before the juice was delivered. Once capuchins learned to 
bring their mouths to the window before the juice was delivered, the juice 
reward was replaced with a food reward. To train a distinct hand action the 
training target was presented to the small hole where food rewards were 
offered. The target was removed once touched by the subject’s hand and a food 
reward was offered. Gradually, the target was moved further from the hole, 
and the subject, unable to touch the target directly, was rewarded for touching 
the window with one or two hands. At this point the learned association 
between stimulus and action was spatial in nature (the mouth action cued by 
the target presented near the centre of the window; the hand action cued by the 
target presented nearer the left of the window). Once actions had been learned 
the target was only presented in the centre of the window, and the capuchin 
was required to learn a colour association rule (see Figure 2.1 b). Only correct 
responses were rewarded, i.e. performing an action that corresponded to 
specific colour. If an incorrect response was performed the experimenter turned 
his back on the monkey for approximately three seconds, a form of negative 
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punishment, removing the opportunity to receive further rewards for a set 
period of time. Once an individual had performed over 85% correct responses 
on three consecutive research sessions (20 trials per session), the monkey began 
the SRC trials.  
 
Stimulus Response Compatibility Trials (SRC) 
During the piloting of these methods (O’ Sullivan, 2011), six monkeys were 
tested on approximately 300 trials each (mean = 303, SD = 110), and the work 
reported below expands upon this preliminary work, testing more subjects, and 
examining considerably more trials. On completion of the colour discrimination 
trials, individuals were transferred into one of two groups in the SRC condition: 
a compatible condition or incompatible condition. Based on performance in the 
colour discrimination stage groups were counterbalanced to include equal 
numbers of quick discrimination learners; for example, the mean number of 
research sessions before reaching criterion on the colour discrimination task 
was 45.75  for subjects in the compatible condition (range = 37-63 sessions) and 
45 for subjects in the incompatible condition (range = 31-66). Each session 
aimed to include 20 individual trials with equal numbers of hand and mouth 
actions performed, but due to the participatory nature of the research, some 
sessions included fewer trials. Each SRC session began with four trials testing 
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baseline action elicitation using the trained colour cue; a series of twenty SRC 
trials followed, with a further four baseline action elicitation trials after the 
tenth and twentieth SRC trial. This rewarding of an already learned association 
was to encourage participation and to assess individual’s constant ability to 
perform both hand and mouth actions discriminately. During an SRC trial a 
second target (see the target on the right; Fig. 2.2.) was held in front of the 
experimenter with his left hand and touched with either a) his right hand or b) 
his mouth. The target was then moved to approx. 5cm in front of the window. 
Individuals in the compatible condition were rewarded for performing an 
action with the same body part as the experimenter, while individuals in the 
incompatible condition were rewarded for using the opposite action. Actions 
were still performed on the cubicle window. An incorrect response resulted in 
the experimenter turning his back on the monkey for approximately three 
seconds. Once a predetermined criterion was reached (≥85% correct responses 
in three consecutive 20 trial sessions) the reward contingency was to be 
reversed. However, after 900 trials only one monkey had reached this criterion 
(Carlos reached the criterion after 500 trials). Because of time constraints, 
monkeys were switched to the opposite condition regardless of progress after 
900 trials. Two monkeys were tested on fewer trials in each condition to 
examine performance on both associate rules without possible confounding 
effects of overtraining. These two monkeys completed 320 trials in each 
condition (Kato and Sylvie). Once reward contingencies were reversed, a 
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further 500 trials were completed by each monkey (320 in the case of Kato and 
Sylvie). As monkeys were free to leave in the middle of sessions and each 
session attempted to test monkeys with 20 trials, monkeys completed on 
average 10.4 trials more than the established cut-off (900 or 320). 
 
Data Analysis 
The monkeys’ success on each trial was recorded as a binary response variable 
(either correct or incorrect). This binary variable was used as the outcome 
variable in a series of generalised linear mixed models (GLMM) with a 
binomial distribution and logit link function to test specific hypotheses 
concerning automatic imitation. As each monkey received multiple trials in 
each condition, the monkey being tested was included as a random-factor in 
each model. As performance was expected to improve over trials as monkeys 
learned the associate rules, trial number in a given block of learning was 
entered as a predictor variable into each model (the trial number restarted at 1 
once associative rules were switched). To test whether monkeys found it easier 
to learn compatible or incompatible associative rules overall, a model was 
developed with the associative rule being rewarded entered as a main-effect 
(i.e. condition). To test hypotheses concerning the ASL hypothesis, a model was 
developed with an interaction included for condition and order of learning; 
simple effects of condition were examined when associative rules were first 
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learned (i.e. order = 1) and when rules are learned for a second time (i.e. order = 
2). To describe the contribution of predictor variables to trial success, odds 
ratios were calculated by back-transforming the log odds ratios. While 
monkeys completed up to 900 trials in the first block of learning, only the first 
500 trials for each monkey were examined (320 in the case of Kato and Sylvie), 
for two reasons. Firstly, one monkey’s associative rule was switched after 500 
trials, so a comparison between groups is more valid at this point. Also, to 
examine any pre-existing bias in automatic imitative ability it is more 
appropriate to examine earlier performances.  
 
Software 
All statistical tests were conducted with the R statistics program (R Core Team, 
2014) in the Rstudio environment (RStudio Team, 2014). Models were 
developed using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), 
and graphics were created using the ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2009). 
 
Experiment 1: Results 
Descriptive data on overall performance for each monkey, including the 
number of trials included in the analyses and the proportion of correct 
responses on each learning block, can be seen in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive data from SRC trials 1-500 for each monkey in both 
conditions. Mean success on Trials where 1 = successful response and 0 = 
unsuccessful is included - this measure is the equivalent of the proportion of 
correct responses in a learning block. Standard error of the mean is included 
in brackets.   
 
Rule rewarded in 1st 
Learning Block 
Trials per 
learning 
block 
Mean Success on Trials (SE) 
 
1st Learning Block 2nd Learning Block 
Pedra Incompatible 500 .506 (.022)  .522 (.022) 
Figo Incompatible 500 .500 (.022) .478 (.022)  
Chico Incompatible 500 .572 (.022) .444 (.022) 
Kato Incompatible 320 .500 (.028) .478 (.028) 
Total Incompatible 1820 .521 (.012) .481 (.012) 
Carlos Compatible 500 .658 (.021)  .484 (.022)  
Micoe Compatible 500 .562 (.022) .502 (.022) 
Inti Compatible 500 .516 (.022)  .478 (.022) 
Sylvie Compatible 320 .512 (.027) .500 (.028) 
Total Compatible 1820 .567 (.012) .490 (.012) 
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No main effect of the associative rule being rewarded 
(compatible/incompatible) was found (Wald chi-square = 2.41, df = 1, p = .121). 
The order in which the rules were learned was also examined and a significant 
main effect was identified (Wald chi-square = 25.279, df = 1, p <.001), with a 
21.09% reduction in the odds of success after switching conditions. A 
marginally significant interaction between associative rule and order of 
learning was identified (Wald chi-square = 3.32, p = .068). When testing the 
effect of the associative rule in the first block of discrimination learning it was 
found that the chance of success was significantly higher when learning a 
compatible rule (16.78% greater odds of being correct; Wald chi-square = 5.74, 
df = 1, p = .017; see Fig. 2.3, order = 1), however, in the second block of learning, 
i.e. after associative rules were switched, the type of associative rule being 
rewarded did not influence chance of success (Wald chi-square = 0.2257, df = 1, 
p = .635; see Fig. 2.3; order =2). While the analyses reported here examines the 
first 500 trials (see rationale above), when all data are included in a model 
similar results are found. A main effect of condition is still absent (Wald chi-
square = 2.2393, df = 1, p = .134), and a main effect of order is still present (Wald 
chi-square = 19.684, df = 1, p <.001). The effect of condition identified in the first 
learning block drops below the .05 significance cut-off (Wald chi-square = 
3.7498, df = 1, p = .053). This is likely due to an improved performance by the 
monkeys learning the incompatible rule between trials 500 and 950, and the 
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absence of Carlos, who exhibited the strongest bias and thus had reached 
criterion by trial 500.  
 
Figure 2.3: Mean proportion of correct responses in first 500 trials for 
compatible (red) and incompatible conditions (blue) when associative rules 
are first learned and when rules are switched (Second Learning Block). Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean (points and error bars are offset to 
prevent overlap). 
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Experiment 2: Methods: 
Subjects 
This second experiment examined repeated reversal learning of compatible and 
incompatible rules with two monkeys from experiment 1 (Carlos and Chico). 
These monkeys were selected as they were the best learners in the initial 
learning block of their respective conditions (see Table 2.1). These research 
sessions took place between October 2012 and July 2013, ten months after 
Carlos’ last session in experiment 1, and four months after Chico’s last session. 
Rewards presented and apparatus employed were the same as experiment 1, 
but slight modifications were made to the procedure.  
 
Procedure 
Both monkeys were tested in a similar fashion to experiment 1. Each session 
began with 4 colour discrimination trials. Once monkeys produced 4 correct 
responses to the colour stimulus they progressed to action discrimination trials. 
In the first block of learning Chico was rewarded for performing incompatible 
responses while Carlos was rewarded for performing compatible actions. 
Incorrect responses resulted in a three second time-out where the experimenter 
would turn their back to the monkey. One strategy employed by monkeys in 
experiment 1 in an effort to maximise rewards was to perform one action 
repeatedly, therefore receiving half of all rewards in each research session. To 
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improve speed of learning and to encourage switching between actions 
correctional procedures were introduced. If monkeys responded incorrectly on 
a trial the same trial was repeated until the monkey either performed the 
correct response or an incorrect response was performed a certain number of 
times. Initially, a trial was repeated up to five times if an incorrect action was 
performed, however, five consecutive “time-outs” became an overly stringent 
punishment and subject participation dropped. To increase participation, 
incorrect responses were instead repeated 3 times (this change occurred after 
264 trials for Chico, and after 78 trials for Carlos). These incidences were always 
scored as a single incorrect trial. 
 
Learning criterion in this second experiment was altered with the intention of 
decreasing the time taken for monkeys to demonstrate learning. To qualify as 
having learned an associative rule monkeys had to progress through the 
following stages. First, a monkey had to provide 65% or more correct responses 
on a test session consisting of twenty trials. Once this criterion had been met, on 
subsequent testing sessions monkeys were only tested on ten trial sets. To 
demonstrate evidence of learning, monkeys had to perform 80% or more 
correct responses on two consecutive sessions of ten trials (taking place at 
different testing sessions; i.e. a minimum of an hour between testing). This two-
tier criterion was employed as we wanted to offer monkeys sufficient 
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experience of the reward contingencies in the earlier stages of learning. 
However, we noticed in experiment 1 that in later stages of learning, monkeys 
would sometimes lose interest with the procedure after performing a number 
of consecutive correct responses (possibly due to satiation). It was predicted 
that reducing session length to 10 trials during later stages of learning would 
improve motivation to attend to the procedure and would therefore provide a 
better measure of learning. Once this criterion was met, the associative rule 
being rewarded was reversed. Over the course of the experiment, Carlos 
reached the required criterion for the compatible rule three times and the 
incompatible rule twice. Chico reached the criterion for both conditions twice. 
To retain comparable numbers of learning blocks for each monkey, Carlos’ first 
four blocks of learning were analysed.  
 
Data analyses 
The first response to each trial was coded as a binary response variable (correct 
or incorrect) – correct responses to a repeated trial were not counted (see 
description of correctional procedures above). As it was expected that trial 
number within each learning block would significantly predict success in each 
learning block, this measure was included in every model that tested our 
hypotheses. The overall effect of the associative rule being rewarded 
(compatible versus incompatible) was examined using a generalised linear 
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mixed model (GLM) with a binomial distribution and logit link function, with 
condition and monkey as predictor variables. An interaction between condition 
and monkey was also examined. To examine whether the order in which the 
associative rules were first learned had an effect on overall performance, a 
GLM was created with this factor included as a fixed effect (for Chico the 
incompatible rule was learned first, for Carlos the compatible rule was learned 
first). Finally, to examine if there was any change in performance over repeated 
opportunities to switch between associative rules, the number of the learning 
block (1st-4th) was included in a GLM as a predictor variable. These analyses 
were also performed for Chico and Carlos separately and the same results were 
identified so only analyses with individual included as a fixed factor are 
reported. Analyses were performed with the same software packages as 
reported in experiment 1.  
 
Experiment 2: Results 
Descriptive data for the number of trials it took before each monkey reached 
the learning criteria can be seen in Table 2.2. A GLM identified trial number 
within a learning block as a significant predictor of success (Wald chi-square = 
71.501, df = 1, p <.0001), with an increase of .27% in the odds of success as trial 
number increases by 1 in a learning block. No overall main-effect of condition 
was identified (Wald chi-square = 1.707, df = 1, p = .191; see Figure 2.4a). 
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Table 2.2. Number of sessions before each monkey reached learning criteria 
for each learning block. The initial of the rule learned is in brackets after the 
trial number (compatible =c; incompatible =i). 
 No. Trials Before Reaching Criterion 
Learning Block  Carlos Chico Total 
1 200 (c) 204 (i) 404 
2 166 (i) 267 (c) 433 
3 60 (c) 551 (i) 611 
4 280 (i) 541 (c) 821 
5 235(c)   
Total 941 1563 2269 
 
A significant effect of monkey was found with Carlos performing better on 
average (65.36% greater probability of being correct; Wald chi-square = 25.161, 
df = 1, p<.0001), and a significant interaction was found between monkey and 
condition (Wald chi-square = 9.443, df = 1, p = .0021). There was no difference 
between conditions for Chico (Wald chi-square = .343, df = 1, p = .558) while 
Carlos performed significantly better on compatible trials (59.32% greater 
chance of a correct response; Wald chi-square = 10.806, df =1, p = .001).  
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Figure 2.4: a) Mean proportion of correct responses in experiment 2 when 
differentiated by a) the associative rule being rewarded (compatible or 
incompatible); and b) the first associative rule that each monkey was 
rewarded for in both experiment 1 and experiment 2. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. 
 
a) 
b) 
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In a separate GLM, the effect of whether learning a rule first influenced success 
identified a main effect of learning a rule (Wald chi-square = 5.235, df = 1, p = 
.0221; see Figure 2.4b). However, an interaction between monkey and learning 
order was found (Wald chi-square = 5.915, df = 1, p = .0150), and when simple 
effects are examined the effect of learning order is only significant for Carlos 
(Wald chi-square = 10.806, df = 1, p = .0010), not for Chico (Wald-chi-square = 
.0343. df = 1, p = .558) suggesting the main effect is driven by Carlos’ 
performance. 
 
Finally, modelling whether learning block has a significant effect on success 
identified a main effect of learning block (Wald chi-square = 51.006, df = 1, 
p<.0001, see Figure 2.5), where success was reduced on average by 25.77% for 
each successive learning block; there was also a significant interaction between 
monkey and learning block (Wald chi-square = 4.817, df =1, p = .0282), where 
the effect of  learning block was significantly greater for Chico (Wald chi-square 
= 46.419, df = 1, p <.0001; odds ratio = -31.56%) than Carlos (Wald chi-squared = 
10.836, df = 1, p = .0010; odds ratio = -18.14%). 
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Figure 2.5: Mean proportion of correct responses by learning block with 
standard errors represented by error bars.  
 
 
Discussion 
The first time monkeys had to learn an associative rule between observing an 
action stimulus and performing an action, the individuals who learned a 
compatible rule performed significantly better than those who were required to 
learn an incompatible association. This finding is the first evidence of automatic 
imitation in a nonhuman primate, contributing to existing comparative 
evidence in birds, and dogs (Mui et al., 2008; Range et al., 2011). Similarly, 
while evidence of action imitation in monkeys is scarce (i.e. Fragaszy, Deputte, 
Cooper, Colbert-White, & Hémery, 2011), this result complements evidence of 
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body part matching (mouth and hand) previously found in other New World 
species (Voelkl & Huber, 2000, 2007b) and more recently in Old World 
monkeys (van de Waal & Whiten, 2012). This is the first evidence of automatic 
imitation in capuchin monkeys, but it is worth noting that while monkeys 
performed better in initial trials with imitative rules, only one monkey reaching 
the pre-set criterion level that would have demonstrated more valid evidence of 
having learned the discrimination rule. The difficulty that monkeys faced in 
transferring their previously learned colour-action association skills to an 
action-action associative paradigm demonstrates that automatic imitation is not 
necessarily “automatic” in the sense of being reflexive and effortless or that 
action matching is readily available to capuchin monkeys (as evidenced by 
previous research; e.g. Fragaszy et al., 2011). Instead, the effect identified here 
may be a more implicit bias that this specific procedure can tap into. If an 
innate action-matching system is present in capuchin monkeys, as is supposed 
in humans and other nonhuman primates (Ferrari et al., 2006; Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1997), it is certainly not overtly evident.  
 
To examine the origin of imitative ability, predictions were made concerning 
imitative learning that followed counter-imitative learning. The better 
performance of imitators in the first learning block did not persist once reward 
contingencies were reversed. The AIM hypothesis predicts that imitation is 
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facilitated by proprioceptive feedback loops where a performed action can be 
compared to an observed action in a supramodal representational system 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). This system would underlie imitative action 
regardless of previous experience. Here it was found that the experience of 
responding to an observed action with a different action in the initial block of 
learning eliminated any bias toward imitation in the second block. If an innate 
supramodal system facilitates action matching it might be expected that a bias 
to imitate would persist following incompatible training. However, it is 
important to note that this null finding cannot be interpreted as direct evidence 
against an AIM approach. A multimodal action matching system that exists at 
birth does not discount later learning that may override an innate bias. It is also 
worth noting that while the associative rule being rewarded in the initial block 
significantly predicted performance (which was not the case in the second 
block of learning), the interaction between order and condition was only 
marginally significant and so this difference in performance between the first 
and second learning block is tentative. Nevertheless, the comparable level of 
success observed in both conditions in the second block of learning corresponds 
with predictions made by the ASL account of imitation and effects observed in 
humans and other animals (Catmur et al., 2007; Mui et al., 2008; Range et al., 
2011).  In a second experiment, further efforts to examine imitative ability in 
two capuchin monkeys showed no evidence that imitation is intrinsically easier 
than counter-imitation overall. One monkey did perform better when 
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compatible trials were rewarded, and this might be interpreted as a bias to 
imitate. However, without discovering a similar effect in the monkey initially 
rewarded for performing incompatible responses, it is difficult to conclusively 
state whether this finding is driven by a bias towards imitation, or towards the 
first-learned association. Together, these studies provide support for an 
associative explanation of imitation. Importantly, these results are also 
compatible with other accounts of imitations that stress the role of sensorimotor 
experience (i.e. the ideomotor approach), and indeed some proponents of these 
alternative accounts have stated that associative learning is likely the 
mechanism that binds dual codes (Paulus, 2014). However, support for an 
associative account rests on a lack of evidence for a disposition to imitate 
action, and due to the small sample studied here (especially in experiment 2) it 
may be that the design had insufficient statistical power to detect a smaller 
effect. 
 
Nonetheless, these results contribute to a growing body of evidence in support 
of the ASL approach to imitation in human and nonhuman animals (Catmur et 
al., 2008, 2009; Mui et al., 2008; Range et al., 2011). The best evidence in support 
of an innate action matching system comes from the literature on neonatal 
imitation in human and nonhuman primates (Ferrari et al., 2006; Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1977), but the reliability of such results has been questioned on 
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numerous occasions (Anisfeld, 1996; Hayes & Watson, 1981; Lodder et al., 2014; 
Ray & Heyes, 2011a). While a recent review has suggested that null findings 
may be the result of low statistical power (Simpson et al., 2014), the debate over 
the validity of a neonatal imitation effect is not yet resolved. Also, there are still 
many questions to be answered concerning imitation in infancy. For example, 
while numerous studies have reported evidence of neonatal imitation in 
primates (Ferrari et al., 2006; Meltzoff & Moore, 1983), it is unclear why this 
tendency diminishes after a number of weeks (e.g. Ferrari et al., 2006) to emerge 
again around 2 years of age (Dickerson, Gerhardstein, Zack, & Barr, 2008). 
More theory-driven research is necessary to test hypotheses related to the 
ontogeny of imitative ability and its underling neurological basis. Some recent 
studies of imitation in infants and children have found support for associative 
accounts (de Klerk et al., 2014; Paulus, Hunnius, Van Elk, & Bekkering, 2012), 
and in the next chapter I too will test predictions based on the ASL approach in 
human children. 
  
While examples of imitative learning are rare in capuchin monkeys, the role of 
imitation in facilitating affiliation are also worth considering here. The 
automatic imitation effect identified in this study complements evidence that 
capuchins are able to recognise corresponding actions of others, for example, 
when being imitated (Paukner, Suomi, Visalberghi, & Ferrari, 2009). However, 
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if the mechanism that links observable action to an executed action is forged 
through associative learning then it is possible that monkeys that have been 
trained to respond in counter-imitative ways may show increased interest and 
affiliation towards those that perform contingent non-matching actions. The 
affiliative facet of imitation needs to be further examined in the light of these 
findings. For example, if it is discovered that imitation’s role in affiliation is 
robust to manipulation (i.e. to incompatible training) then the proposal that 
imitation is learned should be re-evaluated. 
  
Previous research of reversal learning has discovered a robust effect whereby if 
reward contingencies are reversed after an associative rule is learned, the 
learning of the new rule generally takes longer than the initial learning 
(Feldman & Albuquerque, 1968). This effect was observed in experiment 2. 
However, in successive reversals it is generally found that learning is quicker 
and fewer mistakes are performed (Bond, Kamil, & Balda, 2007; Feldman & 
Albuquerque, 1968). Due to these previous observations it was expected that 
alternating between associative rules would eventually become easier for our 
two subjects in experiment two. This was not the case, with one monkey taking 
longer to reach criterion after each consecutive reversal (Chico; see Table 2.2). 
Adoption of “win-stay, lose-shift” strategies in these types of paradigms are 
thought to be indicative of cognitive flexibility and have been noted in apes (for 
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a review see Shettleworth, 1998), and corvids (Bond et al., 2007). Here, we 
found no evidence of flexible learning strategies, which corresponds with 
findings from previous reversal learning experiments in capuchins (Beran et al., 
2008). However, the task examined here is more complex than the tasks 
generally used in tests of reversal learning. Rather than making a choice 
between two available stimuli (e.g. Bond et al., 2007), monkeys had to perform 
two distinct actions towards two distinct stimuli, in effect learning two 
associations instead of one. This increased level of complexity may make 
comparative assessment of learning ability in capuchin monkeys problematic.  
 
Overall, this study contributes to a growing literature in support of the ASL 
approach to imitation. However, this is only a first step towards understanding 
the ontogeny of this ability in primates. Further work incorporating the SRC 
paradigm with New World and Old World monkeys is necessary to provide 
robust evidence of automatic imitation in nonhuman primates. It has been 
suggested that automatic imitation can become a tool through which we can 
examine the behavioural artefact of mirror neurons (Heyes, 2011). If that is to be 
the case, and if the study of automatic imitation effect is to become an 
important tool for answering questions of social cognition, the answers will be 
found in future, careful and controlled cognitive and neuroscience experiments. 
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Chapter 3: Automatic imitation in children 
 
Due to the correspondence problem, copying the behavioural morphology of 
an action is often considered to be cognitively demanding (Nehaniv & 
Dautenhahn, 2002; discussed in detail in Chapter One). Imitating actions that in 
some cases are opaque to the imitator requires a mechanism for transforming 
sensory information into a corresponding matching action. In the preceding 
chapters, two opposing models explaining how this correspondence problem is 
solved were examined; one approach predicts humans are born with an inter-
modal representation space where proprioceptive feedback from an action can 
be compared to a sensory representation of the same action, facilitating action 
imitation (the active inter-modal mapping hypothesis, AIM; Meltzoff & Moore, 
1997). On the other hand, domain-general accounts proposes associative 
learning links sensory and motor representations to overcome the 
correspondence problem (ASL, and ideomotor approach; Heyes & Ray, 2000; 
Brass & Heyes, 2005). In Chapter Two, predictions of these accounts were 
examined in capuchin monkeys providing support for a domain-general model 
of imitation, focussing on the ASL model. The ASL approach has also been 
extensively studied in adults, however, no study has yet tested its predictions 
in children. In this chapter I will discuss research on the development of 
imitative ability in humans and further test predictions of an associative 
account.  
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There is no consensus in the field of developmental psychology about when 
infants first exhibit a capacity for imitation. However, researchers 
predominantly fall into one of two camps. Some believe an imitative faculty is 
present from birth (Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; Nagy et al., 2005; Simpson, 
Murray, Paukner, & Ferrari, 2014), while others believe imitative ability 
develops throughout the first years of life (Jones, 2009; Ray & Heyes, 2011). The 
observation that within hours of being born infants imitate facial gestures was 
first reported by Meltzoff and Moore (1977) and there have been many attempts 
to replicate these findings, with mixed results. Some studies report evidence of 
a number of actions being imitated from birth including tongue protrusion, 
mouth opening, finger movement, and emotional expressions (Field, Woodson, 
Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983; Nagy et al., 2005; 
Nagy, Pilling, Orvos, & Molnar, 2013), while others find either selective 
imitation of only certain actions or no imitation at all (Anisfeld et al., 2001; 
Hayes & Watson, 1981; Heimann, Nelson, & Schaller, 1989). Recent studies in 
nonhuman primates have identified further evidence of neonatal imitation of 
mouth opening and tongue protrusion in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes, Bard, 
2007; Myowa-Yamakoshi, Tomonaga, Tanaka, & Matsuzawa, 2004), and 
evidence of lip-smacking and tongue protrusion imitation in 3-day old rhesus 
macaques (Macaca mulatta,  Ferrari et al., 2006; however, there was no evidence 
of neonatal imitation of these actions when infants were 1, 7 or 14 days old, and 
no evidence was found of mouth opening or hand opening imitation). Evidence 
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from nonhuman primates lends weight to the notion of an evolved and innate 
action matching system that is at least sensitive to certain actions.  
 
However, reviews of the evidence often draw conflicting conclusions about the 
presence of such a system. In the same year that Meltzoff (1996) described the 
human infant as an imitative generalist, Anisfield (1996) declared that only 
tongue protrusion is imitated by neonates. More recent reviews of the literature 
have been similarly inconsistent (Lodder et al., 2014; Ray & Heyes, 2011a; 
Simpson et al., 2014). Ray and Heyes (2011) compare the number of positive 
and negative results for the main gestures studied and conclude that while 
reliable evidence of tongue protrusion is available, there is no support for the 
other gestures. Evidence of imitation of tongue protrusion has been explained 
as an innate reflex possibly related to feeding (Jacobson, 1979) or an artefact of 
general arousal (Jones, 1996). The notion that tongue protrusion may be an 
innate response to certain arousing stimuli that may facilitate exploration is 
supported by an increase in tongue protrusion in response to music (Jones, 
2006), lights (Jones, 1996), and moving objects (Jacobson & Kagan, 1969). 
However, a recent study found that imitated tongue protrusion was not related 
to an increase in hand or finger movement or general activity state which 
suggests no link between tongue protrusion and general arousal (Nagy et al., 
2013). Whether through imitation or through arousal, the tongue protrusion 
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effect is reliable, but the ability to imitate one action is not convincing evidence 
of a generalised multi-modal imitation mechanism (Ray & Heyes, 2011). In fact, 
some have argued that the “tongue protrusion effect” may lead to evidence of 
other actions being imitated. Anisfeld (1996) argues that the scoring methods 
used in some studies could generate false positive findings of other imitative 
actions as a by-product of a tongue protrusion effect. For example, the second 
most widely studied action in this literature is “mouth opening”. Evidence of 
mouth opening imitation is often based upon a comparison of the frequency of 
mouth opening actions performed by an infant when tongue protrusion is 
being modelled by the experimenter and when mouth opening is being 
modelled by the experimenter. If an infant performs more mouth opening 
actions while the same action is being modelled, evidence of neonatal imitation 
is reported. However, higher rates of mouth opening when that action is being 
modelled may be an artefact of tongue protrusion imitation limiting the 
potential for mouth opening actions during the modelling of tongue protrusion. 
The frequency of multiple actions within a given response period are not 
mutually exclusive and this is not taken into account in many studies.  
 
Other reviews draw more confident conclusions concerning the validity of 
neonatal imitation. A recent example of such a review drew attention to 
discrepancies between sample sizes reported in studies that have found a 
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neonatal imitation effect and those that have not (Simpson et al., 2014). The 
authors examined the effect sizes reported in publications that observed effects 
of neonatal imitation and calculate that a sample size of 26 is necessary to find 
the smallest effect size reported in the literature (with a given power of 80%; 
Cohen, 1988). The authors subsequently show that most studies with the 
required sample size find evidence of neonatal imitation while those that do not 
meet the requirement find null results. While the authors are correct to draw 
attention to the importance of a priori power analyses they fail to take into 
consideration criticisms of coding discrepancies highlighted by previous 
reviews (Anisfeld, 1996). Furthermore, Simpson and colleagues (2014) report 
that the effect sizes found in studies of neonatal imitation range from small to 
large (see Cohen, 1992), yet use “the most conservative estimate of effect size” 
in their power analysis (p. 7). This power analysis then provides the sample 
size required to find the smallest effect reported in the literature, not the “real” 
effect of neonatal imitation which is likely larger. An analysis with a less 
conservative estimate of effect size would recommend a lower sample size and 
the authors’ critique would need to be revaluated.  
 
Further work is necessary to confirm the presence of a neonatal effect. 
Systematic reviews of the subject use different criteria on which to base 
conclusions (e.g. Nagy et al., 2013; Ray & Heyes, 2011; Simpson et al., 2014), and 
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while a meta-analysis of existing data would be useful, it is also important that 
further empirical work examines this effect with criticisms of methods, coding 
practices, and data analyses taken into account. While a consensus answer to 
the neonatal imitation question is not forthcoming some have suggested that 
overconfidence in neonatal imitation may distract from the empirical study of 
how imitative ability develops throughout infancy (Jones, 2007). Regardless of 
the presence or absence of innate imitative ability it is important to consider 
both predispositions to imitation and also the influence of ontogenetic 
processes.  
 
What is the alternative to the innate imitation system proposed by Meltzoff and 
Moore (1997)? First of all, it is worth noting that an ability to imitate at birth 
does not preclude the involvement of learning processes later in development. 
In fact, some argue that evidence of imitative ability diminishing over the first 
few months (Ferrari et al., 2006; Fontaine, 1984) suggests that neonatal imitation 
may be a specific adaptation for early bonding and a different imitation faculty 
develops later to facilitate learning  (Oostenbroek, Slaughter, Nielsen, & 
Suddendorf, 2013). There are few studies of the development of imitation in 
infancy, a deficiency that Jones (2007) attributes to the widely held belief that 
infants imitate from birth, however, early work in the field of development 
psychology suggested imitation developed gradually through stages.  Before 
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Metlzoff and Moore’s seminal work on neonatal imitation, Jean Piaget 
(1951/1962) proposed a stage model of imitation that did not presuppose any 
innate imitative ability. By studying his own children Piaget described the 
development of imitation throughout the first two years. Observations of 
infants less than a week old that cried upon hearing another infant cry (see 
Chapter 5 for further discussion of emotional contagion), and imitation of head 
movements at three months were not attributed to intentional imitation (the 
latter effect was described as an effort on the part of the infant to maintain the 
perceptual experience of movement). However, after six months, all of Piaget’s 
children imitated actions already present in their repertoires and which they 
could see themselves perform. Subsequently, Piaget noted that imitation of 
actions unobservable to the infant seemed to develop through practice. Actions 
that produced sounds were imitated sooner, possibly due to sounds acting as 
indices allowing the mapping of an observed action performed by another onto 
the unobservable action performed by the infant (Piaget, 1951/1962; this 
observation corresponds with the ASL model’s predictions that certain stimuli 
will facilitate the link between motor and sensory representations of opaque 
actions; see Figure 3.1).   
 
Before performing novel actions, Piaget described how his children made 
approximate attempts at imitating these actions. For example, upon seeing an 
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adult make a pointing gesture, one of Piaget’s children would attempt various 
finger movements, but did not imitate the specific pointing action until later. At 
these later stages of development, actions were only imitated when they were 
in some way analogous to actions already in the infant’s repertoire, and 
responses were often only approximate as children would try out actions to 
“see whether one of them will fit the model” (Piaget 1951/1962l p . 51). In the 
second year, Piaget observed these imitative attempts to become more exact but 
often retained some level of gradual approximation, or training, before expert 
imitation was achieved. Finally, in the middle of the second year, more 
advanced imitative ability was noted, and Piaget describes that the 
experimentation observed in the earlier stages becomes internalised facilitating 
quicker imitation of novel actions. While the generalisability of these findings is 
limited by the preliminary nature of these case studies, this work is still the 
most detailed longitudinal account of the development of imitative ability in 
infancy, and suggests that the imitative faculty develops gradually throughout 
infancy. However, some more recent work has furthered our understanding of 
the development of early imitative ability.   
 
More recent observations align quite closely with Piaget’s earlier reports. Jones 
(2007) conducted a cross-sectional study of imitative behaviour in 162 infants 
from 6 months of age to 20 months. Eight actions were modelled by a parent 
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and were categorised according to certain properties, including whether the 
actions were visible when being performed, or whether the actions produced a 
sound. Reliable imitation of any kind was not identified at 6 months, and 
actions that produced sounds were first imitated between 8 and 12 months of 
age. The final actions to be imitated were silent and were not observable by the 
infant performing them. Interestingly, one of these actions was tongue 
protrusion which was not imitated reliably until 16 months. These results 
closely match an earlier case-study performed by the same author (Jones, 2006). 
Other studies support the idea of imitative ability developing throughout the 
2nd year. Nielsen and Dissanayake (2004) found that infants start imitating 
synchronous actions around 18 months of age. Masur and Rodemaker (1999) 
found that at 1 year of age infants are already imitating actions performed on 
objects, but that intransitive actions only begin to be imitated consistently at 
around 17 months. These findings describe a different picture of imitation in 
infants and how it may develop throughout infancy. Regardless of whether 
imitation is innate or learned it is clear that imitation in the first years of life is 
limited in its diversity. However, by the age of three it is widely recognised that 
children are highly competent imitators, often over-imitating unnecessary 
actions to achieve outcomes (Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan, Whiten, 
Flynn, & Horner, 2007; Piaget, 1951/1962). If imitation develops throughout 
infancy, it is necessary to explain what shape this learning may take.  
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An associative account of imitative ability was outlined in the first two 
chapters. Here, this model will be summarised briefly with a focus on its 
predictions in relation to the development of imitation in humans. The 
Associative Sequence Learning (ASL) approach was developed by Ray and 
Heyes in 2000 to describe the cognitive process facilitating imitative learning. 
This model has subsequently been adapted to describe the development of 
mirror neurons (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009; Heyes, 2010). The ASL theory 
proposes that an imitator develops links between sensory and motor 
representations of actions through experience. Vertical associations are created 
between sensory and motor representations of actions through experience (see 
vertical lines between sensory 1 and motor 1 in Figure 3.1). This experience 
occurs whenever sensory and motor representations are available at the same 
time. For example, this includes occasions where someone performs an action 
they can see, when observing an action in a mirror, and during synchronous 
social interactions (Heyes & Ray, 2000). These sensory-motor associations are 
created prior to imitation, and facilitate imitation when an action is observed at 
a later time. Other stimuli may facilitate the link between sensory and motor 
action units (see stimuli 1, 2, etc. in Figure 3.1). For example, the vocalised word 
“smile” may become associated with both the performance of a smile and the 
observation of someone else smiling, facilitating an indirect association 
between sensory and motor representations of an action. This indirect route to 
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forming an association is thought to be especially important when an action is 
opaque.  
 
Figure 3.1. The Associative Sequence Learning approach redrawn from Heyes 
and Ray (2000). 
 
The horizontal lines presented in Figure 3.1 represent associations between 
sensory representations of action units that allow more complex behavioural 
strings to be executed. Heyes and Ray (2000) suggest that these horizontal 
associations can be mediated by contextual cues (i.e. the completion of an 
earlier action). As previously mentioned, this approach is closely aligned with 
the ideomotor approach discussed in Chapter 2 which makes similar 
predictions concerning the influence of experience on imitative ability. The ASL 
approach has been applied to explain mirror neurons where sensory and motor 
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representations are instead discussed as sensory and motor neurons (Heyes, 
2010). Connections between neurons develop through sensorimotor experience 
and after an association has been created a motor neuron may fire solely upon 
seeing an action being performed. This model is gathering empirical support 
from studies of adult humans through the analyses of automatic imitation 
effects.  
 
Automatic imitation is not another discrete category of social learning to be 
included with the already defined mechanisms (see Chapter One; or Hoppitt & 
Laland, 2008). Instead, automatic imitation is a stimulus-response compatibility 
effect that is detected when the presentation of an action stimulus (e.g. a picture 
of a hand opening) facilitates the performance of that action and interferes with 
the execution of an opposite action (e.g. closing a hand; for a review see Heyes, 
2011). This automatic imitation effect may be a behavioural indicator of the 
vertical associations between sensory and motor representations of an action 
(or mirror neuron activity), and the effect has been reliably identified in 
numerous studies (e.g. Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Heyes, 
Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). More 
recently, automatic imitation has been employed to test assumptions of the ASL 
hypothesis (Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005; Press, Gillmeister, & 
Heyes, 2007). For example, in a first experiment Heyes and colleagues (2005) 
94 
 
found that when participants were asked to open or close their hand after 
seeing a picture of a hand begin to move they were quicker when the stimulus 
hand was performing a compatible action and slower when it was performing 
an incompatible action. In a second experiment participants were trained to 
respond to seeing an open hand by closing their hand, and to open their hand 
after seeing a closed hand (incompatible sensorimotor experience). A day later, 
participants were asked to perform the same simple reaction task that produced 
an automatic imitation effect in the first experiment; however, after the 
incompatible sensorimotor training the automatic imitation effect was 
eliminated. This suggests that automatic imitation is reliant on experience and 
can be disrupted by counter-imitative training. A more recent study examined 
a similar effect in mirror neuron activity (Catmur et al., 2008). Some 
participants were given counter-imitative training where they were required to 
move their foot after seeing a hand move and move their hand after seeing a 
foot move; other participants were given compatible imitative training. 
Twenty-four hours later participants’ brains were scanned in a functional 
magnetic resonance imager while being presented with video stimuli of hands 
and feet moving. Activity in brain areas associated with mirror neuron function 
was observed in both groups of participants, however, areas of the mirror 
neuron system that were active upon seeing hand actions in the group that had 
received compatible training were active when observing foot actions in the 
incompatible group; the opposite effect was observed when stimuli were 
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reversed. This suggests that experience of contiguous sensory-motor activity 
forges connections between representations of actions that can be observed at 
the neurological level, even if the sensory and motor actions are different. 
Support for the ASL model is growing based on experimental evidence with 
adults, however, for the model to be useful it must take into account the real 
sensorimotor experience of infants and children, and explain whether this 
experience can facilitate the development of imitation.  
 
A crucial aspect of the ASL approach to imitation is that experience forges 
connections between sensory and motor representations of an action, and while 
this has been explored in laboratory settings through training protocols 
(Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, Brass, & Heyes, 2008; Heyes et al., 2005) it is less 
clear whether this type of experience is common in an infant’s environment. A 
few studies have examined imitation of both parents and infants in naturalistic 
play settings. Pawlby (1977) observed mother-infant interactions between the 
ages of four and eight months and found that approximately 16% of 
interactions involved some form of imitation by the mother. Kokkinaki and 
Vitalaki (2013) found that three-four imitative interactions (including both 
actions and vocalisations) took place every ten minutes between mothers and 
infants, and grandmothers and infants when children are 2 to 10 months, with 
66%-79% of imitative interactions performed by the caregiver. Similarly, one 
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study found that parents imitate a child’s vocalisation once every 4-5 minutes 
(Kokkinaki & Kugiumutzakis, 2000), and an earlier study found that 41% - 57% 
of non-cry vocalisations were matched between infants and mothers, primarily 
driven by mothers imitating infants (Papousek & Papouskek, 1989). It is worth 
mentioning that in many of these studies of free-play, infants are also found to 
imitate which suggests early imitative ability (e.g. Kokkinaki & Kugiumutzakis, 
2000; Theano Kokkinaki & Vitalaki, 2013). Flynn, Masur, and Eichorst (2004) 
examined factors that predict imitation between mother-infant dyads and 
found that the rate of imitation by a mother was predicted by the imitative 
opportunities available to the mother (i.e. as infants performed more actions or 
vocalisations imitation opportunities increased). On the other hand, an infant’s 
imitation of a mother’s action was better predicted by the infant’s own 
motivation to perform actions independently, and was not related to 
opportunities that afforded imitation. This suggests that imitation of actions is 
primarily driven by parents imitating infants, and that infant imitation is more 
likely to be the result of chance. Together, this research suggests that 
appropriate sensorimotor experience takes place during an infant’s 
development, however, some authors question whether the amount of 
experience observed in free-play scenarios would be adequate to develop 
imitative ability (Simpson et al., 2014). Nevertheless, sensorimotor experience 
does occur during infancy so the next step is to observe the effect of this 
interaction on behaviour. Building upon evidence of synchronous and imitative 
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experience in infancy and childhood, here we set out to test the effect of this 
influence on behaviour.  
 
In the current study I aimed to test specific predictions of the ASL approach to 
imitation in children. Taking inspiration from previous studies of automatic 
imitation in adults and animals (Range et al., 2011; Stürmer et al., 2000) a 
method for assessing automatic imitation in children was developed. While all 
evidence suggests that ability to imitate actions is established by the age of 
three (Jones, 2006; 2007; Horner & Whiten, 2005; Masur and Rodemaker, 1999; 
Piaget 1951/1962), to begin to examine the ASL approach children between the 
ages of three and seven were tested. The decision to study children already 
possessing imitative ability was largely due to a methodological limitation, as a 
previous study has found that young children (three-four) struggle with the 
task that we employed (see pilot study reported in Simpson & Riggs, 2011). 
This task required participants to make one of two actions in response to an 
action performed by an experimenter. Four different actions were used: hand 
clapping, hand waving, hand closing, and pointing. One game required 
participants to clap or wave, the other game required participants to close their 
hands or point. In compatible conditions participants were asked to respond 
with the same action as the experimenter; in incompatible conditions children 
were asked to perform the opposite action. Each participant experienced all 
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iterations of the game. We expected strong stimulus-response compatibility 
effects as suggested by previous research on automatic imitation (Brass et al., 
2001; Stürmer et al., 2000), however, the primary aim of our study was to 
predict specific automatic imitation effects based on the ASL hypothesis.  
 
The action sets used in this study were chosen based on two criteria. First, all 
actions had to be simple to perform. Secondly, it was expected that children 
have a greater amount of sensorimotor experience performing and observing 
two of the actions. To my knowledge no previous study has described the 
occurrence of specific synchronised actions in childhood and therefore these 
actions were chosen through discussions of synchronous actions that children 
regularly perform during games and social interactions. It is thought that both 
clapping and waving are performed in synchrony during some social 
interaction (e.g. applause and waving goodbye), and are also performed 
together during some games. On the other hand, pointing and hand closing, 
while equally easy to perform, were not considered to be performed in 
synchrony or to be imitated as often. Our first prediction based on the ASL 
approach of imitation is that automatic imitation effects (i.e. the difference in 
reaction time between imitating actions and performing different actions) will 
be greater for actions that have been imitated more in past interactions (the 
commonly imitated action set). Also, the ASL approach predicts that external 
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stimuli may facilitate the association of visual and motor properties of an 
action. Knowing that reactions times are faster when responding to 
multisensory stimuli (Andreassi & Greco, 1975; Hershenson, 1962) we may then 
predict that an automatic imitation effect may be stronger for an action that 
produces other environmental stimuli. The only action that produces a non-
visual stimulus is clapping which also produces sound. We predict that the 
automatic imitation effect will be greatest for this action. Finally, we predict 
that if automatic imitation develops through experience that short periods of 
counter-imitation experience preceding imitation trials may reduce reaction 
times when imitating. If this is the case we should find that when incompatible 
experimental trials precede imitative trials that automatic imitation effects will 
be suppressed. It is difficult to predict whether, or how, age might affect 
automatic imitation. For example, it might be expected that cumulative 
sensorimotor experience throughout development might facilitate quicker 
reaction time on imitative trials in older children while making it more difficult 
to inhibit imitative responses during counter imitative-trials; this might lead to 
an increase in automatic imitation through development. However, children 
get better at inhibiting imitative responses as they get older (Simpson & Riggs, 
2011), which may lead to quicker reaction times when counter-imitating, 
subsequently reducing automatic imitation effects in older children. These 
developmental effects together may cancel themselves out leading to a stable 
automatic imitation effect throughout development with overall quicker 
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reaction times for both imitative and counter-imitative responses. Due to the 
uncertainty over the direction of these effects, age related variation will be 
examined without a priori hypotheses.  
 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 101 children aged between 3 and 7. Twenty-nine participants 
were excluded from the analyses for either not finishing the research session, 
for not performing more than 60% correct responses in any one of the four 
conditions, for not paying attention to the experimenter during the stimulus 
presentation, or for having parents or guardians interfere in their responses 
(mean age of excluded participants = 4.33 years, standard deviation, SD = 1.24 
years). Seventy-two participants were included in the analysis; mean age was 
5.74 years (SD = 1.29 years) and 39 participants were female. Participants were 
recruited at the Royal Zoological Society of Scotland’s Edinburgh Zoo in July 
2013, and voluntarily completed research sessions for rewards of stickers. 
Ethical approval was granted by the University of Stirling Psychology ethics 
committee, and consent was given by the child’s parent or guardian before the 
session began. 
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Materials 
A Sony CX405 Handycam was used to record each research session. 
 
Design 
Over the course of a research session four different games were played using 
two different sets of action. For two of the games participants had to produce 
actions that are commonly imitated or are commonly performed during 
synchronous activity (Commonly Imitated Set, CIS). The actions chosen for the 
CIS were “waving” and “clapping” (see Figure 3.2, a-b), as children often clap 
hands together in games and during applause, and waving is also often 
imitated or performed in synchrony (e.g. in waving goodbye). Furthermore, 
waving and clapping have been identified as two of the earliest actions to be 
imitated by children (Jones, 2007). The actions performed in the other action set 
(the Rarely Imitated Set, RIS) were “pointing” and “hand closing” (see Figure 
3.2, c-d). While these behaviours are as easy to perform as the CIS there is no 
evidence that they are performed in synchrony to the same degree. Using a 
stimulus-response compatibility paradigm two different games were played 
with each action set; both games required the participant to respond to the 
actions performed by the experimenter.  
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Figure 3.2. Action stimuli used in study; arrows indicate movement. Actions 
A (clapping) and B (waving) are part of the commonly imitated set of actions 
while actions C (hand closing) and D (point) are considered rarely imitated 
actions. 
 
One game required the participant to watch the actions of the experimenter and 
perform with the same action (compatible response rule), and the other game 
required the participant to perform the alternate action (incompatible response 
rule). To be included in the analysis a participant had to complete both actions 
sets with both response rules. The order of the games was counterbalanced for 
both response rule and action set.  
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Procedure 
During a research session the experimenter and participant sat facing each 
other across a table. Two sheets of A4 paper were attached to the table in front 
of both the participant and the experimenter (see Figure 3.3). At the beginning 
of the session the experimenter explained that a game was to be played and to 
begin the child must place their hands flat on the sheet of paper (see Figure 3.3). 
The experimenter demonstrated the two actions to be performed in the first 
game and asked the participant if they were able to perform each of the two 
actions: E.g. “Can you wave your hands like this”. Next, the experimenter 
explained the response rule for each of the two actions and asked the 
participant to demonstrate a response: E.g. “In this game if you see me wave 
my hands (experimenter waves his hands), you do the different action, the 
opposite action, and you clap your hands (experimenter claps his hands). So, if I 
do this (experimenter waves his hands) what do you do?” After explaining the 
response rules for both actions the participants’ understanding of the rules 
were tested by asking the child to respond to both actions in order. If the 
participant performed an incorrect response the rules were repeated and a 
further two trials tested comprehension. Correct responses during this pre-test 
phase were rewarded with verbal praise, and if both responses were correct the 
child progressed to the testing phase. If the child did not perform two 
consecutive correct responses after four pre-test trials the child progressed to 
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the testing phase nonetheless. If these children passed the criteria for inclusion 
(see below), their data was included in the analysis.  
 
Figure 3.3. Starting position for both experimenter and participant at the 
beginning of each trial.  
 
 
The testing phase consisted of ten response trials presented in a 
pseudorandomised order. Children were told to react as quickly as possible. To 
begin a trial both experimenter and participant placed their hands flat on the 
sheet of paper (see Figure 3.2); if the child did not have their hands on the 
paper they were prompted to do so (e.g. “hands flat”, “hands on the paper”). 
The experimenter would rapidly perform an action, return his hands to the 
starting position, and wait for the child to respond. During this testing phase 
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correct responses were not praised and incorrect responses were not corrected 
by the experimenter. If an incorrect action was performed the experimenter 
would wait approximately two seconds for the child to change their action. 
Between trials (correct and incorrect), children were encouraged to prepare 
themselves for the next trials with various verbal cues including “hands flat”, 
“ready”, and “next one”. After the tenth trial the child was praised for his or 
her performance, and told that the game was to be played again but with the 
rules changed around. The procedure described above was then repeated but 
with the response rules reversed. After completing ten test trials with both 
response rules, the same overall process was repeated with the different action 
set.  
 
Video Coding 
Videos were coded at a normal playing speed until a trial occurred- then the 
video was coded frame-by-frame to measure reaction time. Each session was 
recorded at 25 frames per second (fps; interlaced). Interlaced video allows for 
greater temporal resolution by overlapping adjacent frames to create a 
perceived resolution of 50 frames per second. The videos were coded at this 
higher rate of temporal resolution, and measurements are reported as such.  
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The response to each stimulus was coded as being correct or incorrect. If a 
participant’s response was incorrect initially but corrected before the next 
action was performed by the experimenter, the response was coded as being 
correct and the initial mistake was noted and pooled with other, uncorrected 
incorrect responses. A measure of reaction time started once an action was 
completed by the experimenter and ended once the completion criteria was met 
by the participant (see Table 1 for definitions of action completion). As actions 
were sometimes performed quicker by one of the participant’s hands, the 
measurement of reaction time ended once the action was completed by one 
hand in the case of all actions other than clapping. 
 
Data analyses 
To be included in the analyses participants had to perform correct responses on 
60% of trials within each game (i.e. for each response rule for both actions sets). 
This criterion was used to ensure that each participant had understood the 
rules of each condition. For the purpose of analyses, each participant’s overall 
performance was summarised to include the number of correct responses in 
each condition (including corrected trials), the number of mistakes made in 
each condition, and the average reaction time for each condition. 
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Table 3.1. Definitions used to begin and end a measurement of reaction time 
on a given trial.  
Action  Action Completion Criteria 
Wave Hands first change direction of movement (i.e. if hands were moving 
inwards, measurement began once hands began moving away from 
each other) 
Clap Hands make contact. 
Point Pointing finger visibly extended from the rest of the fingers 
Close hand Fingers are closed and pressed into the palm 
 
It is worth noting that the correct responses and mistakes are not inverse 
measurements, as a mistake can be corrected within a trial. For example, during 
a counter imitative session a participant might quickly imitate on five trials 
before correcting themselves to perform the correct response on each of the five 
trials. This participant’s summarised performance for that session would 
include 10 correct responses and 5 mistakes. Participants’ average reaction time 
for each condition was a measurement of their mean reaction time following 
removal of any outlying responses (± 2 standard deviations of original mean, 
3.6% of total trials).  
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Statistical Software 
All statistical analyses were performed in SPSS 19 and all figures and graphs 
were produced using R (R Core Team, 2014) in the Rstudio  environment 
(RStudio Team, 2014) using the ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2009). For repeated 
measures tests with more than two conditions Mauchly’s test of sphericity was 
performed and necessary adjustments were made based on Field (2013).  
 
Results 
To examine the overall effect of the two response rules and two action sets on 
reaction time (RT) a 2X2 repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
applied. A main effect of response rule was identified (F(1, 71)= 464.405, p 
<.001) with a mean difference of 28.62 frames between compatible and 
incompatible rules (standard error, SE = 1.328; see Figure 3.4). Also, a main 
effect of action set was found (F(1, 71)= 5.698, p = .02) with a mean difference of 
3.182 frames (SE = 1.33) in RT between the CIS (mean = 55.67) and the RIS 
(mean = 52.49; see Figure 3.4). A significant interaction between action set and 
response rule was also identified (F(1,71)=25.631, p <.001). Post-hoc contrasts 
with Bonferonni correction identified significantly faster reaction times to 
incompatible response rules in the RIS than the CIS (mean difference = 8.262, SE 
= 1.879, p <.001), but no significant difference between compatible rules (mean 
difference = 1.898 frames, SE = 1.428, p = 1). We calculated an automatic 
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imitation score (AI score) for each set of actions by subtracting the average 
participant RT on compatible trials from average RT on incompatible trials. 
This score represents the average difference in RT between compatible and 
incompatible trials. Comparing scores from both action sets using a repeated-
measures t-test identified a significant difference, with smaller AI scores in the 
RIS (mean = 23.54, SE = 1.54) than in the CIS (mean = 33.70, SE = 1.78; t(71) = 
5.061, p<.001).  
 
Figure 3.4. Mean reaction time to each response rule (compatible and 
incompatible), and each action set (Commonly Imitated Set and Rarely 
Imitated Set). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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A similar analysis was conducted to examine the effect of action set and 
response rule on the number of mistakes out of the total of 10 trials per 
participant for each condition. A 2X2 ANOVA identified a significant main 
effect of response rule (F(1, 71) 22.05, p <.001) with significantly fewer mistakes 
made when responding to the compatible rule (mean = 1.132, SE = 0.113) than 
the incompatible rule (mean= 1.854, SE = 0.163). 
 
A significant main effect of action set was also found (F(1,71) = 51.2, p<.001) 
with more mistakes made in the RIS (mean= 2.083, SE= .172) than in the CIS 
(mean= .903, SE=.106).  There was no significant interaction between action set 
and response rule (F(71, 1)= .157, p = .639). Post-hoc comparisons with 
Bonferonni corrections identified fewer mistakes when reacting to compatible 
conditions in the CIS (mean = .513, SE = .086) compared to incompatible 
responses in the CIS (mean = 1.292, SE = .174, p <.001), and both response rules 
in the RIS (meancompatible= 1.75, SEcompatible= .198, p<.001; meanincompatible= 2.42, 
SEincompatible= .220, p <.001). Significantly fewer mistakes were made in response 
to incompatible rules in the CIS than incompatible rules in the RIS (p<.001), and 
within the RIS more mistakes were made when responding to incompatible 
rules (p = .039). An AI effect based on mistakes was calculated for each action 
set by subtracting the mistakes made to compatible response rules from 
mistakes made to incompatible response rules. There was no difference 
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between the AI effects for the CIS (mean = .778, SE = .174) and the RIS (mean = 
.667, SE = .237, t(71) = .397, p=.693).  
 
Stimuli Effects 
We examined effects of specific stimuli by examining reaction times upon 
presentation of each action stimulus for both rules. We performed two one-way 
repeated measures ANOVAs, one for compatible rules and one for 
incompatible rules, with action stimulus as the independent variable. In both 
cases, Mauchly’s tests indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated 
(X²(5)compatible=49.09, p<.001; X²(5)incompatible=19.03, p=.002), so degrees of freedom 
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates for compatible actions 
(ε=.713), and Huynh-Feldt estimates for incompatible actions (ε=.837; see Field, 
2013). We found a marginally significant main effect of stimulus type for 
compatible responses (F(2.14, 151.77)=2.891, p = .055; see Figure 3.5), and a 
significant effect of stimulus type for incompatible responses (F(2.61, 185.426)= 
11.301, p<.001, see Figure 3.5).  
 
When responding with compatible actions, post-hoc tests with Bonferonni 
corrections identified significantly quicker RTs to clapping (mean= 37.704, SE = 
1.50) than waving (mean = 41.309, SE = 1.36; p = .002) and marginally 
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significantly quicker RTs to pointing (mean = 41.899, SE = 1.794; p= .060), but no 
other significant difference were identified between other actions. 
 
Figure 3.5. Mean RT to specific actions for both response rules. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.  
 
For incompatible response rules post-hoc tests with Bonferonni corrections 
identified significant slower RT to clapping (mean= 76.91, SE = 2.95) than 
pointing (mean = 67.257, SE = 2.34; p = .009) and hand closing (mean = 63.413, 
SE = 1.938; p<.001), but no significant difference between clapping and waving 
(mean = 71.876, SE = 2.252; p = .219). Post-hoc comparisons also identified 
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significantly longer RTs to waving stimuli than to hand closing stimuli (p = 
.002).  
 
Figure 3.6. Mean automatic imitation scores for each of the four actions (i.e. 
difference between RT to compatible and incompatible response rules) . 
Error-bars represent standard error of the mean.  
 
Examining differences in automatic imitation effects for each action stimulus 
(i.e. subtracting RT for compatible responses from RT for incompatible 
responses) identified a significant effect of stimulus (F(2.84, 201.994)=13.224, p 
<.001; Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated 
so degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates, ε=.948).  
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Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferonni corrections identified the AI effect for 
clapping (mean = 38.99, SE = 2.87) was significantly greater than the AI effect 
for waving (mean = 30.36, SE = 2.00; p = .013), pointing (mean = 25.336, SE = 
2.092; p <.001), and hand closing (mean = 21.753, SE = 2.404; p <.001; see Figure 
3.6). Waving had a significantly greater AI effect than hand closing (p=.025), 
and there was no difference in AI effect between pointing and waving (p = .195) 
and between pointing and hand-closing (p= 1).     
 
Order Effects 
We examined whether the order that response rules were completed had an 
effect on automatic imitation. The order of presentation had no influence on the 
AI effect for commonly imitated actions (t(70) = -1.109, p=.271; see Figure 3.7). 
However, a significantly greater AI effect was found for rarely imitated actions 
when the compatible response rule was first (mean = 27.13. SE = 1.67; t(70) = -
2.471, p=.016; see Figure 3.7) rather than when it followed the incompatible 
response rule (mean = 19.79, SE = 2.50). However, this reduced AI effect was 
still significantly different from zero (t(35) = 8.14, p<.001). 
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Figure 3.7. Mean automatic imitation effects for both action sets comparing 
sessions where compatible rule trials took place before incompatible rules 
(red) and when compatible trials followed incompatible trials (blue). Error-
bars represent standard error of the mean.  
 
 
Age effects 
Examining the effect of age on reaction times to imitative rules identified a 
significant negative relationship between RT and age for both action conditions 
(rcis= -.486, p <.001; rris=-.486, p <.001, see Figure 3.8A). We also found that age 
was negatively correlated with RTs to incompatible rules for both action sets 
(rcis= -.435, p <.001; rris=-.453, p <.001, see Figure 3.8B). Age was unrelated to 
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automatic imitation effects in either action condition (rcis= -.132, p =.271; rris=-
.032, p =.791). 
 
Figure 3.8: Participant’s average reaction time as a function of age when 
responding in (A) compatible trials and (B) incompatible trials for both 
commonly imitated actions (in red) and rarely imitated actions (in blue). 
Lines represent the linear regression lines for the predicted effect of age on 
reaction time for each condition and action set.  
 
Having identified a significant difference between the automatic imitation 
effects for commonly imitated and rarely imitated action sets, we examined 
whether there was any relationship between age and this effect. With this goal 
in mind, a “prior experience score” was measured for each participant by 
    A)            B) 
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subtracting the average AI effect for rarely imitated action from their score for 
commonly imitated actions. This score represents the average difference in AI 
effect between action sets for each participant (a positive score represents a 
greater AI effect for the CIS, a negative score represents a greater AI effect for 
the RIS). We found no effect of age on this prior experience score (r = -.092, 
p=.440).  
 
Discussion 
This study of automatic imitation is the first to specifically test predictions of 
the ASL model of imitation in children. Unsurprisingly, given the impressive 
imitative skills of children from the age of three we found a significant 
automatic imitation for both sets of actions (see Figure 3.4). However, it is the 
difference in automatic imitation effects between action sets that is of the most 
interest. The ASL model, as well as the ideomotor approach, predicts that 
associations between sensory and motor representations of actions are formed 
through experience and so actions that receive more of this sensorimotor 
experience should be quicker to imitate and more difficult to inhibit. 
Commonly imitated actions were not imitated quicker than rarely imitated 
actions. However, incompatible responses to commonly imitated actions were 
slower than incompatible responses in the rarely imitated action set. This 
resulted in an overall difference in automatic imitation between actions sets 
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with a greater automatic imitation effect identified in the commonly imitated 
set. This finding supports the ASL view of the development of imitation, 
demonstrating that sensorimotor experience facilitates associations between 
sensory and motor representations of an action aiding imitation, and interfering 
with the inhibition of a learned response.  
 
Further evidence in support of a domain-general account is provided by our 
finding that clapping stimuli generated the strongest automatic imitation effect, 
an observation that is predicted by the ASL model’s account of environmental 
stimuli facilitating the connection between sensory and motor representation of 
an action. Environmental stimuli are thought to bridge cognitive 
representations in cases where actions may not provide sensory feedback (Ray 
& Heyes, 2011); however, they may also act to strengthen associations for 
observed actions. This corresponds with evidence of audio-visual mirror 
neurons identified in monkeys that fire when performing an action, seeing an 
action, and hearing an action (Keysers et al., 2003). If automatic imitation is 
indeed a behavioural effect of mirror neuron activity formed through 
associative processes, we would expect this more pronounced effect when 
motor actions have become associated with multiple stimuli across different 
modalities. While it is known that reaction times to multisensory stimuli are 
quicker than reaction times to a single stimulus (Andreassi & Greco, 1975; 
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Hershenson, 1962), here, we only observe quicker reaction times when 
responding with a compatible action suggesting a compatibility-specific effect 
(although this compatibility effect is only marginally significant). If reaction 
times were quicker for both compatible and incompatible trials, we could 
conclude that bimodal stimulation may be the determining factor, however, a 
significant decrease in reaction time to bimodal clapping stimuli was observed 
in counter imitative trials. To my knowledge, studies of the effects of bimodal 
stimuli presentation have not examined inhibition of prepotent responses to 
bimodal stimuli and whether this effect is greater than responses to unimodal 
stimuli. It is also possible that of all the actions used as stimuli, clapping is by 
chance the action performed in synchrony the most often, leading to the 
observed effect. This interpretation, while compatible with the ASL view of 
imitation, incorporates a conceptually different mechanism. Future studies 
could easily differentiate between these two interpretations by manipulating 
the degree of experience participants receive as well as the degree of intermodal 
sensory information available during learning and subsequent inhibition of 
responses to novel associative stimuli. This protocol could isolate the role of 
both experience and stimulus complexity in imitative learning.  
 
Partial support for the ASL view of imitation is found when examining the 
effect of counter-imitative experience preceding imitative action. In rarely 
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imitated action sets it was found that a short session of counter-imitative 
training significantly reduced the automatic imitation effect. Previous research 
has eliminated automatic imitation effects entirely through counter-imitative 
training (Heyes et al., 2005), while here we merely reduce it. However, the 
training received in this study (approximately 12 trials) is not comparable to the 
training in other studies (e.g. 6 blocks of 72 trials, Heyes et al., 2005). While a 
similar order effect was not observed in the commonly imitated action set, this 
may not be surprising given our assumption that commonly imitated actions 
will have stronger sensory-motor connections that may require more extensive 
training to alter. Overall, while simple order effects are common in 
experimental paradigms of this sort, the point highlighted here is that imitative 
compatibility effects are not immune to such effects.  
  
While it was found that older participants averaged quicker RTs for both 
response rules within each action set, no change in automatic imitation was 
found. This is not necessarily surprising. Based on the ASL approach one might 
predict that an automatic imitation effect would increase with age as 
cumulative sensorimotor experience would lead to increased inter-
representational connectivity. However, in the paradigm explored here we are 
dealing with two effects: An imitation effect and an inhibitory effect. To react to 
an action stimulus with a different action one must inhibit imitation. Evidence 
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from previous studies of inhibition in children have found that the ability to 
inhibit prepotent responses increases with age (Simpson & Riggs, 2011). With 
this in mind, as children age we might expect that experience would contribute 
to greater sensorimotor co-ordination resulting in quicker reaction times in 
imitative trials, and developing inhibitory control should reduce RTs when 
responding to incompatible stimuli. If this is the case it is not surprising that we 
see a consistent automatic imitation effect throughout development.   
 
It could be argued that the automatic imitation effect reported here is solely a 
result of a higher memory load required to react to incompatible rules (i.e. the 
“different action” has to be remembered for an incompatible rule, while this 
information is readily available in the stimulus in the compatible condition), 
however, previous research on inhibition has concluded that memory alone 
does not account for the difficulty children face when reacting to stimuli that 
are incompatible with the action to be performed (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 
1994; Simpson et al., 2012). Many studies have examined children’s responses 
on day-night tasks. In these tasks, participants are presented with a stimulus 
picture that is usually incompatible with a response; e.g. if the stimulus shows a 
picture of a sun the response is to say the word “moon”. Researchers have 
shown that increased memory load is not the only effect contributing to 
inhibitory responses (Simpson & Riggs, 2011; Gerstadt et al., 1994). Under the 
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present paradigm automatic imitation is likely to function in conjunction with 
working memory and other inhibitory effects, but as this study is more 
interested in examining automatic imitation in different contexts where 
memory load and inhibitory context is kept constant, this interaction does not 
affect our conclusions. Nonetheless, future studies with children should 
attempt to isolate automatic imitation effects. 
  
The goal of this chapter was to examine imitation from a developmental 
perspective. While early work in the field attempted a detailed description of a 
stepwise development of imitation in infancy (Piaget, 1951/1962), recent work 
on this subject is sparse. It is crucial to consider developmental approaches to 
imitation as even an innate imitative system must interact with the 
environment to generate adaptive behavioural responses. From this perspective 
an associative model complements innate dispositions. In fact, to account for 
the vast difference in imitative ability between humans and other animals (e.g. 
Whiten, Horner, & Marshall-pescini, 2005) the ASL approach must recognise 
innate differences in motivation or attention to account for the unique routes 
human development takes (Heyes, 2012b). The strength of a good theory rests 
on the reliability and validity of its predictions. There is no doubt that the ASL 
model of imitation has need for further empirical support, but converging 
evidence from cognitive (Heyes et al., 2005), neuroscientific (Catmur et al., 
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2008), comparative (Range & Huber, 2007), and now developmental fields 
suggests that this model is reliable in varied contexts. Future research will be 
necessary to examine the predictive power of this model in younger children 
than are still developing their imitative skills. This study marks a first step 
towards realising that goal with an older sample. Furthermore, while there is 
much debate over the function of mirror neurons (Gallese et al., 2011; Rizzolatti 
& Craighero, 2004; Wicker et al., 2003), an associative account suggests that 
mirror neurons may be by-products of sociality, an exaptation instead of an 
adaptation (Cook et al., 2014). Future research will explore the importance of an 
ASL model to social learning and mirror neurons, but now social learning will 
be considered from a different perspective. In the next chapter, we will take a 
step back and examine social learning at the group-level.  
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Chapter 4: Exploring three levels of social influence in capuchin 
monkeys 
 
Social animals will adapt and adjust their behaviour in response to cues from 
conspecifics. Sometimes, a social cue may lead to a string of cognitively 
demanding processes resulting in behavioural change (e.g. hierarchical 
imitation; Byrne & Russon, 1998), but socially influenced action is also elicited 
by simpler, implicit processes (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Frith & Frith, 2008). 
Implicit forms of social influence are observed when humans form bidirectional 
paths on crowded streets (Helbing, Buzna, Johansson, & Werner, 2005), and 
when baboons co-ordinate their movement through their foraging ranges 
(Strandburg-Peshkin et al., 2015). Social influence occurs when the mere 
presence of others increases feeding rates (Decastro, 1994; Galloway, Addessi, 
Fragaszy, & Visalberghi, 2005), and when the emotionally valenced calls from 
neighbouring conspecifics induces behavioural change (Watson & Caldwell, 
2010). These simpler and likely more automatic processes may not receive the 
same empirical attention as processes thought to require more complex 
brainpower, but their influence on both human and nonhuman behaviour is 
pervasive. The objective of this chapter is to highlight certain forms of social 
influence considered to be less cognitively demanding and explore their effects 
in a captive population of primates.  
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Group-level behavioural synchrony is under-studied in the primate literature. 
The study of co-ordinated or synchronous behaviour in non-human primates 
tends to focus on coordinated-action at the dyadic level (e.g. Fichtel, Pyritz, & 
Kappeler, 2011; Fuhrmann, Ravignani, Marshall-Pescini, & Whiten, 2014), 
ignoring the complexity of the dynamic social-space many animals inhabit. The 
empirical study of what has become known as “collective behaviour” is 
currently flourishing in non-primate fields with the support of rigorous 
mathematical modelling of group-systems (Faria et al., 2010; Simpson, 
Raubenheimer, Charleston, & Clissold, 2010). Couzin (2007) has argued that the 
rules that govern collective behaviour may allow individuals to tap into 
“higher-order collective computational capabilities” (p. 715) that may in turn 
allow optimum decision making about where to forage, when to move, etc. The 
superior wisdom of crowds in some situations has been long established in 
humans (e.g. Galton, 1907), but it is only recently that this effect has been 
studied in nonhuman animals. Modelling the movement of shoals and flocks 
has revealed that seemingly complex co-ordinated and adaptive movement is 
likely driven by simple behavioural rules enacted on the individual level 
(Berdahl, Torney, Ioannou, Faria, & Couzin, 2013; Couzin, Krause, James, 
Ruxton, & Franks, 2002). For example, flocks of starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) use 
simple heuristics to form intricate flight patterns (Carere et al., 2009). Similarly 
co-ordinated movement has been reported in fish (Rosenthal, Twomey, 
Hartnett, Wu, & Couzin, 2015), and other bird species (Beauchamp, 2012). 
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Examination of group-level behavioural effects in nonhuman primates is also a 
more recent development.  
 
The study of behavioural synchrony in primates has primarily examined the 
influence of individuals on group movement (e.g. King, Sueur, Huchard, & 
Cowlishaw, 2011; Petit, Gautrais, Leca, Theraulaz, & Deneubourg, 2009; Sueur, 
Deneubourg, & Petit, 2012). One study of chacma baboons (Papio ursinus), 
however, has taken a broader approach to examining group-level synchrony. 
King & Cowlishaw (2009) used a measure of species diversity (Simpson’s 
Diversity Index, Simpson, 1949, cited in King and Cowlishaw, 2009) to examine 
behavioural diversity in baboon troops. Higher scores on this measure 
correspond to less behavioural diversity, and greater behavioural synchrony. 
This measure of group synchrony allowed the authors to test a variety of 
hypotheses concerning ecological and social predictors of group synchrony. For 
example, greater synchrony was found to occur in more cohesive groups (i.e. 
groups spread over a smaller area). This finding may reflect the mediating role 
proximity might play in facilitating instances of social influence, by increasing 
the perceptual availability of social cues. King and Cowlishaw also identified a 
reduction in synchrony in larger groups, an effect that may be relevant in the 
broader context of social facilitation effects mediated by group-size.  
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Social facilitation occurs when the “sheer presence of other individuals” 
influences behaviour (Zajonc, 1965, p. 269). This simple effect has been 
primarily studied in the domain of social psychology where the presence of 
other human observers has been found to both facilitate and impede 
behavioural responses. Reviewing the literature on the topic, Zajonc (1965) 
notes a consistent pattern in the way the presence of observers affects 
behaviours. When an individual is performing a well-rehearsed behaviour (e.g. 
attending to a stimulus, completing a simple maths task), the presence of others 
seems to enhance the performance of the behaviour. However, a behaviour that 
is more cognitively demanding (e.g. learning series of nonsense syllables) is 
hindered by an audience (Zajonc & Sales, 1966). Recent studies have validated 
these findings in humans (Bowman, Weber, Tamborini, & Sherry, 2013; Garcia-
Marques, Fernandes, Fonseca, & Prada, 2015), and social facilitation of well-
rehearsed behaviours has also been noted in many animals. For example, the 
social facilitation of eating behaviour is documented in chickens (Tolman, 
1964), rats (Harlow, 1932), and monkeys (Cebus apella; Galloway et al., 2005). 
However, as discussed in Chapter One, the influence of presence varies 
depending on the number of conspecifics nearby.  
 
It is thought that one of the benefits of group living is that the group can share 
the responsibility of vigilance for predators, thus reducing the need for 
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individual vigilance to the benefit of other behaviour such as foraging. Indeed, 
in many species individuals are found to spend less time scanning their 
environment when in larger groups (Ebensperger, Hurtado, & Ramos‐Jiliberto, 
2006; Pays et al., 2009; for review see Roberts, 1996). Conversely however, 
studies of primates have not replicated the same relationship between group-
size and vigilance (Hirsch, 2002; Treves, 1998, 1999). For example, one study of 
brown capuchin monkeys found that a greater number of conspecifics within 
10 metres of a focal individual actually led to increased vigilance behaviour 
(Hirsch, 2002). In these cases, it is thought that vigilance functions to monitor 
conspecifics and not predators. Interestingly, this negative association between 
group-size and individual vigilance  has also been found in carrion crows 
(Corvus corone; Robinette & Ha, 2001), a species that share many socio-cognitive 
characteristics with capuchin monkeys (e.g. large brain relative to body, 
Macphail, 1982; high tolerance of conspecifics, Miller, Schiestl, Whiten, Schwab, 
& Bugnyar, 2014). Larger group-size has also been found to facilitate foraging 
behaviour (e.g. Beauchamp, 2013; Ebensperger et al., 2006; Pays et al., 2009), but 
this has not yet been studied in primates. These group-size effects are another 
facet of group-level social influence that is often ignored in the primate 
literature.  
 
Furthermore, the reach of social influence does not end within a group. The 
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behaviour of individuals within one captive group has been found to influence 
the behaviour of those in another group as long as auditory and/or visual 
contact is available. This phenomenon is known as the neighbour effect and 
while it is likely to occur in wild populations, it has been mostly studied in 
captive primate groups (Baker & Aureli, 1996; Videan et al., 2005; Watson & 
Caldwell, 2010). Baker and Aureli (1996) found that when aggressive calls were 
made by neighbouring groups of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), the focal group 
would be more likely to perform aggressive behaviours. A more recent study 
found that affiliative behaviours were similarly affected by neighbouring group 
vocalisations (Videan et al., 2005). Common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) 
showed increased levels of affiliative behaviours when vocalisations from a 
neighbouring captive group were affiliative, while rates of aggression increased 
when neighbouring groups emitted vocalisations related to negative or 
aggressive states (Watson & Caldwell, 2010). More recently, a study examined 
this effect experimentally, discovering that an increase in affiliative behaviours 
could be induced through playback of affiliative vocalisations (Watson et al., 
2014). The neighbour effect extends the reach of social influence beyond the 
boundaries of a single conspecific group, and while not yet studied, it is likely 
that this effect also applies to neighbouring groups of different species, 
especially when those species form close associations. This review of neighbour 
effects in primates completes this overview of some of the social phenomena 
that may influence individual behaviour in the context of group living, all of 
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which will be examined empirically in this chapter.  
 
Here, I report an investigation of three forms of social influence. The Living 
Links Research Centre’s neighbouring outdoor enclosures, containing separate 
populations of capuchin monkeys, create an opportunity to examine both inter- 
and intra- group dynamics. Data collected from scan samples of both groups of 
capuchin monkeys allowed the inspection of factors that contribute to within-
group behavioural synchronisation, as well as the influence of group-size on 
behaviour. Furthermore, by collecting simultaneous scan samples of each 
captive group we were able to study neighbour effects. The overarching aim of 
this study was to examine social influence at the group level, and predictions 
were generated based on previous literature.  
 
The work of King and Cowlishaw (2009) is the only previous study of non-
human primates to examine behavioural synchrony at the group level and so 
this work formed the basis for predictions. Their study identified spatial 
proximity as a predictor of increased behavioural synchrony. In the research 
reported in this chapter, the location of a group acted as a proxy measure of 
spatial proximity. The indoor enclosure at Living Links are considerably 
smaller (30m²) than the outdoor enclosure (900m²), and so the same number of 
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monkeys located in an inside enclosure are therefore closer to each other on 
average. It was predicted that behavioural synchrony would be greater indoors 
in more cohesive groups (prediction 1). King and Cowlishaw (2009), also found 
that smaller groups were more likely to be synchronous in their behaviour, an 
effect attributed to a smaller number of individuals displaying a less diverse 
range of behaviours. Based on this finding, it was predicted that smaller groups 
would be more synchronised in their behaviour on average (prediction 2). As 
this is the first study of behavioural synchronisation with captive primates no 
further predictions concerning the effects of environmental factors were made, 
however, the contribution of a number of environmental factors were 
considered. 
  
It was expected that group size would influence the likelihood of certain 
behaviours being performed. Evidence that rates of vigilance in wild capuchins 
are positively correlated with group size (Hirsch, 2002) led to the prediction of 
a similar effect being identified in our captive sample (prediction 3). No 
previous study of primate behaviour has examined the relationship between 
group size and foraging behaviour. However, based on studies of other 
mammals (Ebensperger et al., 2006; Pays et al., 2009) it was predicted that rates 
of foraging behaviour would increase with group-size (prediction 4). While 
feeding behaviours are normally influenced by social facilitation, this effect was 
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not examined here as captive feeding schedules confound an examination of 
influencing social factors. No further a priori hypotheses were made concerning 
the effect of group size on behaviour but the relationships between this variable 
and all behaviours measured was examined.  
 
The two separate monkey troops in the Living Links research site have auditory 
and visual contact with each other (see methods for further details). Based on 
previous findings of the influence of neighbouring groups on the transmission 
of aggressive and affiliative behaviours in New World monkeys and apes 
(Videan et al., 2005; Watson & Caldwell, 2010), it was predicted that behaviours 
associated with affiliation and relaxed contexts (grooming, play, resting) would 
be correlated between groups (prediction 5). Aggressive behaviour was not 
directly measured in this study (due to the difficulty in capturing short 
duration aggressive behaviours through instantaneous scan sampling 
methods). However, measures of vigilance and locomotion were used as proxy 
measures of anxiety or unease in the group. It was predicted that the incidence 
of these behaviours would be correlated between both groups of monkeys 
(prediction 6). By studying a range of factors thought to socially influence 
primate behaviour it was hoped that a better understanding of the connections 
between the multiple levels of explanation would be achieved. 
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Methods 
Animals and research site  
This study was conducted at the Living Links to Human Evolution Field Site at 
Edinburgh Zoo (Living Links). As mentioned in Chapter Two, this research 
facility houses two separate mixed-species troops of squirrel monkeys (Saimiri 
scirilius; 36 individuals) and capuchin monkeys (Sapajus sp.; 27 individuals). 
Capuchin and squirrel monkeys form mixed species groups in the wild and 
research at the Living Links site discovered that the smaller of the two species 
chose to interact with capuchins and no evidence of chronic stress induced by 
mixed species interactions was identified (Leonardi, Buchanan-Smith, Dufour, 
MacDonald, & Whiten, 2010). Each mixed species group inhabits a separate 
enclosure named the East and West wings (see Figure 4.1; for a more complete 
overview of the site see Leonardi et al., 2010). Each mixed species group shares 
an outdoor enclosure measuring approximately 900m², and each species has 
their own inner enclosure. The capuchin inner enclosure measures 31.5m² and 
the squirrel monkey enclosure measures 24.75m²; both inner enclosures are 6m 
high. The squirrel monkeys are able to enter the capuchin inner enclosure, but 
capuchins cannot enter squirrel monkey enclosures. Primary feedings of fruit 
and vegetables occur twice daily (occasional feedings of insects and other 
protein), and additional scatter feeds also take place regularly. Food is regularly 
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delivered through enrichment devices. Ethical approval was granted for this 
study by the University of Stirling, Psychology Ethics committee. 
 
Figure 4.1: Schematic representing a plan-view of the Living Links to Human 
Evolution Research Site, taken and adapted from Leonardi et al., 2010).  
 
 
Behavioural sampling 
Within-group and between-group social influence was examined through scan 
sampling methods (Martin & Bateson, 2007). Scans were made of both captive 
capuchin troops simultaneously by two researchers. Squirrel monkeys were 
present during many sampling points but their presence was not recorded. All 
capuchin monkeys were sampled in each scan, including infants. However, 
four infants under the age of one year (two from each troop) were subsequently 
X X 
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excluded from all analyses as some behaviours were infant-specific (e.g. being 
carried by a parent) and were not relevant when examining group-level 
behaviour. Behavioural observations were made between 23.08.13 and 3.10.13, 
and took place between 9am and 6pm. Time of observation was recorded, as 
well as weather conditions (cloudy, sunny, or raining). Relevant details were 
recorded concurrently by both researchers at the beginning of each scan at the 
viewing deck (see Figure 4.1), and each researcher subsequently began 
recording data from the outdoor enclosure of either the West or East troop. The 
temperature at the time of the scan sample was recorded retrospectively from 
weatherspark.com using the closest available weather station as a reference 
point (Edinburgh Airport). While this discrepancy in location of temperature 
may mean slight absolute difference between recorded temperature and actual 
temperature at the research site, relative variation in temperature throughout 
the sampling periods should be reliable.   
 
Once the behaviour of all monkeys in the outdoor enclosure was recorded the 
researcher would move to the indoor enclosure to observe the remaining 
individuals. Once an individual was recognised, the researcher waited 5 
seconds before recording the monkey’s location and the behaviour being 
performed (see Table 4.1). A total of 94 scans were collected for the East troop, 
and 93 for the West troop (uneven N per group due to incomplete data for 
some scans). During scans a monkey could be inside or outside. For the 
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purpose of analysing group-level effects, a group was then defined as two or 
more monkeys present in the same enclosure (i.e. inside West, inside East, 
outside West, and outside East), allowing the possible measurement of four 
“groups” at each sampling point (from our two monkey troops). Scan samples 
where one individual or no individual was present in a location 
(inside/outside) were not included in the analysis of behavioural synchrony (i.e. 
minimum of two individuals needed) and 254 group-scans were included in 
the final analysis (𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 = 125; 89 outside, 𝑁𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡= 129; 78 outside). To examine 
social facilitation, scans where only one monkey was present in a location were 
also included in the analyses (𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 = 145; 91 outside, (𝑁𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡= 162; 84 outside).  
 
While East and West enclosures are separated by 2. 4 m wooden fences and no 
physical contact is available between troops, monkeys nonetheless have visual 
and auditory contact. A walkway separates the East and West outdoor 
enclosures which is 5.5 metres at its widest point and 2 metres at its narrowest 
(at the viewing deck, see Figure 4.1). The amount of visual and auditory 
information available between groups varies depending on the location of 
individuals in the enclosures. Visual contact between monkeys is possible when 
monkeys are in trees as well as from the ground at the locations marked with 
Xs on Figure 4.1 where two gates allow visual access from ground-level. Visual 
access between monkeys when on the ground is otherwise not possible due to 
the wooden fencing.  
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Table 4.1: Definitions of behaviours used to examine social facilitation in 
capuchin monkeys; adapted from Leonardi et al. (2010). 
Behaviour Name Definition 
Rest (sleep) Individual is stationary with shoulders stooped and head 
down. 
Stationary/Vigilant 
 
Individual is stationary but not resting; is alert and 
vigilant.  
Locomotion Individual is moving in relation to its surroundings. 
Fast Locomotion Individual is moving in relation to its surroundings at a 
fast pace. May include leaping between branches, and 
jumping over obstacles. 
Feeding Individual is chewing food. 
Foraging Individual is actively searching for food with hand(s) in 
earth or flora. 
Grooming The monkey’s hands and/or lips are drawn through the 
coat, skin, or teeth of another and particles are occasionally 
removed. 
Play Monkey engages in high activity interaction with other 
individuals (e.g. chase, rough and tumble, mock 
wrestling).  
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Auditory contact is also possible between groups although this is also 
influenced by the location of monkeys in the enclosure and the volume of a 
vocalisation. Anecdotally, it is possible for some vocalisations from a troop to 
be heard throughout the entire neighbouring enclosure as some vocalisations 
from East capuchins can be heard when standing at the public entrance (see 
Figure 4.1). Communication between groups is not only passive. Monkeys from 
different enclosures sometimes signal to each other from trees or from the 
ground at section X (see Figure 4.1), often performing threat vocalisations 
and/or threatening postures. 
 
To study the neighbour effect in these groups of capuchin monkeys, 
simultaneous behavioural observations were compared to test whether similar 
behaviours were more likely to be exhibited by both groups at the same time, 
once other environmental factors were controlled for. To this effect, when 
analysing simultaneous scan samples from both groups, if no monkey was 
present in the outside enclosure for any of the groups, the sample at this time-
point was not analysed (leaving a total N of 80). Correlations between the 
proportion of monkeys exhibiting each behaviour in both outdoor enclosures 
were produced. 
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Analysis 
Behavioural synchrony 
To examine if behavioural synchrony occurred in our sample, a measure of 
synchrony was calculated from the collected data and compared to a measure 
of synchrony calculated from a dataset generated based on monkeys behaving 
independent of group influence. First, the probability of a monkey performing 
each of the measured behaviours was calculated based on the scan data (N = 
254). Using these probabilities a new dataset was randomly generated with the 
same number of “scan observations” as the original dataset. Some of these 
observations resulted in one or no observed recordings for some behaviour 
categories and so were not included in the calculation of a behavioural 
synchrony score (N = 222). For all other scans a measure of behavioural 
synchrony was calculated. To be included in the analysis more than one 
monkey had to be present in an area (inside or outside), and monkeys 
displaying feeding behaviour were excluded from the analysis (due to 
husbandry imposed synchrony). Degree of behavioural synchrony was 
calculated using a method described by King and Cowlishaw (2009), the 
Simpson’s Diversity Index: 
𝐵𝑆 =  ∑
𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)
𝑆
𝑖=7
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In this calculation, 𝑛𝑖 is the total number of individuals partaking in a measured 
behaviour, and N is the number of individuals in view. Behavioural synchrony 
scores closer to zero indicate a diverse range of behaviours were performed in a 
scan, while a score of 1 indicates all monkeys were performing the same 
behaviour. King and Cowlishaw (2009) describe the resulting score as the 
probability of finding two monkeys in a sample performing the same 
behaviour. This measures behavioural synchrony at the group level rather than 
focussing on the likelihood of a focal animal performing a behaviour based on 
the behaviour of another (or others) in the group (e.g. Beauchamp, 2009; Engel 
& Lamprecht, 1997; Pays et al., 2009).  
 
Once scores of behavioural synchrony were calculated, the variation found in 
both real and randomly generated samples were compared with a Levene’s test 
to assess whether variation in behavioural synchrony in our sample differed 
from what would be expected by chance. Subsequently, the real and randomly 
generated synchrony scores were compared using a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test 
to assess whether average behavioural synchrony differed from what would be 
expected by a simple model describing monkeys behaving independently of 
each other.       
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To examine what variables contribute to behavioural synchrony a linear model 
(LM) was developed. Behavioural synchrony scores were transformed with a 
logarithmic transformation to improve the normality of the model’s residual 
values. A backward stepwise method was used to examine the contribution of a 
range of factors including troop observed (categorical: East/West), weather 
(categorical: cloud, clear, rain), location (categorical: inside/outside), 
temperature (continuous), hour (continuous), and group size at time of 
observation (count). All predictors were first included in the model, and non-
significant predictors were removed in order of least significance until only 
statistically significant independent variables remained. Significant 
contributions to the model were assessed using an F-test. Predictor variables 
were also examined for collinearity by examining Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIF) and no problematic correlations were identified (i.e. no VIF greater than 5 
identified; Zuur, Ieno, Walker, Saveliev, & Smith, 2009). To test whether some 
behaviours were more likely to have contributed to the measure of behavioural 
synchrony, the relationship between synchrony scores and the frequency of 
monkeys performing each behaviour was examined using Kendall’s tau; 
correlations between the frequency of all other behaviours are also reported.  
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Within-group social facilitation 
While examining group-size effects, the proportion of individuals performing 
each behaviour was modelled as a dependent variable. Due to a high number of 
zero values for each behavioural category (i.e. it was common for no monkey to 
be performing the behaviour of interest in a scan), ranging from 30% (vigilance) 
to 92% (grooming), these outcome proportional values were transformed into 
binary dummy factors (i.e. behaviour present, behaviour absent). Also, 
locomotion and fast locomotion were combined to create a single locomotion 
variable.  Generalised linear models (GLM) with a binomial error distribution 
and logit link function were developed for each behaviour examining the 
contribution of environmental factors and group size to the likelihood a given 
behaviour would be observed in a scan. Feeding was excluded from the 
analysis due to husbandry practices. A backwards-stepwise method was used 
to select environmental factors that significantly contributed to the proportion 
of monkeys performing each behaviour (environmental factors include: 
temperature, time of day, group, and weather). Variables that contributed 
significantly to each model are reported (with accompanying Wald-tests for 
significance). It was expected that group size would significantly predict the 
performance of behaviour in these models as the likelihood of any specific 
behaviour being absent increases when group size is low (e.g. 1-5 monkeys in a 
scan). Therefore, to provide a more valid result concerning the effect of group 
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size on the proportion of monkeys performing certain behaviours, further 
analyses were performed. The group-size variable showed a non-normal 
distribution with greater frequency of smallest groups and largest groups. To 
standardise the group-size variable, a categorical variable was created based on 
quartiles (1st quartile: 1-5 monkeys; 2nd quartile: 6-10 monkeys, 3rd quartile: 11-12 
monkeys; 4th quartile: 13-14 monkeys). The effect of group size on each 
behaviour was modelled independently using a GLM with a Poisson error-
distribution and logit link function. Where group-size had a significant effect 
on a behaviour, consecutive quartiles were compared with corrected p-values 
(Shaffer corrections; Shaffer, 1986).  
 
Between-group neighbour effect 
Scan samples taken at the same time-point were compared in order to examine 
behavioural contagion between the two groups of captive capuchin monkeys. 
As the proportion of behaviours exhibited was highly skewed by multiple 
zeros, non-parametric tests were used to examine significant correlated 
behaviours in the East and West groups of capuchin monkeys (Spearman rho). 
To control for other factors capable of influencing these behaviours other 
variables were partialled out of the correlation (temperature, time of day, and 
total sum of both groups present at the time of scan). All statistics report two-
tailed significance levels unless stated otherwise.  
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Software 
All statistical tests were performed using the R software package in the Rstudio 
environment (RStudio, 2014; R Core Team, 2014). GLMs were performed using 
the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) and graphics were produced using the 
ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2009). 
 
Results 
Behavioural Synchrony 
A Levene’s test found a significant difference between the variability of 
behavioural synchrony scores based on the collected data and the data 
generated based on individuals acting independently (Levene’s test = 51.135, p 
<.0001). A Wilcoxon rank-sum test identified a higher level of behavioural 
synchrony in the real sample (mean = .427, standard deviation, SD = .273) than 
the generated sample (mean = .257, SD = .132; W = 411, p<.0001). An LM 
examining the influence of location identified a marginally significant increase 
in synchrony when outside (LM: 𝐹1,252 = 3.402, p = .066), and an LM looking solely 
at the influence of group size identified a positive relationship between group 
size and behavioural synchrony (LM: 𝐹1,252 = 18.756, p <.0001).  
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Table 4.2. Linear model outlining significant contributing variables to 
behavioural synchrony (log transformed).  
Predictor Variables Estimate SE F-test P 
Location   5.895 <.001 
          Inside 0.000 0.000   
          Outside -0.836 0.209   
Troop   4.131   <.001 
          West 0.000 0.000   
          East -0.2746     0.082   
Group Size -0.021   0.018 18.496 <.0001  
     
Group Size * Location 0.112 .024 21.671 <.0001 
     
A full linear model identified a significant interaction between location and 
group size, where larger groups exhibited higher average levels of behavioural 
synchronisation when outside while the opposite effect was found when 
groups were inside (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2). This best model also 
identified significantly higher levels of behavioural synchrony in the West 
troop. 
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Figure 4.2. Linear regression lines representing the interaction between 
group size and location. Shaded lines represent the standard error of each 
regression line. Behavioural synchrony score in this graph has not been log 
transformed.  
 
 
Vigilance and foraging were the only behaviours whose frequency in a scan 
was significantly correlated with behavioural synchrony (see Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3: Correlation matrix examining relationships between the frequency 
of behaviours and behavioural synchrony; strongest positive correlations 
indicate behaviours that contributed the most to behavioural synchrony 
measures. Collinearity between behaviours were also examined. Kendall’s 
tau statistic is presented with corresponding level of significance. BS = 
Behavioural Synchrony, F. Locomotion = Fast Locomotion.  
 BS Foraging Vigilance F.Loco-
motion  
Loco-
motion  
Rest Groom 
Play .007 ns .282*** -0.013 ns -0.020 ns 0.041 ns -0.109 ns -.119* 
Groom -.037 ns -.122* 0.047 ns 0.086 ns -.018 ns 0.259*** --- 
Rest .046 ns -.078 ns 0.068 ns -.096 ns -0.014 ns --- --- 
Locomotion .002 ns .122* -0.028 ns -0.040 ns --- --- --- 
F. Locomotion -.039 ns -.038 ns .090 ns --- --- --- --- 
Vigilance .261*** -.007 ns --- --- --- --- --- 
Foraging .093* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ns  >.05 
 
Foraging behaviour was found to be positively correlated with locomotion and 
play (see Table 4.3), but negatively correlated with grooming. Also, grooming 
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behaviour was positively correlated with resting behaviour, and negatively 
correlated with play (see Table 4.3).  
 
Social Facilitation 
Examining environmental predictors of each behaviour using a GLM with logit 
link function identified vigilance behaviour as more common in the West troop. 
In addition, foraging behaviour was less likely to occur when raining and more 
likely to occur outside (see Table 4.4). Resting behaviour was also more likely to 
be observed in the West troop and was more likely to be observed later in the 
day (see Table 4.4). In the East troop, locomotion behaviour was more common 
and grooming behaviour was observed more often inside (see Table 4.4). Group 
size was a positive predictor of all behaviours in these models which is 
unsurprising given that the likelihood of any behaviour being observed during 
a scan increases in accordance with the number of individuals present.  
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Table 4.4: Logistic regression models examining what variables predicted 
whether a behaviour was performed during a scan. Dummy variables were 
created for this purpose so each dependent variable here is a binary variable 
(1 = present in a scan, 0 = not present during a scan).  
Dependent 
Variable 
Predictor 
Variable 
Estimate SE Wald X² P 
Rest vigilant       
 Troop   7.212 .0072 
    West 0.000 0.000   
    East -0.492 0.147   
      
 Group size 0.342 0.039 108.767 <.0001 
      
Foraging      
 Weather   6.566 .038 
    Sun  0.000 0.000   
    Cloud  0.551 0.345   
    Rain -1.642 0.895   
 Location   27.481 <.0001 
    Inside  0.000 0.000   
    Outside  1.704 0.334   
 Group size  0.299 0.043 62.415 <.0001 
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To examine the effect of group size in a more valid way, the proportion of 
monkeys performing each category of behaviour was compared based on 
quartile measurements of group size. Group size was found to have a 
significant influence on the proportion of vigilance (GLM: 𝑋3
2 = 212.70, p 
Rest       
 Troop    3.867 .0492 
    West  0.000 0.000   
    East -0.624 0.322   
 Time -0.114 0.058 3.896 .0484 
 Group size 0.2289 0.056 33.970 <.0001 
Locomotion      
 Troop   3.877 .0489 
    West 0.000 0.000   
    East 0.517 0.264   
 Group size 0.111 0.029 14.622 .0001 
Groom      
 Location   8.487 .0035 
    Inside  0.000 0.000   
    Outside -1.399 0.482   
 Group size 0.211 0.065 12.875 .0003 
Play      
 Group size 0.305 0.062 40.749 .0001 
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<.0001), foraging (𝑋3
2 = 936.56, p <.0001), locomotion (𝑋3
2 = 589.05, p <.0001), 
resting (𝑋3
2 = 452.10, p <.0001), play (𝑋3
2 = 84.03, p <.0001), and grooming (𝑋3
2 = 
153.84, p <.0001). A multiple comparison’s test with Shaffer corrections is 
reported for consecutive quartiles in Table 4.5.  
 
The proportion of monkeys exhibiting evidence of vigilance increased from the 
first quartile (mean = 0.262, SE = .036) to the second quartile (mean = .318, SE = 
.032), and also increased between the second quartile and the third quartile 
(mean = .352, SE = .032), but a significant decrease in vigilance was observed 
between the third and fourth quartile (mean = .268, SE = .027). The proportion 
of monkeys foraging increased over each consecutive quartile (1st quartile: 
mean = 0.079, SE = .026; 2nd quartile: mean= 0.123, SE = .022; 3rd quartile: mean = 
.209, SE = .033; 4th quartile: mean = .264, SE = .027). Locomotion, on the other 
hand, decreased over the first three quartiles (1st: mean = .300, SE = .041; 2nd: 
mean = .206, SE = .022; 3rd: mean = .163, SE = .020), and increased significantly in 
the final quartile (mean = .240, SD = .020). The proportion of monkeys resting 
significantly increased between the first (mean = .040, SE = .020) and second 
quartile (mean = .054, SE = .016), between the second and third quartile (mean = 
.142, SE = .031), and significantly decreased between the third and fourth 
quartile (mean = .059, SE = .016).   
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Table 4.5: Following the identification of a significant effect of group size 
multiple comparison tests were made to examine significant differences 
between consecutive quartiles. Model estimates from the GLM are reported 
with standard errors in parentheses; baseline comparison is always the lower 
quartile. P-values of comparisons are indicated by symbols.  
 Quartile Comparisons 
 1st – 2nd 2nd – 3rd 3rd – 4th 
Vigilance 0.194 (.033)*** 0.100 (.031)** -0.269 (.033)*** 
Foraging 0.444 (.056)*** 0.531 (.046)*** 0.234 (.038)*** 
Locomotion -0.369 (.035)*** -0.244 (.043)*** 0.394 (0.042)*** 
Rest 0.286 (.081)*** 0.966(.063)*** -0.897 (.062)*** 
Play 0.538 (.094)*** 0.016 (.084)ns 0.294 (0.079)*** 
Groom -0.075(.108)ns -0.613(0.140)*** -0.655(.186)*** 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ns  >.05 
 
The proportion of play behaviour increased between the first quartile (mean = 
.027, SE = .019) and second quartile (mean = .047, SE = .013), there was no 
difference between the second and third quartiles (mean = .048, SE = .013), and 
proportion of play significantly increased in the final quartile (mean = .064, SE = 
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.014). There was no difference found in the proportion of grooming observed in 
smallest groups (mean = .027, SE = .017), and the second quartile (mean = .025, 
SE = .009), but the proportion of individuals grooming significantly decreased 
over the third and fourth group-size quartiles (3rd quartile: mean = .014, SD = 
.037, 4th quartile: mean = .007, SE = .027). 
 
Between groups neighbour effects  
For each behaviour, the correlation between the proportion of monkeys 
performing that behaviour in the East troop and the proportion of monkeys 
performing that behaviour in the West group was examined. When time of day, 
temperature, and group size are partialled out of correlations a positive 
relationship was identified between the proportion of vigilant monkeys in the 
east and west troops (see Table 4.6). Similar relationships were identified for 
play behaviour, fast locomotion, and resting behaviours (see Table 4.6).  
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Table 4.6: Spearman correlation coefficients for proportion of behaviours 
exhibited from both East and West groups, including the correlation 
coefficients once other possible confounds are partialled out of the analyses 
(temperature, time of day, and group size).  
 
 
 
Vigil-
ance 
Forage Rest Loco-
motion 
Feeding F. loco-
motion 
Groom Play 
Spearman’s Rho 
partialling out 
time, temp, and 
group size 
.228* .166 .314** .029 .235* .388*** .132 .292** 
P value  .042 .144 .004 .801 .036 <.001 .250 .008 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001 
 
Discussion 
The degree of behavioural synchrony identified in two groups of captive 
capuchin monkeys was significantly greater than expected based on a 
randomly generated dataset with individuals behaving independently. To my 
knowledge, this is the first evidence of behavioural synchrony at the group 
level in New World primates and in a captive population. Contrary to 
prediction one, examination of predictors of behavioural synchrony revealed 
that groups in their indoor enclosure exhibited decreased levels of synchrony. 
This finding is incompatible with previous findings that discovered increased 
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spatial proximity afforded greater opportunities to co-ordinate behaviour. 
However, on considering the interaction between location and group-size this 
effect is understandable. When outside, larger groups were found to have 
higher levels of behavioural synchrony (Figure 4.2). As the number of 
individuals in an enclosure increases, the average distance from a conspecific 
decreases, potentially creating more opportunities for social influence. But why 
wasn’t this effect also observed in the indoor enclosure where the same basic 
principle applies? This effect might be attributed to a combination of increased 
heterogeneity in terms of hierarchical composition in large groups and the 
enclosed nature of the indoor space. Monkeys of varying social status might 
interpret a social environment in very different terms, especially when that 
environment is enclosed. Higher ranking individuals may interpret an enclosed 
indoor environment as safer and preferentially treat this area as a place to rest. 
However, the perceived threat of violence from a dominant aggressor may 
increase vigilance and locomotion in more subordinate monkeys. This increase 
in intra-group behavioural variability may be less relevant when outdoors as 
subordinate monkeys especially can decide to keep a greater distance from the 
dominant monkeys, pre-empting possible negative reaction. There could be 
other reasons for this interaction; however, further studies will be able to shed 
light on how individual differences contribute to variation in behavioural 
synchrony in different contexts. It is important to consider the possibility that 
an environmental cue, especially a social cue, will be interpreted and acted 
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upon in different ways by different individuals which will generate 
behavioural diversity within a group. 
  
While it was predicted that smaller groups would exhibit greater behavioural 
synchrony, this effect was only noted when monkeys were inside (prediction 2; 
see Figure 4.1). The observation that behavioural synchrony increased with 
group size in outdoor enclosures could be attributed to a number of factors (see 
Table 4.2, and Figure 4.2). An increase in the number of conspecifics in this 
larger outdoor area may promote synchrony by increasing the likelihood that a 
groupmate will observe a conspecific’s behaviour, thus facilitating any variety 
of social learning mechanisms (enhancement or contagion effects; see Chapter 
One for detailed descriptions of each). After all, perception of a social cue is 
necessary for an individual to be influenced by it. Whether the mechanism 
directly leading to an influencing effect is social contagion, or social facilitation, 
cannot be determined from the current data, however, future research should 
determine which mechanisms might determine behavioural synchrony at the 
level of the individual. For example, group-size effects may contribute to 
synchrony, as some behaviours measured here were found to be related with 
both behavioural synchrony and group-size (i.e. foraging, and vigilance 
behaviours).  
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Support was found for the third prediction that group size would positively 
influence vigilance behaviours, although the proportion of monkeys displaying 
vigilance behaviours did reduce in the largest groups. While this finding 
contradicts research on the effect of group-size on vigilance in other species of 
mammals and birds (Ebensperger et al., 2006; Lazarus, 1978; Pays et al., 2009), it 
complements research with primates (Hirsch, 2002; Treves, 1998, 1999) and 
corvids (Robinette & Ha, 2001). Hirsch (2002) has suggested that the heightened 
vigilance exhibited in larger groups of capuchin monkeys is due to pressure of 
monitoring conspecifics. While capuchin monkeys are notably tolerant of 
conspecifics (e.g. Ottoni, De Resende, & Izar, 2005), these monkeys inhabit a 
complex hierarchical group system (Fragaszy, Visalberghi, & Fedigan, 2004), 
and must be attentive to the behaviour of others. Some theorists have argued 
that certain forms of complex intelligence found in ape species are absent in 
monkeys (i.e. imitation, Fragaszy, Deputte, Cooper, Colbert-White, & Hémery, 
2011; or self-recognition, Mitchell & Anderson, 1993). However, others have 
suggested that the intelligent processes facilitated by the large brains of 
monkeys might be related to processing social signals in a complex social space 
and reacting quickly, and correctly in accordance with their own immediate 
goals (Barrett et al., 2007). This proposed form of monkey-intelligence replaces 
the anthropocentric view of a Cartesian primate mind with a mind grounded in 
perception and action (Barrett et al., 2007). For example, a mind that may need 
to be extra vigilant in a crowded social space. Captive populations are also 
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unlikely to be as concerned with predator detection as wild animals, and 
without this factor driving vigilance levels in smaller groups, the effect of 
group-size on vigilance may be more pronounced.  
 
The proportion of monkeys performing foraging behaviour significantly 
increased relative to group size across each quartile of group-size (prediction 
four). This finding corresponds with previous research on capuchin monkeys 
that found the presence of a conspecific facilitated successful foraging (Dindo et 
al., 2009b). However, this is the first study to demonstrate a positive 
relationship between group size and foraging behaviour in capuchins. While 
other studies of group-size in mammals and birds have discovered that larger 
groups facilitate foraging (Ebensperger et al., 2006), and the style of foraging 
behaviour (Beauchamp, 2013), this is the first report of a similar effect in 
capuchin monkeys. While in other studies, group foraging results in a 
reduction in vigilance (Ebensperger et al., 2006), this was not found in our 
analysis which produced no evidence of a significant relationship between the 
frequency of vigilance behaviour and foraging behaviour (see Table 4.3). This 
may be because increased vigilance relative to group size seems to be a unique 
characteristic of some primates (and some other species; e.g. crows Robinette & 
Ha, 2001). The proportion of play behaviour observed in our sample was 
significantly lower in the smallest groups, stayed constant over medium-to-
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large groups, but was highest in the largest groups. Interestingly, the frequency 
of play behaviour positively correlated with foraging behaviour. It may be that 
this relationship is representative of differences between age or sex categories 
in our samples, with younger male monkeys more likely to be found playing, 
while females and older monkeys forage more. While these factors did not 
come within the scope of this study, future studies should investigate the 
individual differences that may interact with group-size effects. It is posited 
that the same mechanism that facilitates relaxed foraging behaviour in older 
monkeys may influence similar attitudes in younger monkeys which are 
displayed through different behavioural expression. Emotional contagion may 
also be the underlying mechanism behind socially facilitated play behaviour as 
has been posited in other social animals (Osvath & Sima, 2014). Resting was 
also found to be positively influenced by group size, again, potentially due to 
the tendency of monkeys to sleep in larger groups, especially near the end of 
the day. Finally, locomoting behaviour was more likely to occur when monkeys 
were present in smaller groups. It could be that when alone, or with only a 
small group of other monkeys, there is an increased necessity to patrol an 
enclosure for possible threats, both of a social and predatory nature. Also, it is 
important to remember that the capuchin monkeys studied here share their 
enclosures with squirrel monkeys, whose presence and behaviour are likely to 
influence some of the social effects examined here. For example, it is thought 
that one benefit of mixed-species groups is that vigilance can be shared 
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between individuals of different species without suffering some of the costs of 
large single species groups (e.g. mate competition; Wolters & Zuberbühler, 
2013). Here, a first step was taken in exploring the effects of social influence 
within-species but future studies are necessary to tease apart the more complex 
nature of these effects in mixed-species groups. 
 
Finally, this study examined neighbour effects between the two separate troops 
of capuchin monkeys. When other variables are partialled out of correlations, 
play behaviour and resting behaviour were positively correlated between East 
and West groups. However, this effect was not found for grooming behaviours. 
The inconspicuousness of grooming behaviour may have contributed to this 
finding. While monkeys resting on horizontal branches can easily be observed 
from an adjacent enclosure, and the vocalisations produced during play are 
similarly conspicuous, grooming behaviour is more discrete and less obviously 
visible from a distance. This provides partial support for our fifth hypothesis 
that affiliative behaviours may be related between groups. Similarly, while no 
direct measures of aggression were taken, we found partial support of our sixth 
prediction that unease would be correlated between groups, with evidence of 
correlated vigilance and fast locomotion between groups.  
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As the methodology employed in this study is an indirect test of the neighbour 
effect it is difficult to confirm that the correlations observed were definitively 
due to between-group social influence. Monkeys in some cases may have been 
influenced by other factors, including visitor effects that were not measured 
during this study (Hosey, 2000). These findings of correlated behaviours 
between groups of captive animals, complement evidence of neighbour effect 
in apes and other New World primates (Videan et al., 2005; Watson & Caldwell, 
2010). Overall, these effects are under-examined in the primate literature and 
there are important reasons to encourage further research on this topic. Watson 
et al. (2014) induced a culture of increased affiliative behaviours by simulating 
neighbouring affiliative vocalisation, providing evidence that the manipulation 
of neighbour effects may improve captive welfare. Evidence of neighbour 
effects of aggression suggest that eavesdropping on distressed or aggressive 
neighbours may have a negative impact on group behaviours (Videan et al., 
2005). This knowledge can provide guidance for the introduction of welfare 
measures; for example, reducing between-group contact when one group may 
have to undertake a potentially stress-inducing husbandry procedure.  
 
This chapter has summarised and examined some of the phenomena that take 
place among group living primates. The literature on social learning often 
ignores the study of group level effects to the detriment of a complete 
162 
 
understanding of the social interaction. Theoretical and empirical steps have 
been taken to address this imbalance (Galef, 2013; King & Cowlishaw, 2009), 
and here a further attempt has been made. It is suggested that simultaneous 
observations of neighbouring groups should be used to understand the 
complex interactions between captive groups that may have auditory, visual, 
and even olfactory contact. Next steps should examine these effects on an inter-
species level and specifically address the impact of these neighbour effects on 
captive animal welfare.  
 
The study of social influence at the group level must be complemented with an 
examination of the mechanisms acting at the individual level that mediate 
behavioural responses. In many cases, the mechanisms of interest will not 
require complex cognitive processing, but understanding them is no less 
important. The mechanism of behavioural co-ordination or synchrony is 
enacted on the level of the individual, but the study of an interaction between 
group-level effects and individual effects introduces exciting possibilities for 
future avenues of research. In the next chapter, an experimental study will 
examine one potential mediator of group-level behavioural synchrony on the 
individual level. While the focus of this chapter has been group-level 
behavioural dynamics, the next will focus on changes in emotional state that 
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may mediate the relationship between contagious or synchronous behavioural 
effects.  
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Chapter 5: Social contagion in capuchin monkeys  
 
As discussed in the introduction, the study of cognitive mechanisms 
underlying social learning and social influence, especially in primates, has long 
been at risk of becoming side-tracked by focussing on mechanisms considered 
“complex”. For conceptual reasons it might be useful to rank cognitive 
mechanisms in order of complexity (e.g. de Waal, 2008; Whiten & Ham, 1992), 
but arguing that certain processes are more worthy of empirical consideration 
is inimical to a complete understanding of social learning. For example, 
empathy, the process of adopting the emotional state of another, is defined at 
varying levels of complexity (de Waal, 2008). de Waal (2008) describes a nested 
model of empathy with emotional contagion (i.e. the automatic matching of 
another’s emotional state) facilitating more complex empathic processes like 
perspective taking and empathic concern. But, to understand a hierarchical 
model of this type it is important that each component is understood in its own 
right. One group of mechanisms that may contribute to complex cognitive 
processes are categorised broadly as social contagion effects. Social contagion is 
defined as the “spread of affect, attitude, or behaviour from individual A (the 
initiator) to individual B (the recipient), where the recipient does not perceive 
an intentional influence attempt on the part of the initiator’’ (p 266, Levy & 
Nail, 1993). While considered less cognitively taxing than true-imitation 
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(Whiten, 2000) or true-empathy (de Waal, 2008), these processes likely account 
for many examples of emotional and behavioural state-matching in human and 
nonhuman animals, and so are important to understand.  
 
While the study of empathy is rarely examined explicitly in the social learning 
literature, it is often considered a related phenomenon. Indeed, some recognise 
it as an emotional equivalent of imitation based on evidence that both 
phenomena may be facilitated by mirror neurons (Iacoboni, 2009). Furthermore, 
simpler cognitive processes likely recruited in true-empathy (e.g. emotional 
contagion; de Waal, 2008), are sometimes explored in the social learning 
literature under the category of social contagion (see definition above). An 
individual possessing the capacity for true-empathy or cognitive-empathy must 
go beyond matching the emotional state of another, and cognitively distinguish 
another’s emotion from their own, as well as act compassionately towards that 
individual (de Waal, 2008; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Hatfield, Rapson, & Le, 2009). 
From their second year human children have been found to possess the ability 
to differentiate between their own emotional states and those of others 
(Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), and they also make efforts to alleviate the distress 
of others (Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990). Unexpectedly, each cognitive 
component of “true empathy” is also found in adults (for review see Decety, 
Norman, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2012). However, evidence of the cognitive 
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processes necessary for true empathy in nonhuman animals is less apparent. 
Chimpanzees, ravens, and elephants have been found to console distressed 
conspecifics (Fraser & Bugnyar, 2010; Fraser, Stahl, & Aureli, 2008; Plotnik & de 
Waal, 2014). Indeed, evidence of pro-social behaviour in rats directed towards 
distressed conspecifics has also been presented as evidence of empathy (Ben-
Ami Bartal, Decety, & Mason, 2011). However, observing a distressed 
conspecific may elicit a similar emotional response in an observer through 
emotional contagion, and to quell one’s own discomfort an observer may help 
or console a conspecific. Due to the inherent difficulty in inferring goals of 
empathic concern in animals, some have argued that no concrete example of 
true empathic ability in nonhuman animals exists (Vasconcelos, Hollis, 
Nowbahari, & Kacelnik, 2012). 
 
Even evidence of the comparatively simpler process of emotional contagion is 
difficult to identify. To overcome the problem of judging emotional contagion 
from behaviour alone, physiological indicators of emotional arousal can be 
examined following observation of an emotionally valenced social stimulus (i.e. 
a conspecific’s emotional expression). In humans, a number of studies have 
shown that after watching an individual express distress, anxiety, or disgust, a 
human observer produces a physiological response that matches the observed 
emotional state (Buchanan et al., 2012; Waters et al., 2014; Wicker et al., 2003). 
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For example, the stress experienced from speaking in public elicits a similar 
stress response in individuals watching someone give a talk (Buchanan et al., 
2012). Buchanan and colleagues found that the stress hormone levels taken 
from individuals watching anxious individuals giving a presentation increased 
in proportion to the stress hormone levels measured in the speakers. Second-
order emotional contagion has also been identified in humans. Participants 
watching the face of another individual, who is watching a video of an actor 
producing joyful or fearful expressions, respond with facial expressions that 
correspond to the emotions portrayed by the actor (Dezecache et al., 2013). In 
animals, the best evidence of emotional contagion identified through 
physiological means is found during mother-infant interactions. For example, 
an infant chick’s distress has been noted to induce a similar emotional reaction 
in the mother hens (Edgar, Lowe, Paul, & Nicol, 2011; using a similar procedure 
in non-related pairs of hens found no emotional contagion effect, Edgar, Paul, 
Harris, Penturn, & Nicol, 2012). One study of chimpanzees examined 
physiological correlates of emotion to identify emotional contagion. Following 
presentation of video footage showing a conspecific being injected with a 
needle and syringe, chimpanzees experienced a reduction in peripheral skin 
temperature indicative of physiological arousal (Parr, 2001). However, a similar 
physiological response was identified when chimpanzees were observing 
videos of needles without a conspecific present, so it is unclear if the 
physiological reaction was elicited by the emotional reaction of a conspecific 
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(i.e. evidence of emotional contagion) or because of a potentially threatening 
stimulus. A more recent video playback experiment found that chimpanzees 
watching videos of conspecifics performing a range of emotionally valenced 
behaviours (e.g. aggressive interactions, infanticide), showed no congruent 
emotional response to the videos (however, emotion in this case was measured 
behaviourally; von Rohr, van Schaik, Kissling, & Burkart, 2015). 
 
Overall, evidence of emotional contagion measured through physiology is rare 
in animals and in most cases, evidence of emotional contagion has been 
provided from behavioural data. However, acknowledging that behaviour is 
our primary source of information about an animal’s goals, emotional state, and 
preferences, it is important to recognise the difficulty in teasing apart emotional 
contagion from response facilitation or behavioural contagion. We know that a 
number of behaviours are related to underlying emotional state. However, if 
we find that these behaviours are being socially facilitated, is it possible to 
conclude that emotional state is also being transmitted (see Chapter Six for a 
more detailed discussion)? While it is difficult to differentiate between 
emotional and behavioural contagion, one recent study found that ravens were 
more likely to adopt a playful mood (i.e. a motivation to perform one of a 
number of play behaviours) after seeing a conspecific playing (Osvath & Sima, 
2014). This example is particularly convincing as the play behaviours exhibited 
169 
 
by the observer ravens did not necessarily involve the same actions they had 
observed, rather an action belonging to a class of behaviours associated with 
play. The most convincing evidence of emotional contagion in primates is 
similar; i.e. an individual is exposed to an emotionally valenced stimulus and 
reacts with behaviour that suggests a change in affective state has taken place. 
For example, the neighbour effect that was examined in the previous chapter is 
sometimes credited as evidence of emotional contagion. Baker and Aureli 
(1996) found that when aggressive calls were made by neighbouring groups of 
chimpanzees, the focal group would also be more likely to perform aggressive 
actions (not necessarily aggressive vocalisation). A more recent study found 
that affiliative behaviours were similarly affected by neighbouring group 
vocalisations (Videan et al., 2005). Common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) were 
also found to show increased levels of affiliative behaviours when vocalisations 
from a neighbouring captive group were affiliative, and the opposite effect was 
observed when neighbouring groups produced negative or aggressive calls 
(Watson & Caldwell, 2010). Under experimental conditions it was discovered 
that an increase in affiliative behaviours could be induced through playback of 
affiliative vocalisations, suggestive of emotional contagion (Watson, Buchanan-
Smith, & Caldwell, 2014). Together, these results demonstrate a form of social 
influence indicative of emotional contagion, however, without more controlled 
study it is difficult to specifically identify whether emotional state matching is 
crucial for these effects to occur. 
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In humans, it has been suggested that facial mimicry is indicative of emotional 
contagion as variation in physiological responses associated with emotional 
arousal (i.e. skin conductance variation) correlate with facial mimicry 
(Dezecache et al., 2013). Facial mimicry may then be the best evidence of 
emotional contagion found in nonhuman primates, and has been identified in 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus, Ross, Menzler, & Zimmermann, 2008), 
chimpanzees (Pan trogladytes, Davila-Ross, Allcock, Thomas, & Bard, 2011) and 
baboons (Mancini, Ferrari, & Palagi, 2013). Behavioural evidence of emotional 
contagion in humans is found in infants crying to the sound of other babies 
crying but not in response to other stimuli of a similar intensity (Martin & 
Clark, 1982). Humans rapidly match facial gestures that communicate affective 
states (e.g. Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Hess & Blairy, 2001), and there is some 
evidence that creating facial gestures linked to emotion can cause a subject to 
exhibit autonomic responses indicative of emotional arousal (Ekman, Levenson, 
& Friesen, 1983). It may be then that rapid facial mimicry may help mediate 
emotional contagion rather than act as an observable behavioural response of 
an underlying emotional effect. However, while facial mimicry may be 
indicative of emotional contagion, it has yet to be identified in non-play 
interactions, so it may be that this phenomenon is specific to these interactions 
and is communicative rather than contagious. Also, further work is necessary to 
show that the underlying emotions being experienced are indeed congruent 
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rather than complementary, and are not triggered by other environmental 
stimuli that may cue play behaviour.  
 
While studies of emotional contagion are not common, examples of behavioural 
synchronisation are more prevalent in the nonhuman literature. The ability to 
detect and react according to the behavioural states of conspecifics is adaptive, 
and many species use the behaviours of conspecifics to cue their own. The 
synchronous movement governed by simple heuristics witnessed in flocks, 
swarms, herds, schools, and other large groupings of animals provide 
convincing evidence that cognitive intelligence is not necessary to coordinate 
group behaviour (Beauchamp, 2012; Couzin et al., 2002; Reynolds, 1987). This 
coordinated movement is important for adaptive group living, and aids in 
predator detection and avoidance (Beauchamp, 2009; Carere et al., 2009; 
Ebensperger et al., 2006). Sometimes however, the function of co-ordinated 
behaviour is less obvious. One area that has received considerable interest is the 
study of socially facilitated displacement behaviours. Displacement behaviours 
are a class of behaviour defined by their apparent irrelevance to the situation in 
which they occur. They are often related to body care (e.g. self-grooming, self-
scratching, yawning, body-shaking, preening, etc.), but also occur during 
instances of stress, thwarting, or indecision (Delius, 1967; Diezinger & 
Anderson, 1986; Maestripieri, Shino, Aureli, & Troisi, 1992; Sevenster, 1961). 
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Curiously, many displacement behaviours appear to be socially facilitated. The 
most common example is that of yawning, however, there is evidence that 
scratching in primates (Feneran et al., 2013; Holle et al., 2012), and preening in 
birds (Hoppitt et al., 2007; Palestis & Burger, 1998), are also socially facilitated. 
As displacement behaviours are linked with emotional arousal it is difficult to 
differentiate between emotional and behavioural social transfer in these 
instances. Is socially contagious preening or scratching indicative of a change in 
emotional arousal, or merely coordinated body-care behaviour? This study will 
attempt to address the difficulty in interpreting emotion from behaviour, and 
Chapter Six will address in detail the issue of contagious displacement 
behaviour.  
 
To examine in greater detail the transmission of behavioural and emotional 
states we attempted to examine these effects under experimental conditions in 
capuchin monkeys (Sapajus sp.). As mentioned in Chapter 1, capuchin monkeys 
are a socially tolerant group-living species that are well known for their large 
brain to body size ratio (Fragaszy et al., 2004), and a number of studies have 
examined the ability of capuchin monkeys to learn from others with mixed 
results (Dindo et al., 2009b; Fragaszy et al., 2011). Capuchin monkeys can learn 
about the edibility of food from conspecifics (Visalberghi & Addessi, 2001), 
foraging behaviour is enhanced through the presence of conspecifics (Dindo, 
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Whiten, & de Waal, 2009), and in a two-action task, different methods of 
opening a puzzle box (either lifting a window upward, or sliding it to one side) 
were reliably copied (attributed to emulation; Dindo, Thierry, & Whiten, 2008). 
However, evidence of more complex imitation is lacking. Little support for the 
possibility of capuchins learning complex tasks purely from observing a 
conspecific has been found (for a review see Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 2001), and 
behaviour matching is limited to actions that require the manipulation of an 
object (Fragaszy et al., 2011). Interestingly, while capuchin monkeys have been 
the focus of numerous studies of social learning, no study has yet examined 
emotional or behavioural contagion with this species.  
 
In this current study, we presented monkeys with video stimuli representing 
conspecifics from their group in a number of emotionally valenced scenarios 
(e.g. monkeys displaying threat displays, grooming each other, foraging), to 
examine whether an emotionally contiguous response would be elicited by the 
observer monkeys. To rule out the possibility of a stressful stimulus generating 
an emotional response, rather than the emotional reaction of the conspecific, the 
video stimuli presented in this study never displayed the stimulus that was 
eliciting the reaction in the monkeys in the video. Many studies of emotional 
contagion have only measured the behaviour of an observer (e.g. Davila-Ross et 
al., 2008; Osvath & Sima, 2014), but both behaviour and physiology were 
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measured here. By examining both the behavioural response of the observer 
monkeys as well as stress hormone levels measured through salivary cortisol, it 
was possible to examine contagion both behaviourally and physiologically. 
Levels of cortisol, a steroid hormone released through the adrenal cortex, 
measured in the blood, urine, or saliva has been used to assess stress levels in 
primates for a number of years (Heintz, Santymire, Parr, & Lonsdorf, 2011; Tse 
& Bond, 2004). Cortisol levels increase in response to psychological and 
physiological stressors, (for review see Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004), and the 
release of cortisol into the blood can be measured in saliva within one minute 
(Vining, McGinley, Maksvytis, & Ho, 1983). However, unlike blood or urine 
sampling methods, saliva can be collected non-invasively at multiple time-
points separated by short intervals.  
 
Our primary hypotheses concern social contagion in capuchin monkeys. 
However, as this is the first study to examine salivary cortisol in capuchin 
monkeys, a secondary aim was to examine variance in the cortisol measured. 
Cortisol has been found to follow a daily circadian rhythm in some primates 
peaking in the morning and dropping throughout the day (Chan & Debono, 
2010; Heintz et al., 2011), and as research sessions took place at two different 
time points in the day, it was possible to examine this daily variation for the 
first time in capuchin salivary cortisol. Also, the collection of salivary cortisol 
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allowed an assessment of average variation of cortisol in primates throughout a 
research session. An important consideration when conducting research with 
captive animals is the assessment and improvement of subject welfare for both 
ethical and empirical reasons (Ash, 2014). The sampling of salivary cortisol 
allowed an examination of whether the monkeys became increasingly stressed 
due to their voluntary separation from their social group.  
 
This study’s primary aim was to examine the change in both behavioural and 
emotional responses as a result of social stimuli. It was predicted that measures 
of anxiety and cortisol would be greatest during stimuli containing video 
representations of anxious group-mates in comparison to social control videos 
(i.e. stimuli showing neutral behaviours, e.g. feeding, foraging), and non-social 
control videos containing recordings of enclosures without monkeys present. If 
emotional contagion mediates transmission of affiliation and a sense of ease, it 
is expected that observation of videos containing groupmates in more relaxed 
scenarios (i.e. resting or grooming) might reduce stress hormone levels as well 
as stress related behaviours in comparison to control stimuli. Furthermore, 
while the behaviours used to assess emotion are presumed to correlate with 
stress responses based on previous research of displacement behaviours linked 
to stress (for a review see Maestripieri, Schino, Aureli, & Troisi, 1992), this 
study was also able to assess the validity of behavioural measures as indicators 
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of arousal, measured here through cortisol. Behaviour was examined in the 
context of a change in cortisol over a research session and average cortisol over 
a session. An average measure of cortisol is likely indicative of the monkey’s 
general state of arousal at the time of the session and will vary across sessions 
dependent on the monkey’s experience both during the research session and 
before the session. On the other hand, examining a measure of change in 
cortisol informs us of behaviours that might be more indicative of a real-time 
change in arousal.  
 
Methods  
Animals and research site  
Research was conducted at the Living Links to Human Evolution Field Site at 
Edinburgh Zoo. For further information concerning layout, husbandry 
practices, and population make-up at this research site see Chapters Two and 
Four. As previously described in Chapter Two, research rooms situated 
between both East and West capuchin and squirrel monkey enclosures facilitate 
the study of monkeys in isolation or in smaller groups. For the purpose of this 
study ten capuchin monkeys (Sapajus sp.) were tested (eight males, mean age = 
6.33 years; SD = 3.43), between 16.09.2013 and 09.12.2013.  Experimental 
sessions took place twice daily, four times a week, and participation was 
rewarded with raisins, peanuts, and sunflower seeds. Diluted pineapple juice 
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was used for training, and all rewards were supplementary to the primates’ 
diets. Ethical approval was granted for this study by the University of Stirling’s 
Ethics Committee.  
 
Materials  
Eight research cubicles arranged in a connected 2X4 matrix act as a corridor 
between the monkeys’ indoor and outdoor enclosures (each cubicle measures 
49.5 cm X 52.1 cm X 51.4 cm). Partitioning slides inserted between cubicles 
allow monkeys to be separated from their groupmates for research purposes, 
and for this study subjects were granted access to two adjacent, middle cubicles 
(see Figure 1). Video stimuli were recorded using a Sony Mini Digital Video 
Camera, and video stimuli were presented using Microsoft PowerPoint on a 
19” LCD monitor. Cotton swabs were used to collect saliva from monkeys at 
various stages of the research session (Salimetrics, SalivaBio Children’s Swab).  
 
Stimuli 
At the time of the study dominant males from both East and West groups did 
not take part in research sessions, so these individuals were recorded for use in 
the video stimuli. In some stimuli videos, other monkeys were present in the 
video, but these monkeys were never subjects.  Monkeys included in the stimuli 
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were observed in their enclosures and recorded on a digital video camera. 
Extracts of recorded video were chosen to represent a variety of different 
emotional states in capuchin monkeys. Neutral control stimuli included video 
recordings of the dominant male, alone or with other monkeys, sitting or 
moving in a relaxed state foraging or eating. Positive stimuli showed the 
dominant male grooming or being groomed by another monkey. Negative 
stimuli included the dominant male demonstrating stress related behaviours; 
e.g. performing a threat display, being highly vigilant. The monkeys in the 
video were never directly orientated towards the observer and while the 
monkeys in the stimuli may occasionally glance in the general direction of the 
camera lens, the video stimuli were designed to give the impression that the 
observed monkeys were being eavesdropped upon. Non-social control stimuli 
were also created. These included recordings of a section of the indoor and 
outdoor enclosures with no animal in view. As two groups of monkeys were 
tested in this study (i.e. East and West groups), two separate sets of group-
specific stimuli were developed. For each group, two different stimuli were 
created for each of the emotionally valenced conditions (e.g. two positive 
stimuli videos for presentation to capuchins in the East group, and two 
different positive stimuli for the monkeys in the West group). Each stimulus 
was presented once during a morning research session and once during an 
afternoon research session to control for possible circadian variation in cortisol 
levels. In total, the design included the presentation of four stimulus types 
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(non-social control, neutral control, positively valenced, negatively valenced), 
each with two distinct video stimuli, each shown to the subject twice (in the 
morning and afternoon). Overall, each subject took part in 16 research sessions. 
However, one monkey (Inti) stopped taking part in research sessions at the end 
of this study and did not complete one session (data from the remaining 15 
sessions was analysed).  Data from 159 research sessions was analysed. Due to 
experimenter error, one monkey (Chico) was presented with the first positively 
valenced stimulus twice on consecutive morning research sessions. The 
stimulus was presented to this monkey a third time during an afternoon 
session (to counterbalance daily variation in cortisol) and these data were 
analysed instead.  
 
Training for collection of saliva sample  
Before the onset of the study monkeys were trained to chew on a cotton swab 
(Salimetrics, SalivaBio Children’s Swab) by rewarding a series of approximate 
behaviours. At the first stage, monkeys were rewarded for any behaviour that 
increased the proximity between the swab and the monkey’s face (often 
achieved when a monkey would try to smell the novel item). Subsequently, 
monkeys were rewarded for any further interaction with the swab involving 
their mouth (licking, sucking, biting, etc.). To discourage monkeys from 
touching the swab, if the swab was touched by the monkey’s hand, the 
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experimenter would withdraw the swab and turn their back to the monkey 
signalling that approximately 5 seconds would elapse before the monkey 
would next get the opportunity to achieve a food reward. This method 
continued until each monkey would keep the swab in their mouth for a number 
of seconds. To encourage some monkeys to take the cotton swabs in their 
mouth, the swabs were first soaked in a pineapple juice and water solution (1:1 
dilution). Once the monkeys had learned that they could suck on the swab to 
receive juice, the swab was offered dry. Once a monkey would take a swab in 
their mouth it was retracted and a food reward was offered. This was repeated 
until the swab looked visibly wet, which took approximately one-two minutes. 
 
Before the experimental sessions began a saliva sample from each monkey was 
centrifuged (at 3600 rpm for 10 min) to assess whether sufficient saliva was 
being collected. Once it was clear that a monkey was providing sufficient saliva 
for analyses, monkeys were deemed ready for the experimental procedure.  
 
Procedure 
The monkeys at this research centre have been trained to signal their intent to 
end a research session by pushing against the cubicle doors that lead to their 
enclosures. Piloting the procedure with control non-social stimuli different to 
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those used experiment identified an optimal interval of five minutes between 
the onset of the first stimulus and the collection of the second sample of saliva. 
When longer time intervals were used, some monkeys persistently signalled to 
leave and sessions were terminated. Cortisol is transferred from the blood to 
saliva in approximately one minute (Vining et al., 1983), and the second saliva 
sample was expected to reflect the monkey’s hormonal response to the video 
presentation. In humans, the effect of a stressor on salivary cortisol is most 
evident 20-40 minutes after the onset of the stressor, however, significant effects 
are identified after ≤10 minutes (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). During piloting, 
no noticeable change in stress-related behaviours (i.e. see definitions in Table 
5.1) were identified throughout this five minute interval suggesting this time 
spent separated from their group was not stressful in itself. However, as this 
may be difficult to assess through behaviour alone, this effect was also 
examined as an aim of this study. 
  
An experimental session began once a subject was separated from other 
monkeys and once all other monkeys had left the bank of research cubicles (i.e. 
not in any of the compartments seen in Figure 1). Once all entrances to the 
cubicles were closed, the experimenter took a baseline saliva sample from the 
subject. After this sample was successfully taken, a video monitor was placed 
approximately 50 cm from one of the two cubicles in use. The monkey was free 
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to stay in the experimental cubicle (i.e. the cubicle facing the video monitor) or 
move to the adjacent cubicle, however, food rewards were only offered in the 
experimental cubicle.  
 
During each session the same 15 second video stimulus was presented to the 
monkey on four occasions. The presentation of the stimuli was automated 
using Microsoft Powerpoint. Each of the four stimulus presentations was 
preceded by a five second presentation of an olive green screen with a moving 
dot. The second stimulus presentation immediately followed the first and this 
was followed by a 15 second interval where the subject was offered a peanut 
half. The third and fourth presentation followed and after the final stimulus 
presentation the screen went black. Every fifteen seconds a beep sounded 
signalling the presentation of a single food reward (peanut half or sunflower 
seed). This continued for 3 minutes and 15 seconds when a different sound 
signalled for a second saliva sample to be taken. The soaked saliva swabs were 
immediately placed on ice packs and were placed in a freezer at -20°C within 
one hour. The interval between the first and second saliva sample was 
approximately 5 minutes ± 10 seconds.  
 
During each session the subject’s behaviour was recorded in both cubicles on a 
Logitech HD Webcam (C270). All videos were subsequently coded for 
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behaviours related to stress (see Table 5.1 for definitions). Vigilance and 
scratching behaviours were examined as well as the number of times the 
monkeys moved between the two cubicles (a proxy measure of activity). 
Monkeys are also trained to touch the doors leading to their enclosures as an 
indication that they would like to leave. Isolated door touching events during a 
session were measured as possible indicator of discomfort, whoever, if door 
touching behaviour persisted, a research session would be terminated and the 
monkey would be allowed to leave. This did not occur during the sessions in 
which the data was collected, however, some research sessions were terminated 
before baseline saliva samples were taken as monkeys gave clear indications of 
discomfort. Also, three other monkeys were trained to provide saliva samples 
but were not comfortable remaining in the cubicles for the required interval 
and did not complete more than five experimental sessions each. While the 
amount of time spent in the non-experimental cubicle could indicate an 
arbitrary preference, it may also indicate a preference to be further from the 
stimulus so this was also examined. Finally, attention paid to each stimulus was 
measured to examine any attentional preference.  
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Table 5.1: Definitions of behaviours used to examine emotional contagion in 
capuchin monkeys. Scratch, touch door, and peep were recorded as events. 
For a new event to be recorded the previous bout of behaviour must have 
terminated at least 5 seconds before the onset of the new bout.  
 
Behaviour Name Definition 
Attention The monkey’s eyes are focussed in the direction of the monitor (i.e. just 
below the camera recording the behaviour). 
Scratch The nails of one of the monkey’s hands or legs are moved across a part 
of the skin repeatedly. A new event was not coded if the location of the 
scratching moved. 
Cross middle The monkey leaves the focal cubicle to enter the second cubicle; both 
front and back legs must leave the experimental cubicle. 
Touch Door The monkey puts pressure on the outer slide indicating that he/she may 
want to leave. This may be a hand placed on the door with little 
pressure; or pushed with the monkey’s entire body; sometimes the door 
is pulled by hand if there is a small opening, and the separating slide 
isn’t flush with the back wall. 
Vigilance The monkey looks through the holes on the top or bottom of the 
separating slide or looks through the bottom slide. 
Time in Second Cubicle Time spent in second cubicle was measured in seconds. 
 
 
Hormone analysis 
The hormone analysis took place in the Endocrinology Lab of the Department 
of Behavioural Biology, University of Vienna, Austria. In order to keep the 
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samples frozen during transport from Edinburgh to Vienna, they were sent 
overnight on dry ice. The monkeys’ saliva was gained by centrifuging the 
cotton swabs (3600 rpm, 10 min), and salivary cortisol concentrations were 
measured in duplicates, using an enzyme immunoassay (EIA) against Cortisol-
3-CMO:BSA (for a detailed assay description see Palme & Möstl, 1997). This 
assay has already been used successfully in other species, including primates 
(i.e. bonobos, Pan paniscus, Behringer et al. 2009), horses (Equus ferus caballus, 
(Schmidt, Aurich, Möstl, Müller, & Aurich, 2010), and dogs (Canis lupus 
familiaris, Kotrschal, Schöberl, Bauer, Thibeaut, & Wedl, 2009). Intra and 
interassay coefficients of variation were 8.1 % and 10.8 %, respectively. Some 
samples were not analysed due to contamination or insufficient saliva leaving a 
total of 145 baseline samples (from 159 collected samples), 149 second samples, 
and 138 pairs of samples (i.e. available baseline and second samples from the 
same session). Overall, using the collection method described above, 92.5% of 
samples were able to be analysed, a rate comparable to other studies that have 
used similar methods with nonhuman primates (e.g. 88% success by Lutz, 
Tiefenbacher, Jorgensen, Meyer, & Novak, 2000).  
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Data Analysis  
Daily and within-session variation in cortisol 
To examine daily variation in cortisol levels the hour a saliva sample was taken 
(11:00- 12:00, 12:00-13:00, 14:00-15:00, and 15:00-16:00) was included as a 
predictor variable in a linear mixed model (LMM) with baseline cortisol levels 
as the outcome variable and subject included as a random factor. Baseline 
cortisol was log transformed to improve normality, but visualisations of this 
data and descriptive statistics represent non-transformed data. To test whether 
cortisol levels changed on average between the baseline measures and second 
measurement, a repeated measures Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was performed 
on the combined data to examine any group level effects. However, as multiple 
measures from each monkey were included in this group-level test, a series of 
repeated measures Wilcoxon signed ranks tests compared individual variation.  
 
Effect of stimuli on behaviour and cortisol levels 
One monkey was excluded from the examination of the effect of the 
emotionally valenced stimuli on behaviour and cortisol. Sylvie, had the highest 
mean levels of baseline cortisol (mean = 330.1 ng/ml) and also the highest 
variance (standard deviation, SD = 186.4 ng/ml; see Figure 2). Further 
examination of video from this individual’s research sessions identified that 
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high mean and variance were likely unrelated to the experimental design and 
instead artefacts of separation from her infant. To examine the effect of stimulus 
type on stress hormone levels, an absolute change in cortisol over the research 
session was used as a dependent variable. This was calculated by subtracting 
the value of the cortisol measured in the baseline sample (taken before stimulus 
presentation) from the value of the cortisol measured in the second sample 
(taken approximately five minutes after the onset of the stimulus). Absolute 
change, rather than relative change, was used as a comparable absolute change 
in cortisol (e.g. 10 Ng/ml) can be vastly different in relative terms depending on 
the baseline measure (e.g. if baseline levels are 10 Ng/ml, a 10 Ng/ml change 
represents a 100% increase, while if a baseline measure of 100 Ng/ml is taken 
this change represents only a 10% change in cortisol). Behavioural outcome 
variables measured as continuous variables (attention, time in second cubicle) 
were examined for normality and non-normal data were transformed to 
improve the distribution of residuals in models (e.g. both attention and time in 
second cubicle were transformed using a logarithmic transformation). 
However, descriptive data and graphical representations of data are based on 
non-transformed values. Linear mixed-models were used to examine the effect 
of the stimulus type on the absolute change in cortisol, attention, and time 
spent in second cubicle. Poisson-distributed error structures are advised when 
handling count data (Zuur et al., 2009), however a comparison of model 
diagnostics from Poisson and Gaussian distributions identified no advantage to 
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Poisson models, so linear-mixed models are reported below. When necessary, 
count variables were transformed (log transformations) to improve error-
structure (i.e. scratch, cross middle, touch door, and peep). As each monkey 
was tested multiple times on each condition, subject was always included in a 
mixed model as a random effect. The significance of stimulus type on outcome 
variables was assessed using F-tests. If significant effects were identified for the 
stimulus type, post-hoc comparisons explored the simple effects with adjusted 
p-values using the Shaffer method (Shaffer, 1986).  
 
Behavioural Predictors of Cortisol 
To examine behavioural predictors of cortisol, two linear mixed models were 
designed with subject as a random factor. One model examined behavioural 
predictors of an absolute change in cortisol between baseline levels and the 
second sample. Two outlying data-points (> 4 standard deviations from the 
mean) displayed very large residual values in the model (>4) and were 
removed from the final model. A second model examined behavioural 
predictors of average cortisol over the research session; the dependent variable 
in this case was the mean value of the baseline and second sample. A 
logarithmic transformation was performed on the average cortisol level to 
improve the fit of the linear model, and one data-point (>3 SD from the mean) 
was removed to improve model fit. As average cortisol was log transformed, to 
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describe the contribution of predictor variables, odds ratios were calculated 
through back-transformation of log odds. A backwards stepwise method was 
used to create each model. First, all independent variables were included in the 
models. Predictor variables were subsequently removed from each model in 
order of least significance. The final models with all significant contributing 
variables are reported. Variance inflation factors (VIF) were calculated for all 
predictor variables to test for collinearity and no evidence of collinearity was 
identified (all VIFs < 5, Zuur et al., 2009).  
 
Software  
All statistics test were performed using R statistical software (R Core Team, 
2014) run in the Rstudio environment (RStudio, 2014). Linear mixed models 
were created using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015). All graphics were 
created using the ggplot package (Wickham, 2009). 
 
Results 
Variation in cortisol 
There were considerable individual differences in monkeys’ baseline average 
cortisol scores and variance (see Figure 5.1). A linear mixed model (LMM) 
found that the time of day had a significant effect on baseline cortisol levels 
(𝐹3,132 = 5.377, p = .002).  
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Figure 5.1: Boxplot of baseline cortisol for each individual monkey. All 
boxplots display median values (solid horizontal lines) with inter-quartile 
ranges (upper and lower limits of the boxes), and maximum and minimum 
values within 1.5 times the inter-quartile range measure from the upper and 
lower hinges. Outliers are represented with filled dots and are values outside 
1.5 times the inter-quartile range measured from both hinges. 
 
Post-hoc comparisons (with adjusted p-values - Shaffer methods) found that 
cortisol levels were higher between 11:00-12:00 (mean = 125.646 Ng/ml) than 
measures taken between 14:00-15:00 (mean = 109.260 Ng/ml) although this 
effect was only marginally significant (t = -2.133, p = .098). There was also a 
significant difference between cortisol levels measured between 11:00-12:00 and 
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those taken between 15:00-16:00 (mean = 124.6179 Ng/ml, t = -3.185, p = .007; see 
Figure 5.2). Cortisol levels were also significantly higher when taken between 
12:00-13:00 (mean = 187.733 Ng/ml) than when they were when taken between 
15:00-16:00 (t = -3.243, p =.007; see Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2. Boxplot representing baseline cortisol levels taken at different 
time-points in the day. For a description of boxplot components see Figure 
5.1.  
 
 
Overall, no significant difference was found between baseline measures of 
cortisol (median = 104.4) and the second measures (median = 103.6; Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test: Z = - 0.896, p = .185). Examining the change in cortisol for 
each individual monkey identified two monkeys whose cortisol levels 
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significantly changed throughout the sessions (see table 5.2).  
 
Effect of stimuli on behaviour and cortisol levels 
A linear mixed model (LMM) with individual monkey as a random factor, 
found that the type of stimulus had no effect on absolute change in cortisol 
(LMM: 𝐹3,113= 0.141, p = .935; see Figure 5.3). Similarly, stimulus-type did not 
influence the amount of time the monkeys would spend in the second cubicle 
(LMM: 𝐹3,131= 0.133, p =.941), frequency of movement (LMM: 𝐹3,131 = 1.134, p = 
.338), door touches (LMM: 𝐹3,131 = 1.047, p = .374), vigilance behaviours (LMM: 
𝐹3,131 = 0.432, p = .731), or scratches (LMM: 𝐹3,131 = 0.234, p = .873). 
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Table 5.2. Median measures of cortisol at baseline and after the stimulus for each monkey. P-values and Z scores from 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests are also presented to test significant differences between baseline and seconds scores.  
 
 Kato Carlos Junon Chico Reuben Sylvie Inti Figo Ximo Torres 
Median Baseline 
Cortisol (ng/ml) 
58.25 121.55 
 
45.1 72.2 76.8 261.85 81.5 155.1 94.2 196 
Median After 
Cortisol (ng/ml) 
45.1 116 80.55 63.3 98.3 237.65 94.05 101.2 108.1 201.3 
Z (p-values) 0.667 
(.252) 
-0.439 
(.670) 
1.665 
(.048) 
-.460 
(.677) 
0.702  
(.241) 
-0.105 
(.542) 
0.785 
(.216) 
-1.337 
(.091) 
1.933 
(.027) 
-.869 
(.808) 
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A linear mixed model with individual as a random factor found that condition 
had a significant effect on attention to stimuli (LMM: 𝐹3,131= 7.354, p < .0001; see 
Figure 5.4). Post-hoc comparisons (with adjusted p-values) found that 
significantly greater attention was paid to negatively valenced stimuli (mean = 
11.45, SD = 8.57) when compared to neutral stimuli (mean = 8.12, SD = 6.93; t = -
2.296, p = .043), positive stimuli (mean = 7.13, SD = 8.12; t = -3.960, p = .0002), 
and control stimuli (mean = 6.15, SD = 6.70; t = -4.130, p = .0002). No other 
significant differences were found in attention to stimuli.  
 
Figure 5.3. Boxplot of absolute change in cortisol for each condition. For a 
description of boxplot components see Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.4. Boxplot of attention to videos for each condition. For a description 
of boxplot components see Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Behavioural predictors of cortisol 
An LMM identified that the frequency of vigilance behaviours was a significant 
predictor of absolute change in cortisol over 5 minutes with an average 
decrease of 12.05 ng/ml of cortisol for every unit increase in vigilance behaviour 
(see Table 5.3.). One indices of discomfort was found to be marginally 
significant in predicting change in cortisol, with an observed increase of 12.66 
ng/ml on average for every one observation of a monkey pushing against the 
research cubicle door (see Table 5.3.).  
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Table 5.3. LMM describing change in cortisol over 5 minutes (DV = absolute 
change in cortisol), and average cortisol in a research session (DV = sum of 
baseline cortisol values and second values).  
 
 
Examining average cortisol it was identified that attention and vigilance 
significantly predicted average cortisol levels; a unit increase in attention 
predicted an average reduction of 2.82% in average cortisol, while a unit 
Dependent Variable Predictor 
Variables Estimate SE T P 
Absolute Change in Cortisol      
 Constant 28.472 13.377 2.13 .0353 
 Vigilance -12.048 4.284 -2.81 .0057 
 Push door 12.660 6.671 1.90 .0601 
Average Cortisol  
(log transformed) 
     
 Constant 5.115 0.197 25.85 .0001 
 Attention -.0286 0.009 -3.02 .0031 
 Vigilance -.0707 0.034 -2.20 .0381 
 Scratch -.0775 0.042 -1.84 .0678 
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increase in vigilance predicted a 6.83% reduction in average cortisol (see Table 
5.3). A marginally significant effect of scratching was identified with a unit 
increase in scratching predicting a 7.46% reduction in average cortisol (on 
average).  
 
Discussion 
An attempt to study emotional contagion in capuchin monkeys discovered that 
the type of emotionally valenced stimuli presented to subjects did not 
systematically affect any behaviours related to emotion or arousal (i.e. 
scratching, comfort in the research cubicle, vigilance), or physiological stress 
responses measured through salivary cortisol. However, monkeys did attend 
significantly longer to stimuli depicting conspecifics demonstrating behaviours 
related to anxiety or high levels of arousal (e.g. displacement behaviours, threat 
displays). These findings leave us to conclude that emotional or behavioural 
contagion was not identified in capuchin monkeys under this experimental 
paradigm; however, systematic variation in attention to specific emotionally 
valenced stimuli suggests meaningful social information was perceived by 
subjects.  
 
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact reason for why emotional or behavioural 
contagion was not identified. First, assuming a true null-result, capuchin 
monkeys might not use the behaviour of conspecifics to directly cue their own 
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behavioural or emotional response, without that behaviour being directed 
toward the observer in a communicative way (i.e. threat display in the direction 
of an observer). The video stimuli presented in this experiment were recorded 
to give the impression of a monkey being eavesdropped upon. This was 
intentional, as they were designed to elicit automatic behavioural or emotional 
contagion in response to the same behavioural or emotional state, rather than to 
elicit a complementary response to a communicative gesture. It is therefore 
possible that this finding reflects a true negative result indicative of ecologically 
valid capuchin behaviour. Evidence of behavioural contagion found in the 
study of neighbour effects (Videan et al., 2005; Watson & Caldwell, 2010) is 
often triggered through vocalisations with communicative functions. On the 
other hand, many of the behaviours displayed by monkeys in the stimuli may 
hold no communicative value to a third party observer (e.g. grooming, 
scratching, foraging, etc.). Threat displays were observed in the videos which 
signal aggression towards the recipient of such a display, however, it is unclear 
whether the signal holds the same value to a third-party observer.  It is also 
possible that the individual monkeys presented in the videos could have 
influenced responses. Dominant males from each group were always present in 
the videos, sometimes alone, sometimes with other monkeys, and it is possible 
that the relationships between the subjects and the individuals in the video 
could mediate a behavioural or emotional response. For example, emotional co-
ordination between mother-infant pairs has been found in humans and birds 
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(Edgar, Lowe, Paul, & Nicol, 2011; Waters, West, & Mendes, 2014), and it is 
unclear whether this emotional contagion might extend to unrelated group 
mates. Some of the younger subjects in this study were observing first-degree 
relatives in the videos (e.g. mother, father, son, brother), however, an 
unreported examination of these monkeys’ reactions to those specific stimuli 
identified no systematic variation in any direction.  
 
It could be argued that subjects could not perceive the social content of the 
videos. The technology used to record and present video stimuli is produced 
for human viewing and it is difficult to know whether nonhuman animals 
perceive the same information as human experimenters (D’Eath, 1998). 
However, capuchins have been found to react to social stimuli presented in 
video monitors. For example, Anderson and colleagues (Anderson, Kuroshima, 
Paukner, & Fujita, 2009) found that monkeys observing themselves in video 
recordings noticeably altered their behaviour and in some cases performed 
communicative facial gestures toward the recordings. Our subjects were never 
observed responding in this way. In the study by Anderson et al. (2009), 
subjects were more likely to direct facial displays towards videos showing 
monkeys directly facing the camera, but the monkeys in our stimuli were not 
orientated in this way. A substantial body of evidence suggests that video 
playback is successful in eliciting context specific social effects from monkeys 
and apes (Anderson, Myowa-Yamakoshi, & Matsuzawa, 2004; Parr, 2001; 
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Paukner & Anderson, 2006), but it is nonetheless possible that the stimuli were 
not ecologically valid. A recent study with the same population of capuchin 
monkeys tested here found that behavioural responses to a picture of a 
conspecific did not match the reaction to the real conspecific (Morton et al., 
under review). The authors attribute this finding to absence of other relevant 
cues (e.g. movement, sounds, smell, etc.), and the same factors may have 
confounded the results found here. It is possible therefore that the presentation 
to subjects of moving images of conspecifics in an unusual context lacked the 
auditory and other sensory information necessary for authentic emotional or 
behavioural reactions.  
 
It is important to also consider that the interval between the onset of the 
stimulus and the collection of the second saliva sample did not allow an 
optimal measurement of cortisol variation. This interval was limited due to 
welfare considerations for the subjects, and while changes in cortisol can be 
identified within ten minutes of arousal, peak cortisol levels are identified 20 to 
40 minutes after the occurrence of a stressor (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). It 
may then be that the interval was not sufficient to identify subtle changes in 
cortisol caused by stimuli. Overall, it is difficult to distinguish between a 
genuine null-result and an insensitive method. However, the finding that 
monkeys attended significantly more to stimuli presenting a group-mate in an 
anxious behavioural state suggests that some element of these specific stimuli 
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were of interest to the monkeys. While it is tempting to interpret this 
observation through an anthropomorphic lens and claim evidence of 
nonhuman schadenfreude, a more parsimonious interpretation is that the 
behaviours exhibited by the monkeys in those videos (e.g. high vigilance, threat 
display, etc.) acted to alert the subject to a potential environmental or social 
stressor. Increased attention to these videos may have then been an effort to 
identify this stressor. This evidence of systematic attention to stimuli does 
suggest that some aspects of specific stimuli hold significant interest to 
observers.  
 
A secondary goal of this study was to examine qualities of stress hormones in 
capuchin monkeys. To this end, evidence of increased levels of cortisol in 
samples collected in the morning and early afternoon complements previous 
findings of cortisol circadian rhythms in primates (Chan & Debono, 2010; 
Heintz et al., 2011), and validates the use of salivary cortisol as a measure of 
meaningful physiological change. It has been argued that improved animal 
welfare generates more reliable and valid empirical data (Ash, 2014), and in this 
sample, monkeys’ salivary cortisol did not increase significantly over the course 
of a research session on average, indicating that the procedures used to study 
these capuchin monkeys was not detrimental to the participant’s welfare in 
general. It could be argued that the second hormone measure represents the 
rise but not the peak of cortisol concentrations, but half of monkeys’ median 
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values from the second sample were lower than median baseline measures (see 
Table 2), suggesting that this non-significant result is not indicative of a trend in 
increasing cortisol. When examining individual variation in cortisol levels only 
two monkeys were identified as having significantly elevated cortisol levels at 
the end of the session on average. Interestingly, both monkeys were 
enthusiastic subjects in research sessions. One of these monkeys, Junon, has 
been taking part in cubicle research for a number of years (e.g. see Morton, Lee, 
& Buchanan-Smith, 2013) and did not display obvious signs of anxiety 
throughout research sessions. Similarly, the other monkey who displayed an 
increase in cortisol levels, Ximo, was anecdotally the most reluctant to leave the 
cubicle area once the research session was complete. During research sessions 
these specific monkeys demonstrated no obvious signs of anxiety; however, 
examining behavioural correlates of cortisol identified some interesting effects. 
Lower vigilance behaviour during a research session predicted a reduction in 
cortisol over the session. While difficult to conclusively explain the reason for 
this finding, one interpretation is offered here. During some research sessions a 
monkey might be more motivated to attend to activities in their social group. If 
this is the case, separation from their group may lead to an increase in stress 
hormone levels and also increased interest in activity outside of the research 
cubicles (which is what the measure of vigilance examined). Also, comfort in 
the cubicle (measured as the number of times a subject signalled their intention 
to leave the research cubicles) was a marginally significant predictor of an 
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increase in cortisol. This suggests that the measure of comfort used in this study 
was a valid one, and future researchers may want to more stringently adhere to 
these signals performed by monkeys. However, while a small number of 
monkeys showed a significant increase in stress hormone levels, the majority 
demonstrated no such change, and indeed half of the monkeys showed a (non-
significant) decrease in median cortisol level through the research session.  
 
While behaviours performed by monkeys during the research sessions might be 
related to real-time change in cortisol, behaviour may also be indicative of a 
monkey’s general arousal at the time of the research session. A reduction in 
some behaviours were found to predict higher levels of average cortisol. For 
example, when cortisol was higher both vigilance and attention to the video 
stimuli was reduced. Also, when cortisol levels were higher, a marginally 
significant reduction in scratching behaviours was identified. The identified 
relationships can be interpreted in two ways. Higher levels of arousal might 
reduce some activities (i.e. attention to stimuli, vigilance). This reduction in 
certain behaviours may be indicative of a freeze response that occurs when 
animals are threatened (e.g. rats, Blanchard, Flannelly, & Blanchard, 1986; 
humans, Roelofs, Hagenaars, & Stins, 2010). On the other hand, animals with 
lower cortisol levels may be using certain behaviours (e.g. vigilance, scratching, 
attention to stimuli) to reduce their stress levels. If this is the case, the 
behavioural predictors of stress are better interpreted as coping mechanisms. 
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Under this interpretation, monkeys with higher levels of cortisol may not be 
coping with the stress as well as monkeys displaying increased activity levels. 
Indeed self-reported stress levels have been found to be reduced in men that 
are observed to perform increased displacement activities (Mohiyeddini, Bauer, 
& Semple, 2013; Mohiyeddini & Semple, 2013). Future research should aim to 
differentiate between these interpretations, but it is important to recognise that 
regardless of which interpretation is correct, this finding has significant 
implications for the study of emotion through behaviour. Based on previous 
research on the behavioural correlates of stress (e.g. Maestripieri, 1993; 
Maestripieri et al., 1992; Polizzi di Sorrentino, Schino, Tiddi, & Aureli, 2012), 
one might conclude that when monkeys are more vigilant and scratch more 
often in relative terms, they are also likely to be “more stressed”. Here, the 
hormone profiles of subjects when itchy and vigilant were lower than when 
those same monkeys were less vigilant and less itchy. The use of behaviour to 
infer emotional state is problematic, and the findings of this study suggests 
caution should be practised when examining emotion through behaviour.  
 
This study of emotional contagion in capuchin monkeys raises more questions. 
It may be that evidence of emotional contagion identified through neighbour 
effects (e.g. Watson & Caldwell, 2010) reflects meaningful behavioural 
synchronisation without a mediating emotional component. It may be that the 
emotional content in a monkey’s behaviour acts only as a first-step towards 
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cuing an adaptive, congruent behavioural response in an observer. This first-
step may have been observed in this study. These questions have yet to receive 
conclusive answers, but the study of emotion in animals is a challenging task. It 
is clear that we are far from completely understanding emotional and 
behavioural transfer, and the interaction between the two. In the next chapter, 
this link between emotion and behaviour is examined further by addressing a 
simple behaviour that has taken on considerable importance in the study of 
primate emotion: Scratching.  
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Chapter 6: Contagious scratching in capuchin monkeys 
 
The relevance of itch to physical and psychological well-being has long been 
recognised, and as early as 1660 was defined as “an unpleasant cutaneous 
sensation which provokes the desire to scratch” (Hafenreffer, 1660, cited in 
Rothman, 1941). Today, this centuries-old definition regularly appears in the 
scientific literature and captures an important dualism. An itch is defined both 
by the sensation in the skin and the behavioural action that quells discomfort. 
When considering itch in primates it is important to recognise both the sensory 
and motor aspects of itch for one important reason. While it is assumed that 
animals get itchy, scratching behaviour in nonhuman animals is often discussed 
without invoking the probable cutaneous origin. The exploration of itch is then 
restricted to those species that can describe the sensation (i.e. humans), and 
while it is true that a sensation of itch does not necessarily lead to a scratch (e.g. 
scratching responses can be inhibited, Rosenbaum & Ayllon, 1981), it is less 
clear if scratching occurs without the sensory trigger. In humans for example, 
scratching rates are correlated with reported itchiness (Holle et al., 2012), and a 
causal understanding of how scratching alleviates itch is beginning to be 
understood (Yosipovitch, Fast, & Bernhard, 2005). Without evidence to the 
contrary then, it is reasonable to assume that an observed scratch, in the 
majority of cases, is elicited by an uncomfortable sensation of itch. 
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 Scratching must therefore be examined in the context of itch, especially as 
scratching and other self-directed grooming behaviours as used as indices of 
emotional arousal in nonhuman primates (Maestripieri et al., 1992; Polizzi di 
Sorrentino et al., 2012). While a correlational relationship between observable 
behaviour and underlying emotion is undeniably useful, a complete 
understanding will only emerge from careful consideration of the entire 
process of itch, incorporating a broad literature on physiological, neurological 
and psychological factors. With this goal in mind, I will examine both the 
sensation of itch and its observable motor response with a special focus on 
scratching as a displacement behaviour. 
 
A chronic or acute sensation of itchiness, formally called pruritus, can be rooted 
in a skin disorder, a disease of another organ, damaged nerve fibres, or 
psychological causes (for a review see Ikoma, Steinhoff, Ständer, Yosipovitch, & 
Schmelz, 2006). Once believed to be a mild form of pain, it has now been 
established that while some mechanisms are shared, the sensation of pain and 
itch have unique neurophysiological pathways (Mishra & Hoon, 2013), and 
indeed some elements of these itch pathways are beginning to be mapped 
(Andrew & Craig, 2001; Davidson & Giesler, 2010; Davidson et al., 2012; Namer 
et al., 2008). The sensation of itch can be rooted in a number of non-cutaneous 
factors (e.g. chronic kidney failure, Mettang, 2010), but most itches originate in 
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the skin. An irritant, whether physical or chemical, triggers a series of 
physiological steps that leads to itch being registering in the brain where an 
appropriate motor response is planned (Patel & Dong, 2010). One commonly 
explored pathway is mediated by histamine.  An irritant or allergen triggers the 
release of histamine from mast cells in the skin facilitating a local immune 
response and simultaneously stimulating peripheral C-fibres (i.e. unmyelinated 
sensory nerve fibres) that relay the sensation of itch to spinal nerve cells 
(Andrew & Craig, 2001; Davidson & Giesler, 2010; Jutel, Watanabe, Akdis, 
Blaser, & Akdis, 2002; Schneider, Rolli-Derkinderen, Arock, & Dy, 2002). While 
histamine-induced itch is the most commonly studied pathway, itch can also be 
evoked through mechanical (Fukuoka, Miyachi, & Ikoma, 2013) and electrical 
means also (Ikoma, Handwerker, Miyachi, & Schmelz, 2005), and some 
components of these pathways differ  from the histamine mediated route 
(Davidson & Giesler, 2010; Davidson et al., 2012; Namer et al., 2008). For 
example, it has been found that different afferent C-fibres relay histamine and 
non-histamine-induced itch (e.g. Davidson et al., 2007; Namer et al., 2008). 
Histamine induced itch does not activate any itch-specific brain region, but a 
number of regions associated with itch have been dubbed the itch-matrix 
(Mochizuki et al., 2007). The only study to examine the neurophysiology of 
psychologically induced itch examined the activation of brain regions when 
watching someone scratch and discovered that the same region activated 
during the sensation of itch were stimulated when watching someone else 
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scratch (Holle et al., 2012). Thus, the simple definition of itch cited in the 
introduction betrays a complex phenomenon that occurs under a surprising 
range of conditions, and while itch is not yet entirely understood, we have 
learned a lot about the proximate mechanisms over the preceding decades.  
 
But why itch in the first place? In certain circumstances an itch can be adaptive. 
A localised sensation on the skin alerting an animal to the presence of an 
irritant (e.g. an ectoparasite or chemical) may lead to its removal through 
scratching or self-grooming. Indeed, the frequency of scratching, as part of a 
broader grooming repertoire, increases in animals exposed to ectoparasites 
(Eckstein & Hart, 2000; Loewenstein, Ludin, & Schuh, 2006), and animals that 
are prevented from self-grooming and scratching have higher parasite loads 
(Mooring, McKenzie, & Hart, 1996; Murray, 1987). In cases of pathogen induced 
itch, or itch caused by a disease of the skin or another organ, the role of 
scratching is less clear, as in these cases skin may be damaged or scarred (e.g. 
Oaklander, Cohen, & Raju, 2002). In fact, it is this potentially harmful form of 
itch that has largely driven research into the proximate mechanisms of the 
phenomenon while adaptive itch is ignored.  
 
Our understanding of multiple itch mechanisms is advancing, but there is little 
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evidence that these inroads have influenced the study of itch in other empirical 
spheres. The study of nonhuman primate behaviour is a field where the 
complementary motor response of itch has taken on complex and significant 
meaning, allowing human observers insight into the unobservable emotional 
states of their subjects. 
 
A scratch may displace a parasite or a piece of detritus embedded in fur, but it 
is a displacement behaviour in another sense. Displacement activities are 
behaviours that appear “out of context with the behaviour which closely 
precedes or follows them, either in the sense that they do not seem functionally 
integrated with the preceding or following behaviour or that they occur in 
situations in which causal factors usually responsible for them appear to be 
absent or at least weak” (Delius, 1967, p 1294). We do not entirely know why 
displacement behaviours occur (Anselme, 2008), but they are performed by a 
range of taxa (Diezinger & Anderson, 1986; Huxley, 1914; Tinbergen & Iersel, 
1947), and are correlated with instances of motivational conflict, behavioural 
thwarting, and stress (Delius, 1967; Maestripieri et al., 1992). Displacement 
activities take on many forms and can relate to feeding (Raber, 1948), parental 
care (Sevenster, 1961), or body care (Maestripieri et al., 1992). In primates, 
displacement behaviours often take on the latter’s form; self-directed 
scratching, grooming, yawning, and body rubbing are all classed as 
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displacement behaviours (Maestripieri et al., 1992). The study of displacement 
behaviours was popular in the middle of the last century (e.g. Cohen & Price, 
1979; Sevenster, 1961; Tinbergen & Iersel, 1947; for a review see Zeigler, 1964), 
but while no satisfactory proximate or ultimate explanation of displacement 
behaviours emerged, interest has dwindled since the early 1970s (for an 
example of the decline in use of the terms related to behavioural displacement 
activities see Figure 6.1). However, recent studies of emotion and welfare in 
nonhuman primates have benefitted greatly from examining this class of 
behaviour. 
 
In the late 80s and early 90s, a number of studies reported the observation that 
self-directed displacement behaviours were often performed by primates when 
stressed (Aureli & van Schaik, 1991; Pavani, Maestripieri, Schino, Turilazzi, & 
Scucchi, 1991; Schino, Maestripieri, Scucchi, & Turillazzi, 1990; Troisi & Schino, 
1987). Based on this evidence, Maestripieri et al. (1992) suggested displacement 
behaviours could be used as reliable indicators of anxiety in primates. Both 
pharmacological and behavioural observations lend support to this assertion. 
Anxiogenic drugs administered to long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) 
increased displacement behaviours while anxiolytic treatments reduced their 
frequency (Schino, Perretta, Taglioni, & Troisi, 1996). Similarly, anxiolytic 
treatments administered to marmosets (Callithrix jacchus and C. penicillata) 
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reduced subsequent scratching bouts when the monkeys were placed in 
stressful scenarios (e.g. presented with novel stuffed animals or a novel 
conspecific, Barros, Boere, Huston, & Tomaz, 2000; Cilia & Piper, 1997). 
 
Figure 6.1. Frequency of terms related to displacement behaviours in the 
Google n-gram database which contains a digital record of over 15 million 
books (~12% of all books ever published; Michel et al., 2011) made freely 
available to search for the frequency of words or strings of words (see Michel 
et al., 2011). Result below show the combined frequency of the following 
terms: displacement activity, displacement activities, displacement 
behaviour, displacement behavior. 
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There is also behavioural evidence linking the frequency of displacement 
behaviours to anxiety. When infant rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) are in 
dangerous situations their mothers scratch more often (Troisi et al., 1991), and 
when M. fascicularis are paired with unfamiliar conspecifics scratching rates are 
also seen to increase (Schino et al., 1990). Similar evidence of a relationship 
between anxiety and displacement behaviours has been reported for capuchin 
monkeys (Cebus apella nigritus, Polizzi di Sorrentino et al., 2012, lemurs (Lemur 
cata, Sclafani, Norscia, Antonacci, & Palagi, 2012), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes, 
Leavens, Aureli, & Hopkins, 2001; 2004), and baboons (Papio anubis, Castles, 
Whiten, & Aureli, 1999), and based on these findings, researchers have used 
scratching and other displacement behaviours when examining stress in 
captive animals. The frequency of total displacement activities performed are 
often used as one proxy measure of anxiety (e.g. Fagot, Gullstrand, Kemp, 
Defilles, & Mekaouche, 2013; Plowman, Jordan, Anderson, Condon, & Fraser, 
2005; Pomerantz & Terkel, 2009), but scratching is sometimes measured and/or 
analysed independent of other behaviours (e.g. Carder & Semple, 2008; 
Rimpley & Buchanan-Smith, 2013). While certain displacement behaviours 
defined in original theoretical papers on the displacement-emotion relationship 
may not be included in ethograms (e.g. yawning, body shaking, self-grooming), 
scratching is almost always incorporated, possibly due to the relative frequency 
and conspicuousness of these behaviours.  
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There is also some evidence that self-directed displacement behaviours are 
good predictors of anxiety in humans. Waxer (1977) found that psychiatric 
patients who scored higher on measures of anxiety performed a significantly 
higher number of non-communicative hand-gestures including self-stroking. 
When comparing nonverbal behaviours of psychiatric patients and control 
participants, Fairbanks and colleagues (1982) found that psychiatric patients 
displayed higher frequencies of grooming behaviours (e.g. hair or face 
touching). Similarly, experiences more likely to induce anxiety increase self-
directed behaviours. For example, when the topic of conversation in a 
psychiatric interview is of particular emotional relevance to the interviewee, 
hand-to-body self-touching rates increase (Shreve et al., 1998, cited in Troisi, 
2002).  
 
A wealth of evidence supports the claim that self-directed behaviours are 
reliably related to anxiety in primates. While the validity of this finding is not in 
question, further steps are necessary to properly understand this link and 
provide satisfactory ultimate and proximate explanations of how the 
underlying emotion states of an animal can predictably lead to a certain 
behavioural response (see discussion section in Chapter Five). As scratching is 
central to much of the literature on this topic it is surprising that further 
attention is not paid to the literature concerning itch in humans, or indeed the 
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broader literature on physiological or autonomic changes correlated with stress 
responses.  
 
Displacement rates are certainly influenced by social factors. Scratching rates 
increase following aggressive encounters (Aureli & van Schaik, 1991; Daniel, 
Santos, & Vicente, 2008), when an individual is closer to a more aggressive 
conspecific (Polizzi di Sorrentino et al., 2012), and during or after other socially 
stressful events (Cilia & Piper, 1997; Sclafani et al., 2012). However, another 
social phenomenon may influence the performance of displacement behaviours 
like scratching. Social facilitation and behavioural contagion are processes 
where a behaviour performed by one individual increases the likelihood that 
the same behaviour (or class of behaviours) is performed by an observer 
(Hoppitt & Laland, 2008a). In human and nonhuman primates, the contagious 
nature of yawning has received the most interest (e.g. Anderson, Myowa-
Yamakoshi, & Matsuzawa, 2004; Campbell & de Waal, 2011; Millen & 
Anderson, 2011; Paukner & Anderson, 2006). However, other displacement 
behaviours are also socially facilitated. A number of studies have found that 
preening (a well-established displacement behaviour in birds) is socially 
facilitated (Hoppitt et al., 2007; Palestis & Burger, 1998), and there is growing 
evidence that scratching is contagious in human and nonhuman primates.  
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Evidence of a contagious scratching effect in humans is convincing. Healthy 
adult observers experience the sensation of an itch and scratch more often after 
seeing someone else scratch (Holle et al., 2012). Indeed, the use of fMRI 
scanning when observing someone else scratch has found that brain regions 
active when scratching are also active when observing someone else scratch 
(Holle et al., 2012). Contagious scratching has also been examined in nonhuman 
primates. An early study of action imitation found that a long-tailed macaque 
could easily learn to scratch when an experimenter scratched (Mitchell & 
Anderson, 1993). In the first study of contagious scratching, Nakayama (2004) 
found that Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) would increase scratching rates 
after observing an alert groupmate scratch. A more recent study examined 
contagious scratching in rhesus macaques (Feneran et al., 2013). When housed 
in pairs, it was found that macaques were more likely to scratch in the two 
minutes following a cagemate’s scratch. Under experimental conditions 
monkeys were also more likely to scratch after watching video footage of 
another monkey scratching. However, it is unclear how wide-spread this 
contagious scratching effect is, as a recent investigation of contagious 
behaviours in nonhuman great apes found no evidence of contagious 
scratching after viewing a conspecific or human experimenter scratch (Amici et 
al., 2013). The occurrence of contagious displacement activities (e.g. yawning, 
preening, and scratching) is problematic for the study of displacement 
behaviours as measures of emotion.  
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Given that scratching is both a reliable predictor of emotional arousal in at least 
some species of primates, and socially transmissible between groupmates, the 
question arises whether corresponding emotional states may also be 
transmitted during contagious scratching events. The emotional contagion 
interpretation of scratch contagion is an interesting one, especially as emotional 
contagion has been identified in a number of species. As already mentioned in 
Chapter 5, Buchanan et al. (2012) found that cortisol levels measured in humans 
observing someone experience a stressful event (e.g. an oral presentation) 
increased in proportion to the levels of cortisol measured in the stressed 
speaker. Similarly, second order emotional contagion has been identified. 
Participants watching the face of another individual, who is watching a video 
of an actor producing joyful or fearful expressions, respond with facial 
expressions and skin conductance levels that correspond to the emotions 
portrayed by the actor (Dezecache et al., 2013). This ability to pick up on the 
emotions of others is present from an early age. Babies mirror the physiological 
stress response of a mother that has undergone a stressful experience (Waters et 
al., 2014), and a similar but contralateral effect was found in mother hens who 
became distressed after observing their chicks display stressful behaviours 
(Edgar et al., 2011). It seems emotions are also transmitted between nonhuman 
primates as agonistic and affiliative vocalisations from neighbouring captive 
primates affect the behaviours of the individuals listening to these calls (i.e. 
agonistic calls increase aggressive behaviours, affiliative calls increase 
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grooming behaviours, etc.; Baker & Aureli, 1996; Watson & Caldwell, 2010; 
Watson, Buchanan-Smith, & Caldwell, 2014). If auditory cues influence 
behaviour in a manner indicative of emotional contagion it is conceivable that a 
visual cue (i.e. a displacement behaviour like scratching) could induce a similar 
effect.  
 
In the current study the investigation of contagious scratching is extended by 
studying this effect in a species of New World primate for the first time. Video 
recordings of conspecifics were presented to subjects. Some video stimuli 
displayed monkeys scratching themselves, while others did not. The primary 
hypothesis was to examine if rates of scratching were higher after observing 
scratching groupmates. Scratching contagion might be a behavioural artefact of 
emotional contagion and so is a behavioural example of emotional contagion. If 
this is the case a broader range of stress-related behaviours might be influenced 
by the scratching stimuli.  
 
Methods 
Animals and research site 
Ten tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus sp.) were tested (eight males, mean age = 
6.33 years; SD = 3.43). All monkeys were housed in one of two mixed-species 
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groups (with squirrel monkeys, Saimiri sciureus) at the Living Links to Human 
Evolution Research Centre at Edinburgh Zoo, Scotland (for a comprehensive 
description of the facility see Chapters Two and Four, also MacDonald & 
Whiten, 2011). The monkeys were never food or water deprived, and all 
rewards offered during research sessions were supplementary to their diet. 
Ethical approval was granted by the University of Stirling Psychology Ethics 
Committee.  
 
Materials 
Eight research cubicles arranged in a connected 2X4 matrix act as a corridor 
between the monkeys’ indoor and outdoor enclosures (each cubicle measures 
49.5 cm X 52.1 cm X 51.4 cm). Partitioning slides inserted between cubicles 
allow monkeys to be separated from their groupmates for research purposes, 
and for this study subjects were granted access to two adjacent cubicles. To 
create stimuli videos clips of monkeys were recorded on a Sony Mini Digital 
Video Camera. The video stimuli were presented using Microsoft PowerPoint, 
and presented to monkeys on a 19”monitor.  
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Stimuli  
As dominant monkeys did not take part in research sessions, these individuals 
were recorded for use in the video stimuli. As the subjects were sampled from 
two different captive groups, stimuli videos were created for each group with 
subjects only ever presented with footage of monkeys from their own group. 
When a scratching event (defined as the “movement of the fingertips 
repeatedly across the same skin area”; adapted from Feneran et al., 2013, p  27) 
was identified, the relevant section of video was edited to a 10-second clip. In 
total, five 10-second clips were created for each group. All clips included the 
alpha male from the relevant group.  For one group, two clips contained 
footage of the alpha male with both the alpha and beta females (each carrying 
an infant). For the other group, two clips contained the alpha male and alpha 
female. Each 10-second clip was subsequently edited into two 5-second clips; 
one clip containing a scratching event, the other containing the same monkey/s 
but with no scratching event. In six of the ten clips the scratching event took 
place in the first five seconds, with the control clip being the subsequent five 
seconds, and in the remaining four the scratching event took place in the final 
five seconds and therefore the control clip was the earlier segment.  No change 
in behaviour was apparent between control clips taken from before or after the 
scratching event. Five scratching clips were combined to create the 30s stimulus 
clips and five neutral clips were used for each of the control stimulus clips. 
Each 5s video clip was followed by an olive-green screen for one second.  
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Procedure 
Each monkey completed two sessions. Once the subject was separated, and 
before the session commenced, the video monitor was placed approximately 50 
cm from one of the two cubicles in use. A black screen accompanied by a beep 
signalled the beginning of the session (see Figure 6.2; a beep also signalled the 
start and finish of a stimulus presentation and delivery of a food reward). After 
15 s, a single reward was offered to the monkey by hand. At 30s, the first video 
clip was presented. A black screen was presented from 60s to 90s, and a single 
reward was offered at 75s. The second clip was presented at 90s, followed by a 
black screen at 120s. A single, final reward was offered at 135s. For their first 
session half of the subjects received the scratching clip first, and each monkey 
received both possible orders of presentation over the two sessions. Due to 
experimenter error one monkey (Ximo) received the same order of presentation 
during both sessions. Ximo was tested a third time with the alternate 
presentation order. Including data from this monkey’s 1st and 2nd sessions (not 
counterbalanced), or 1st and 3rd sessions (counterbalanced) altered the results of 
statistical tests, so data from all three sessions were analysed. However, for the 
sake of transparency in statistical reporting, all results are reported.  
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Figure 6.2: Experimental procedure for each session; food reward (half a peanut) presented at 15, 75, and 135s. Order of stimuli 
was counterbalanced across subjects, and each subject experienced both orders over two sessions. 
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Each monkey was continually recorded on video throughout each session. 
Videos were subsequently coded by two observers for relevant behaviours (see 
Table 2 for definitions). Due to the results of Chapter Five, where an increase in 
cortisol was related to a reduction in vigilance behaviour and a marginally 
significant increase in comfort related door touching (see description in Table 
1), these behaviours were particularly relevant to an observation of emotional 
change. Behaviours exhibited during the 60-sec period following the start of the 
scratching clip were combined across the two sessions for each monkey. 
Behaviours coded following the control clip were similarly managed. Cohen’s 
Kappa was calculated for 50% of the data and interobserver reliability was high 
(Kappascratch = 1; Kappacomfort = .70; Kappavigilance = .86, Kappaactivity = 1). Each 
coder’s dataset was analysed independently and no differences were found in 
terms of statistical significance or direction of the reported effects. Results are 
reported for only one set of data. To account for a small sample size bootstrap 
procedures were incorporated (10,000 iterations) when comparing between 
conditions (scratching vs. control) and confidence intervals for paired t-tests are 
reported (two-tailed unless otherwise specified).  
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Table 6.1: Behaviours coded to examine contagious scratching and emotional 
contagion. 
Behaviour Definition 
Scratch The “movement of the fingertips repeatedly across the same skin 
area” (adapted from [13 p.  27]); more than 3s without scratching 
had to elapse before a scratching bout was coded as a new event (a 
similar rule was applied to measures of vigilance and comfort). 
Activity The number of times the monkey passed from the first cubicle to 
the second. 
Vigilance Vigilance was measured as the number of times the subject looked 
through the holes in the opaque partitioning slides. 
Comfort If the monkeys persistently pushed on the partitioning slide (i.e. 
pushed on the slide more than once without changing their 
behaviour) the researcher would open it to allow the monkey to 
leave the cubicle. While no monkey did this, the number of times 
each monkey performed this behaviour was recorded as a measure 
of how comfortable the monkey felt during the session.  
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Results  
Three monkeys did not scratch during any session (see Figure 6.3). When data 
from all of Ximo’s sessions are analysed, monkeys were found to have 
scratched significantly more often in the scratch condition (mean = 1) than the 
control condition (mean = .5), (n=10, p = .020, mean difference = 0.5, 95% CI = 0.2 
- 0.8). This overall result is the same if the analysis is re-run with only Ximo’s 1st 
and 3rd sessions, however, the difference in average scratching rate between 
conditions drops below significance if Ximo’s 1st and 2nd session are analysed (n 
= 10, p = .126; mean difference= 0.4, 95% CI = 0 - 0.8). The direction and 
significance of all further statistical comparisons do not differ based on Ximo’s 
data so results are only reported for an analysis that includes all sessions.  
 
Analyses of other stress-related behaviours revealed no significant differences 
between conditions for measures of vigilance (meanscratch = 1.8, meancontrol= 1.8; 
p= 1, see Figure 6.4a), activity (meanscratch = 1.6, meancontrol= 2.0; p = .533, Figure 
6.4b), or comfort (meanscratch = 1.5, meancontrol= .9; p = .265, Figure 6.4c).  
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Figure 6.3: Total number of scratches by each monkey in each condition 
(Ximo scratched once following the control video in his second session, and 
scratched once following the scratching video in his third session). 
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Figure 6.4: Mean frequency of: a) vigilance behaviour, b) activity levels, and c) comfort, for each type of stimulus. Error bars 
represent standard errors of mean values. For definitions of behaviours see Table 6.1.  
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Discussion  
When presented with a video of groupmates scratching, capuchin monkeys 
were more likely to scratch than when they were presented with a video 
containing no scratching, a finding consistent with previous reports of 
scratching as a contagious behaviour in monkeys and humans (Feneran et al., 
2013; Holle et al., 2012; Nakayama, 2004). However, given the marginal nature 
of this result, caution is urged. Under the most conservative analyses, five out 
of six monkeys that showed differential rates of scratching towards stimuli 
scratched more often to scratching stimuli. While on the surface this result is 
suggestive of scratching contagion, the low statistical power associated with 
small sample size increases the likelihood of a type II error, and increases the 
influence of single data points in determining p-values. Thus, the evidence of 
scratching contagion reported here is relatively preliminary and further 
research is necessary to reliably conclude an effect of scratching contagion in 
New World primates. Given evidence that scratching is transmitted in a 
contagious manner in humans and Old World monkeys, it may be unsurprising 
that capuchin monkeys also demonstrate a propensity to contagiously scratch. 
However, previous research on nonhuman great apes failed to find a scratching 
contagion effect (Amici et al., 2013). Further study is necessary to develop a 
complete understanding of the phylogenetic distribution of contagious 
scratching. If this effect is absent from great apes we must ask why this is the 
case, given evidence from other related species.  
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While preliminary evidence of contagious scratching was found in this sample, 
no other stress-related behaviours were found to vary across conditions, 
suggesting that contagious scratching occurs independently of emotional 
contagion. While social contagion through vocalisations suggests that captive 
primates are influenced directly by emotionally salient stimuli (Baker & Aureli, 
1996; Watson & Caldwell, 2010), here we see that one form of behavioural 
contagion, triggered by a visual cue, may occur without accompanying 
emotional contagion.  
 
If the primary function of scratching is to remove ectoparasites, then contagious 
scratching may act to increase sensitivity to external cutaneous stimulation; i.e. 
increasing the chance of detecting an ectoparasite. On two occasions during or 
immediately after observing the scratching video monkeys scratched 
themselves to remove detritus from their skin. Therefore, the observation of a 
groupmate scratching may act to increase sensitivity to cutaneous sensations, 
and while this increased sensitivity may often lead to unwarranted scratching, 
benefits gained by improving parasite detection and removal may be adaptive 
in the long run. Scratching has become surprisingly significant in the study of 
primate emotion, but mere recognition of a relationship between scratching and 
anxiety is unsatisfactory (the same applies to other self-directed displacement 
behaviours). This observation has allowed researchers examine otherwise 
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unobservable psychological phenomena in nonhuman primates. However, if 
we do not fully understand the mechanism underlying this relationship we risk 
confounding influences from factors we do not appreciate. Interest in 
displacement activities may have waned in recent decades, but with the use of 
such behaviours continuing to thrive in the field of primatology, the proximate 
and ultimate cause of displacement behaviours may be best explored in the 
context of the study of primate emotion. While it is still unclear whether 
contagious scratching is a general phenomenon found throughout the primate 
order, the behavioural contagion of displacement behaviours in some 
nonhuman primates naturally leads us to enquire whether emotional contagion 
may also be taking place. In nonhuman primates scratching contagion could be 
mediated in at least two ways: 1) the underlying emotional state of one 
individual could be passed to another leading to observable behavioural 
contagion, or 2) a socially transmitted sensation of itch serves to synchronise 
and enhance parasite detection. The central question is therefore whether 
emotional state is transmitted during cases of contagious scratching, and in this 
study no evidence of emotional transfer was identified.  
 
Scratching contagion without emotional contagion creates both theoretical and 
practical complications when scratching is used to assess the emotional state or 
welfare of a nonhuman primate, and future research is necessary to tease apart 
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the function of these behaviourally contagious cases. For example, in the 
instance of contagious scratching it could be predicted that the contagious 
scratch elicited by watching a conspecific scratch could serve to promote 
ectoparasite removal, through increased sensitivity to an itch sensation (in a 
similar way that negative affect can influence pain sensitisation, (Janssen, 2002). 
Indeed, in humans, seeing a groupmate scratch is not the only visual stimulus 
that triggers a scratch. Watching static images of ants, fleas, and skin conditions 
(Lloyd, Hall, Hall, & McGlone, 2013), or listening to a lecture on the topic of itch 
also triggers scratching behaviour (Niemeier, Kupfer, & Gieler, 2000). While the 
little research on contagious scratching has not made it clear whether 
contagious scratching leads to an overall increase in scratching frequency, or 
merely creates a tendency for this behaviour to occur synchronously within a 
group, either possibility could have ramifications for the use of scratching as a 
behavioural indicator of stress. While we emphasise the importance of 
examining how contagious scratching may impact the study of emotion in 
primates, the same caution is urged when examining yawning as a 
displacement behaviour (e.g. Castles et al., 1999), or indeed any displacement 
behaviours that also show contagious qualities (e.g. preening in bird species).  
 
The interpretation of behaviour often focuses on cognitive or emotional 
explanations grounded in the brain. While this approach has contributed much 
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to our understanding of behaviour, it seems that the contribution of the rest of 
the body is often side-lined (Barrett, 2011a). The displacement behaviours of 
most interest to primate researchers are related to body maintenance (e.g. 
grooming, scratching, body shaking), yet little consideration is granted to 
internal physiological changes that may underlie such behaviours. While the 
function of displacement activities are not entirely understood, one possibility 
first proposed independently by Morris (1956) and Andrews (1956) is that 
autonomic stress responses affect physiological changes that subsequently 
trigger observable behavioural routines. It is known that displacement 
behaviours exhibited by animals are dependent on external stimuli available to 
the animal at the time of stress or frustration; for example, displacement 
feeding behaviours are dependent on the availability of food or water in 
domestic fowl (Raber, 1948). While feeding behaviours are cued by the external 
stimuli of food availability, some behaviours “seem to be connected primarily 
from cues arising within the animal's own body” (Bindra, 1959, p 267). Known 
autonomic responses include increased blood pressure, vasoconstriction of 
blood vessels in the skin, and sweat production (Kreibig, 2010). With a range of 
physiological changes taking place when frustrated or anxious it is surprising 
that little attention has been paid to this mediating variable in the emotion-
displacement relationship. While the seminal theoretical paper on the 
relationship between displacement behaviours and emotion touches upon the 
possible link between autonomic processes and self-directed behaviours 
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(Maestripieri et al., 1992, p 974), to our knowledge no research has since directly 
tested this link. The first theoreticians to propose autonomic processes as a 
mediating link used the example of preening behaviours in birds (Andrew, 
1956; Morris, 1956), but other displacement behaviours could also be triggered 
by physiological  changes (e.g. yawning is thought to function to cool the brain: 
Gallup, 2011; Massen, Dusch, Eldakar, & Gallup, 2014). 
  
While past theorising suggested displacement activities may take place due to 
motivational factors (Tinbergen & Iersel, 1947), or to the re-direction of 
thwarted energy (Bindra, 1959), the explanation of displacement activities (at 
least in some cases) as standardised responses to homeostatic changes is a rich 
avenue of research, and an interpretation that makes specific, testable 
predictions. In the medical literature it is established that stress responses can 
lead to various expression in cutaneous disorders (Arck, Slominski, 
Theoharides, Peters, & Paus, 2006; Yamamoto et al., 2009), but this link needs to 
be examined further in the field of behavioural research. Displacement 
behaviours may well be a window into the emotions of animals but it is 
important to understand the pathway between an emotion and an observable 
behaviour. While evidence of a link between anxiety and self-directed 
behaviours is robust, when this finding is extended to test hypotheses related to 
primate emotion (e.g. whether a certain intervention improves animal welfare) 
234 
 
a standardised protocol is advised. Current practices allow great flexibility in 
the choice of which behaviour to measure and indeed include in subsequent 
analyses. To reduce bias it is suggested that when displacement behaviours are 
being observed in primates, all recognised behaviours should be measured (see 
Maestripieri et al., 1992) and one planned analysis of all pooled behaviours 
should be performed. If due to some limitation a smaller sample of behaviours 
is recorded, there is ample support for the sole inclusion of scratching as a 
proxy measure of emotion (although see discussion section, Chapter Five, for 
interpretative problems if scratching is a coping mechanism). The 
standardisation of these methods can only increase our confidence in findings 
related to the study of primate emotion. 
 
Scratching is a simple behaviour that has taken on a complex significance in the 
study of nonhuman primate behaviour. In the context of a broader range of 
displacement behaviours scratching is a useful tool, however, it is argued here 
that further work is necessary to understand the relationship between 
displacement scratching and emotion. While contagious effects may act to 
confound the study of the displacement-emotion relationship, a focussed 
examination of the interaction between emotion, displacement activities, and 
behavioural contagion will serve to inform future decisions on the use of 
displacement behaviours as measures of emotion. Displacement behaviours are 
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most useful when exploring a primate’s emotional reaction to social 
interactions, but if social interactions themselves increase displacement 
behaviours through social facilitation or contagion, we need to be cautious in 
our interpretations. A complete understanding of emotion and displacement 
behaviours will require consilience between disciplines, consolidating research 
from neurophysiological and behavioural fields. A concerted research effort has 
presented the exciting possibility that the underlying emotional states of 
primates are easily observable. It is hoped that a similarly rigorous approach in 
the future will enable a richer understanding of those same emotions. 
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
 
“There are lifetimes of work awaiting those who wish to provide a deeper understanding 
of non-imitative processes in social learning which may well be of greater importance in 
the lives of non-human animals than is imitation” - (Galef, 2013, p 128) 
 
The work outlined in the preceding chapters explored the mechanisms of social 
learning that are considered to be “less complex”. Galef (2013) has claimed that 
focussing on imitative processes has limited our understanding of a broader 
range of mechanisms that are at play when animals are influenced by or learn 
from conspecifics. While debate over how to categorise the various behavioural 
forms of social learning has led to an increasing consensus (Hoppitt & Laland, 
2013; Zentall, 2012), it is incorrect to assume that this equates to understanding 
these mechanisms. It is of course important to have a common lexicon through 
which a science of social learning can be communicated, but an understanding 
of the mechanism and development of many processes of social learning 
remains lacking (Byrne, 2002a; Galef, 2013). Aiming to understand rather than 
describe social learning processes is even more important when current 
definitions are not mutually exclusive (see Call & Carpenter, 2002; Hoppitt & 
Laland, 2013), and when it is difficult to differentiate between the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying behavioural observations (e.g. the difficulty in 
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distinguishing between types of emulation learning; Hopper, 2010). The work 
presented in this thesis aimed to address some of these problems. Chapters 
Two and Three examined automatic imitation, and presented results testing 
hypotheses related to the development of action matching ability. Chapters 
Four, Five, and Six examined some of the lesser-studied mechanisms of social 
influence: Group-size effects, neighbour effects, emotional contagion, and 
behavioural contagion. Far from providing superficial insights, the findings 
from these studies encourage an approach to social learning that 
simultaneously embraces the diversity of social learning processes and respects 
the influence of simpler mechanisms rather than focussing solely on complex 
imitative learning.   
 
Automatic imitation in capuchin monkeys 
The mirror neuron system is thought to facilitate action imitation by mapping 
observed actions onto a motor representation of that action (Gazzola & Keysers, 
2009) and has been studied extensively at the single-neuron level in monkeys 
(see Kilner & Lemon, 2013). However, little behavioural evidence exists of 
imitative ability in monkeys. Automatic imitation, the tendency for the 
observation of an action to cue the performance of that same action, is thought 
be a behavioural indicator of mirror neuron activity (Catmur et al., 2007; Heyes, 
2011; Longo, Kosobud, & Bertenthal, 2008). Therefore, evidence of such an 
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effect in monkeys is crucial to support the idea that the mirror neuron system 
facilitates action imitation. Through the use of a stimulus-response 
compatibility paradigm, the first evidence of automatic imitation in monkeys 
was identified. Capuchin monkeys performed significantly better on imitative 
trials than on counter-imitative trials (see Chapter Two, Figure 2.3). While some 
studies have shown that monkeys are more likely to use actions they have 
previously observed (e.g. van de Waal & Whiten, 2012; Voelkl & Huber, 2000), 
the experiment reported in Chapter Two presents the first evidence of this 
effect using a stimulus-response paradigm. Here, a contribution is made to a 
growing body of work that suggests monkeys can match the actions of 
conspecifics (van de Waal & Whiten, 2012; Voelkl & Huber, 2000), but this 
ability needs to be confirmed in macaque monkeys, as single-celled sampling 
methods have confirmed the presence of mirror neurons in this family alone 
(e.g. Macaca fuscata, Fujii, Hihara, & Iriki, 2007; Macaca nemestrina, Gallese, 
Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996). The function of mirror neurons is not yet 
clear (Cook et al., 2014; Giacomo Rizzolatti & Fogassi, 2014). We are learning 
more and more about what mirror neurons do (e.g. Gallese et al., 1996; Umiltà 
et al., 2008; Keysers et al., 2003), however, studies of the properties of single 
neurons tell us little about what mirror neurons are for. If these neurons are 
involved in imitation, as some have suggested (Giacomo Rizzolatti & Fogassi, 
2001), research needs to first demonstrate that animals that have these neurons 
are able to imitate. This study of capuchin monkeys had taken a small step 
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towards demonstrating a potential behavioural function of mirror neurons in 
primate behaviour. 
 
To further enhance our understanding of the cognitive mechanism that 
facilitates action imitation, two approaches proposed to explain the 
correspondence problem were explored. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the cognition of action matching, predictions of an 
adaptationist approach (the active intermodal mapping, AIM, hypothesis; 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1997) were pitted against those of a developmental 
perspective (the associative sequence learning, ASL, hypothesis; Heyes & Ray, 
2000). To test these conflicting approaches to the ontogeny of imitative ability, 
the reward contingency used in our first study of automatic imitation was 
reversed; i.e. monkeys that were previously rewarded for imitating were 
rewarded for performing alternative actions, while monkeys initially rewarded 
for performing compatible actions were rewarded for imitating. A nativist 
approach to imitation might predict that in this second block of learning, given 
the innate mechanism facilitating action matching, an automatic imitation effect 
should persist. On the other hand, an empiricist perspective on imitation would 
predict that automatic imitation may be attenuated following counter-imitation 
learning. The findings reported in Chapter Two are more in line with a learning 
approach to imitation, with no difference in performance between conditions in 
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the second bout of learning (see Chapter Two, Figure 2.3). However, it may be 
that an innate bias towards action imitation also exists in primates, but that this 
effect does not persist following incompatible experience. Furthermore, the 
second experiment reported in Chapter Two, where two monkeys were tested 
on both compatible and incompatible rules over multiple blocks of learning, 
found little evidence that imitative actions were easier overall. Although one 
monkey did perform better on imitative trials across all learning blocks this 
could be attributed to an order effect. This study supports the idea that 
associative processes may contribute to action imitation, and potentially the 
primate mirror neuron system.  
 
There is a growing literature suggesting some mechanisms of social learning 
develop through associative processes (Catmur et al., 2009; Dawson & Chittka, 
2014; Leadbeater & Chittka, 2007). Not only do these findings provide insight 
into the presence of various forms of social learning in animals, but they inform 
us of the ontogenetic and mechanistic processes underlying this learning. This 
richer understanding of these processes is a testament to a research effort 
driven by bottom-up questioning. Discovering that simple processes facilitate 
connections between sensory-motor representations does not detract from the 
role these representations may play in other more complex forms of social 
learning. However, it does advocate caution when predicting potential 
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functions of mirror neurons, for if mirror neurons are the result of congruently 
occurring stimuli and actions, they may not serve any particular evolutionary 
function (Cook et al., 2014).  
 
Automatic imitation in children 
Imitative ability in children is vastly different from that of New World 
primates. Children are skilled imitators from an early age, even imitating 
causally irrelevant details of action sequences at the age of three (McGuigan et 
al., 2007). An ASL view of imitation predicts that synchronous or correlated 
sensory-motor experience should facilitate action imitation (Heyes & Ray, 
2000). A common approach to testing the influence of experience on imitation 
in adults is to introduce a training stage and measure the effects of this training 
on imitation effects (Catmur et al., 2008; Gillmeister et al., 2008). The study 
reported in Chapter Three used a similar method but instead took advantage of 
a child’s own previous experience. Children between the ages of three and 
seven were asked to react to an action performed by an experimenter, and were 
required to respond to action stimuli with both compatible and incompatible 
actions at different stages in the procedure. Two action sets were used for this 
purpose; one set incorporated actions that children often perform in synchrony 
(clapping and waving), and experience of synchronous performance was 
expected to be more limited for the other set (finger pointing and hand closing). 
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As predicted by the ASL approach, automatic imitation effects (i.e. the 
difference in time taken to react to compatible and incompatible stimuli), were 
greater for actions expected to be regularly performed in synchrony. Another 
prediction of the ASL model was also supported. Automatic imitation effects 
were greater for the only action that engaged two sensory modalities (clapping) 
in-line with the prediction that associations between multimodal sensory 
representations might easier facilitate an action response. The developmental 
trajectory of automatic imitation was also examined, but no systematic change 
was observed, as the ability to both imitate actions and inhibit incorrect 
imitative responses during incompatible trials was found to improve with age, 
generating a consistent automatic imitation effect (see Chapter Three, Figure 7). 
Together, these findings support the ASL model, and to my knowledge, this is 
the first study to examine predictions of an associative account of imitation in a 
population of this age.  
 
Knowing that these automatic imitation effects are present in children is 
important. Most of the research that supports the ASL view of imitation and 
mirror neurons has been found in adult humans (e.g. Catmur et al., 2008; 
Gillmeister et al., 2008; Cook, Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2010), but if 
sensorimotor experience does facilitate imitation (Cook et al., 2014; Heyes & 
Ray, 2000) it is crucial that predictions of the ASL model are also supported in 
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children who we know have the capacity to imitate (Dean, Vale, Laland, Flynn, 
& Kendal, 2014; Whiten et al., 2009). If experience dependent automatic 
imitation effects were not identified in this population, one might conclude that 
existing support for the ASL view in adults may be evidence of a sensorimotor 
phenomenon unrelated to social learning. Furthermore, when considered with 
the results reported in Chapter Two of this thesis, these findings highlight the 
importance of considering the role of simple processes in the behaviour of 
humans as well as animals. 
 
Three levels of social influence in capuchin monkeys 
In Chapter Four, a study of three levels of social influence was reported. This 
study integrates work primarily conducted in the field of ethology into a 
system of social learning mechanisms developed in the field of comparative 
psychology. Three factors of social influence were explored. Behavioural 
synchrony is a measure of how coordinated a group’s activity is, calculated as 
the probability of randomly picking two monkeys from a group and observing 
them perform the same behaviour (King & Cowlishaw, 2009). Surprisingly, this 
measure has only been used in one other study of group synchrony (King & 
Cowlishaw, 2009), and the study reported in Chapter Four is the first to 
examine this effect in New World monkeys and in a captive population. Using 
observational scan methods (Martin & Bateson, 2007) over a two month period 
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it was discovered that capuchin monkeys were more synchronous than 
expected by chance, and that group size and location interacted to influence 
this synchrony. Synchronous activity mediated by group-size might be due to 
the size of a group having an influencing effect on the performance of certain 
behaviours. The data gathered for the purpose of studying behavioural 
synchrony was reanalysed to examine the effects of group-size on capuchin 
behaviour, and larger groups predicted increased levels of vigilance, resting, 
foraging, and playing. The increase in the proportion of individuals being 
vigilant complements previous findings that suggest that in some social species 
vigilance may primarily serve to monitor conspecifics (Hirsch, 2002; Robinette 
& Ha, 2001; Treves, 1999). While the mechanism underlying group-size effects 
related to foraging, rest, and play is yet to be understood, it may be that a larger 
group-size may signal relative safety from predators or other groups and 
facilitate more relaxed behaviours. Indeed, when smaller groups of monkeys or 
individual monkeys were found in an enclosure it was much more likely that 
they were locomoting which is a possible indicator of unease. Certain 
behaviours were also found to be correlated between separate captive groups of 
captive monkeys after the influence of environmental factors were partialled 
out (e.g. weather, time of day, temperature). Behaviours related to being 
relaxed (e.g. foraging and play) were related between groups, as were 
behaviours related to being agitated (e.g. vigilance and locomotion). While it is 
difficult to control for every extraneous variable that might influence the 
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behaviour of both groups at the same point in time (e.g. number of visitors at 
the enclosures, unobservable activity of keeping staff) this result is in line with 
previous studies of the neighbour effect (Videan et al., 2005; Watson & 
Caldwell, 2010) where classes of behaviours related to certain motivational 
states (e.g. alarm calls, grooming) are associated with corresponding 
vocalisation from neighbouring groups.  
 
Together, these studies of capuchin behaviour present some novel observations 
(e.g. this is the first evidence of behavioural synchrony and neighbour effects in 
capuchins). The methods used here are not new, but the use of simultaneous 
scan sampling facilitates many analytical possibilities. Examining these data 
from multiple perspectives also allows insightful observations between various 
levels of explanation. For example, knowing that foraging is influenced by 
group-size (see Table 5, Chapter Four) might explain why behavioural 
synchrony increases with group-size when outside where foraging is more 
likely to take place (see Table 2 and Table 4, Chapter Four). Furthermore, the 
effects examined in this chapter are underexplored in the comparative 
literature, possibly due to the assumption that the mechanisms thought to 
facilitate these group-level effects are likely indicative of social contagion or 
presence effects. However, these effects seem to be pervasive in the behaviour 
of capuchin monkeys. Social influence acts within groups, and between groups, 
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it is affected by sheer presence of other individuals and can generate 
synchronous behaviour at the group level. Observations of these effects are 
important, but future research efforts must explain the adaptive function of 
these effects, as well as the rules that mediate these processes.  
 
Social contagion in capuchin monkeys 
In Chapter Five, I aimed to investigate social contagion of behaviour and 
emotion. Some studies have shown that behaviour may be contagiously 
transmitted between neighbouring groups of conspecifics (e.g. Chapter Four, 
Videan et al., 2005; Watson & Caldwell, 2010), and studies of humans and other 
animals have found that in some cases, emotion is contagiously transmitted 
between individuals (measured through facial gestures Hess & Blairy, 2001; or 
physiological stress responses Buchanan, et al., 2012; Edgar, Lowe, Paul, & 
Nicol, 2011). However, little is known about the contexts under which social 
contagion occurs in nonhuman primates and what cognitive and emotional 
mechanisms might operate in these cases. It is especially important to 
understand the relationship between emotional contagion and behavioural 
contagion and the procedure employed in Chapter Five facilitated this effort. 
Video recordings were made of monkeys from the Living Links research site, 
and the content of these stimuli were chosen to represent social scenarios 
indicative of certain emotional states. These stimuli were presented to 
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conspecifics during research sessions and the behavioural and physiological 
responses to these stimuli were measured. A physiological or behavioural 
response congruent with the emotional state represented in the stimuli would 
be indicative of social contagion, however, no evidence of either effect was 
observed. Monkeys did not display an increase in stress related behaviour or 
salivary cortisol while watching videos of anxious individuals, and stress 
hormones were not suppressed by watching groupmates groom. Monkeys did 
however pay greater attention to videos displaying anxious conspecifics 
suggesting some social content was perceived by monkeys. Indeed, increased 
attention to stimuli of anxious groupmates might be an adaptive response to a 
social signal of an environmental stressor. The failure to identify either 
emotional or behavioural contagion was discussed in detail in Chapter Five, 
with specific reference to procedural limitations. While it was not possible to 
tease apart emotional and behaviour contagion in this particular study, the 
sampling of salivary cortisol and behaviour at the same time point did allow an 
examination of the link between physiological measures of emotional state and 
behavioural measures. 
 
The collection of salivary cortisol at the beginning and end of research sessions 
for the purpose of examining emotional reactions to stimuli also allowed for the 
study of behavioural correlates of physiological stress. Unsurprisingly, a higher 
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rate of signalling intent to leave the research cubicle predicted an increase in 
cortisol, suggesting greater care should be taken in responding to this signal in 
future research with this study population. However, on average, monkeys’ 
stress hormone levels did not increase over the course of research sessions. 
Lower levels of vigilance behaviours and lower levels of attention to stimuli 
were related to higher levels of average cortisol and lower scratching rates were 
marginally indicative of higher average cortisol. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
it is difficult to identify if this behavioural variation is a result of hormonal 
variation, or if the observed behaviours act to moderate hormone responses 
(Mohiyeddini et al., 2013). Research that has manipulated physiological stress 
through the administration of anxiolytic drugs has found that an increase in 
stress hormone levels leads to higher rates of self-directed behaviour (e.g. 
Schino, Perretta, Taglioni, Monaco, & Troisi, 1996). However, these findings 
cannot determine the function of scratching. The examination of emotional 
contagion is crucial to understand how empathic responses function in 
primates and other animals, but the current state of understanding is limited. 
Emotional contagion may not require the same level of cognitive complexity as 
“true empathy” (Preston & de Waal, 2002), however, it may be more important 
to understand this effect. While many animals may not possess the ability to 
take on the perspective of another individual (a prerequisite of empathy; de 
Waal, 2008), emotional contagion may be relatively widespread taxonomically. 
Emotional contagion may be adaptive in certain natural environments when 
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the sharing of emotional state may allow coordinated responses to potential 
threats, but the sharing of negative emotional states may be detrimental to 
animal welfare in certain captive environments. Understanding when and how 
these social phenomena operate may help inform practices that minimise the 
unnecessary sharing of emotional-state in these contexts.  
 
Contagious scratching in capuchin monkeys 
The final empirical chapter in this thesis explored the complex and compelling 
topic of scratching. As well as being linked to a variety of medical conditions 
(Ikoma et al., 2006), scratching functions to remove detritus or ectoparasites 
from the skin (Eckstein & Hart, 2000; Murray, 1987), is linked to anxiety in 
primates (Maestripieri et al., 1992; Polizzi di Sorrentino et al., 2012), and has 
also been found to be behaviourally contagious in humans and some 
nonhuman primates (Feneran et al., 2013; Holle et al., 2012). Given that rates of 
scratching are linked to emotional arousal, particularly anxiety (see Chapter 
Five; Maestripieri et al., 1992; Polizzi di Sorrentino et al., 2012; Schino, Perretta, 
Taglioni, & Troisi, 1996), observations of contagious scratching could be a 
behavioural indicator of emotional contagion. Ten capuchins were separated 
from their social groups and presented with two one-minute video sequences: 
videos of their groupmates scratching, and videos of their groupmates in 
neutral scenarios. Capuchin monkeys scratched more often when watching 
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videos of their conspecifics scratching on average, however, this effect was not 
significant under a more conservative analysis (see Chapter Six for more detail). 
No systematic differences were found in the frequency of other stress-related 
behaviours exhibited during the video presentations. While the results do not 
allow conclusive identification of scratching contagion in capuchin monkeys, 
the identified trend is suggestive of a contagious scratching effect. Nonetheless, 
a serious discussion of scratching’s role as a behavioural indicator of emotion is 
crucial. If contagious scratching is a robust effect (as is certainly the case in 
humans Holle et al., 2012; Papoiu, Wang, Coghill, Chan, & Yosipovitch, 2011), 
this phenomenon might confound studies of emotion in primates in cases when 
scratching is used as a behavioural proxy. Contagious scratching, far from 
synchronising emotional state, may act to synchronise sensitivity to 
ectoparasites, which might have particular value given ectoparasites are also 
socially transmitted. During this study of contagions scratching, two scratching 
events occurring after the presentation of the scratching stimuli were observed 
to remove pieces of detritus from the monkey’s skin. Further research will be 
necessary to truly understand the role of a simple scratch, and it is fitting that in 
this thesis on the importance of considering simpler processes, a seemingly 
simple behaviour is found to encourage some very serious thought.  
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Final comments 
Throughout this thesis I have explored social learning from the bottom up with 
the aim of better understanding the processes involved in learning from others. 
Examining automatic imitation in monkeys and children has demonstrated a 
potential role for associative processes in action matching. Exploring the social 
and environmental factors that determine behaviour at the group-level, 
highlights the importance of conceptualising social influence as a dynamic 
process, better understood by considering multiple levels of explanation. We 
know surprisingly little about the relationship between emotion and behaviour 
in nonhuman animals, particularly how this relationship functions in the 
context of social influence. Although the current thesis has not provided 
extensive insights into the process of emotional contagion, some progress has 
been made in understanding the relationship between behaviour and 
physiology, an important part of developing a science of animal emotion. 
Finally, the consideration of contagious scratching in primates demonstrates 
how the study of seemingly simple effects can be worthwhile both intellectually 
and practically. While understanding complexity might be the primary 
objective of scientific enterprise, this goal can only be achieved by 
understanding the simple integral components. In probing human-like 
intelligence in other animals we may be inclined to forget the influence of 
simple processes on our own behaviour. When considering the evolution of 
advanced human cognition it is undeniably important to explore these 
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cognitive homologues in other animals, and this research enterprise has 
undoubtedly produced thought-provoking insights into the surprising 
complexity of animal minds. But at the same time, we must not forget our 
shared simplicity. As comparative scientists we must approach the study of 
cognition, behaviour, and emotion from both perspectives, from the bottom up 
as well as from the top down. In doing so, we will better understand not only 
the nature of complex processes in human behaviour, but the fundamental role 
of simple mechanisms.  
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